This will form the basis for my one of the first lf my future YouTube counter-apologetics videos, so sneek peek broski.


Basically, ontological arguments come down to trying to turn the proposition "God exists" into an analytic judgement, a statement whose truth is guaranteed essentially because it comes down to affirming the Law of Identity (A is A), with another example being "All batchelors are unmarried", i.e "All unmarried men are unmarried men".

Existence is not a Property

Most, if not all, ontological arguments import the assumption that existence is the property of an object, that is to say that things can "have" existence. To get a little philosophically deep, it assumes that their is some ontological substance to which properties inhere. This is self-evidently absurd. Firstly, this assumption actually assumes the non-existent things exist! They simply lack the particular property of existence is all... Lol. Secondly, a simple thought experiment. Imagine an apple and some of its properties: We'll say it's several inches wide, is green (yum) is a little sour and is fairly round. Now, subtract each of those properties in turn and what happens? The apple is gone, you've reduced it to nothing. To exist is to manifest in some way via properties, it is not a thing to be had in and of itself. If you doubt this, try to imagine an apple that doesn't have existence in your imagining.


Modal Realism and its Myriad Problems

Now, theists think they can escape this through the lulz of Plantinga's modal ontological argument; think again. Plantinga's argument makes use of the "possible worlds" concept. Basically, a possible world is a way the world might possibly have been, other possible states of affairs. For example, there is a possible world in which we lost World War II, or where I didn't make this post (:p). The actual world is the way the world happens to, actually, be; this world.

The problem here is this: What does it mean to say things exist in other possible worlds? There are 2 positions here: Modal realism - which says that other possible worlds REALLY exist and that the term "actual world" is just indexical and valid relative to each world - and Modal fictionalism - which says that possible worlds are just fictions useful in the analysis of modal propositions, not as realms with real ontic grounding.

So, aside from the INFINITELY inflated ontology one tends to get with modal realism, it actually makes a complete lulzfest of Christianity. If God really exists in other possible worlds, then so do other gods. In fact, all gods ever imagined in this world and those not yet imagined - so long as they aren't contradictory - all exist under modal realism. They are all possible, therefore any monotheist holding to modal realism and the validity of Plantinga's modal ontological argument must become polytheists. And accepting a strong modal realism is NECESSARY for a modal ontological proof of God's existence to work, because otherwise you're stuck in modal fictionalism, which simply holds that to be in some possible world is merely to say something about an abstract principle, just a set of compossible propositions. But under modal realism, it just leaves ontological arguments (and other theistic argument-styles such as theodicies) in complete disarray. Even God's supposed trans-possible worlds persistence doesn't allow theists to negate this without being inescapbly inconsistent on their metaphysics of modality.

So, either Christians, Muslims and the like must accept modal realism, become polytheists and fundamentally change their view of God and his relation to things like evil and other gods, or they must accept modal fictionalism and admit they have a decrepit, useless argument regarding God's existence. I don't think they like those options.


There are more ("Why Axiom S5 Can't be used like This", "The Problem of Non-God Objects", etc.), but how many of you actually read this far (you bastards)? xD

I'm pretty much a bone head in terms of philosophical terms. I understood the general argument (because I am familiar with most of the terms you used) but I'm not sure I completely understood what inhere or ontic actually mean.
Enlighten me,

I'd like a quick explanation of 'modal realism' vs 'modal fictionalism' please.

Thanks

I thought I did:

(March 12, 2014 at 9:05 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: The problem here is this: What does it mean to say things exist in other possible worlds? There are 2 positions here: Modal realism - which says that other possible worlds REALLY exist and that the term "actual world" is just indexical and valid relative to each world - and Modal fictionalism - which says that possible worlds are just fictions useful in the analysis of modal propositions, not as realms with real ontic grounding.

Basically, modal realism says that possible worlds are really existing things, while modal fictionalism just says that possible worlds are just a useful fiction, not existing things in the same way our world is.

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(March 12, 2014 at 9:40 pm)Jovanian Teapot Wrote: I'm pretty much a bone head in terms of philosophical terms. I understood the general argument (because I am familiar with most of the terms you used) but I'm not sure I completely understood what inhere or ontic actually mean.
Enlighten me,

To inhere is basically to be a necessary aspect of. "Ontic" just refers to the factual, real existence of something.

(March 12, 2014 at 10:05 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: I thought I did:

so you did.....Sorry, but I'm still confused.
How do the two differ? What is the difference between a real possible world and a fictional possible world when each has equivalent effect on the material universe we experience? Like, none other than as topics of discussion.
Is the modal realist acting on faith? Is faith in the reality of a possible universe parallel to that of the theist who claims a real deity despite no material evidence?

No no no. These are 2 different positions about possible worlds. The modal realist thinks other possible worlds exist, while the modal fictionalist doesn't think they exist.

As I have understood it, modal fictionalism compares to modal realism in the way that on the former, one need not assume that the worlds are plausibly real in order to benefit from thinking about them (essentially hypothetical situations) while the latter suggests that all worlds can be real because the claim "this world is real" is indexical.

OP, did I butcher this? I hope not.
I'm trying to become more technically savvy with the philosophical jargon.

(March 13, 2014 at 1:09 am)MindForgedManacle Wrote: No no no. These are 2 different positions about possible worlds. The modal realist thinks other possible worlds exist, while the modal fictionalist doesn't think they exist.

Sorry to be dim, but I don't think I'm getting it.
Neither position seems to have reason to believe. If they exist, where are the real possible worlds? At least the fictional possibles only claim to be hypothetical. That makes sense.

Jovian Teapot Wrote:because the claim "this world is real" is indexical.

I looked up indexical and I hope I'm using the right definition: that an indexical term's meaning will differ with usage and context.
Using that definition, in what context is the "this world is real" claim made other than in the world we find ourselves?

Well I read it - all

Not that I understood it but I did my best.

I have a number of questions with regard to the Ontological Argument which may or may not have already been covered by what you've written. These are:

What defines what is actually possible in any given universe and what is not? How do we know God is possible in any universe? Is it, for example, possible in another universe that Scooby Doo is a living creature with all of the characteristics of the cartoon character? Same for Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck et al.

If we assume that there is a possible universe where God exists can we also assume that there is a possible universe where he doesn't? If there is a universe that exists without God then that universe was not created by him. If its possible for there to be a universe without God the creator then no universe needs a creator and therefore God doesn't exist in any possible universe.

Even if there is a universe where God exists how does he get from there to here? Surely, if he can visit any universe (omnipresence) then there can't be a single universe without him, but, some of those possible universes weren't created by him so he isn't really God there.

Actually there are about a dozen more of these but I think they are all on similar lines. I am probably making all sorts of false arguments (argument from ????). Perhaps you could point a few of them out?

Ontological arguments fail because argument must be valid and sound. Sound means the premises from REALITY must be true. If there are no premises argument is empty.