Is atheism a scientific perspective?

[Angrboda]

I appreciate the fact that you are actually evaluating the argument as opposed to name calling. 

Yes, I am aware that there are problems with the definition of specified. It is incredibly difficult to quantify information in the way that ID opponents demand. What I think Dembski is right about is that the quantity of information of a given sequence is directly proportional to the functionality that arises from said sequence. This is coupled with the fact that gene sequence exhibit an extremely high degree of functionality. While we don't know how to quantify it, this does not mean that we can't draw conclusions based on the qualitative features. I think he was premature in his attempt to draw probabilistic conclusions about these sequences when we don't know how much information we are talking about. However, I think the central argument that DNA contains information and that that information leads to specific functions is true.

Your objections are a part of a larger argument that I have developed. I would instead of dealing with them ex parte, include the whole.

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Contra Design -- Against the argument for design from biology

For many, the question of design is as simple as Justice Stewart's observations on obscenity, to wit, "I'll know it when I see it." They start from the presumption that certain things look designed and go directly to "was designed" (Do not pass Go, do not collect $200). But it takes a little more than that to make an actual argument. There has to be something connecting the premise that "It looks designed," to the conclusion, "Therefore it is designed."

Schematically, it goes something like this:

P1) It looks designed;
P2) . . . .
P3)
P4)
C1) Therefore it was designed.

Now a first gander at P2, etc. is to suggest the following:

P1) It looks designed;
P2) If it looks designed, then it was designed;
C1) Therefore it was designed.

Unfortunately we know that P2 is not true. There are things which look designed that weren't designed and vice versa.

So we try a different tack:

P1) It looks designed;
P2) Things that look like an intelligence designed them, are designed;
P3) It looks like a thing an intelligence designed;
C1) Therefore it was designed.

But the key question here is what does it mean to say that it looks like a thing an intelligence designed? This is entirely too vague to be of use when debating whether something like the DNA in a cell was designed, wherein the target is clearly removed from any direct traces of a designer. And we still have the problem of false positives; we can't infer design if our argument is only 'sometimes' right.

So we attempt to narrow in on what it means for something to look like it was designed by an intelligence. Perhaps:

P1) It looks designed;
P2) Things that look like an intelligence designed them, are designed;
P3) It looks like a thing an intelligence designed if it is similar to the way humans design things;
P4) It is similar to that;
C1) Therefore it was designed.

This brings a little focus to the question, but again it's rather vague. We have two problems. One, it's not specified in what ways the item must be similar to count for a design inference; obviously the color of an object is irrelevant. The other problem is that for compositions as complex as a cell, we don't have similar things from human designers -- we're not that intelligent, so it leaves open the question of what we mean by similar if there are no similarly complex works of human design. As Hume remarks on the relevant rule of analogy, "wherever you depart in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty" (Hume, Dialogues, Part II). What aspects of human design are we comparing to a cell?

This is where complex specified information, ala Dembski comes in:

P1) It looks designed;
P2) It looks designed because it has CSI;
P3) Things that have CSI, are designed;
C1) Therefore it was designed.

Unfortunately, as you seem to be admitting, and I'm claiming, Dembski jumped the gun in terms of a rigorous, usable definition for CSI. So what happens if we adopt your language that "The specified part is indicating that the information is used to accomplish a desired function." So being specified alludes to the item having specific functional significance. Here's the problem with that. Consider a bird's wing. Its function is to allow the bird to fly. It's not information, supposedly that's in the DNA for the creation of the wing, but ceterus paribus, the cases are parallel. Whether you agree with evolution or not, it is the case that we have mapped out how it is possible for this function to have arisen naturally. Function isn't specific only to designed systems. As I said before, function is in the eye of the beholder. If there is a possibility that the function of the wing arose naturally, then obviously function cannot be used to split the baby. For if it is even possible that specified information can arise naturally, it's no longer a flag for design. Now you may think the situation is different with abiogenesis, but it's not. All that has to be shown is that a possible sequence from a simpler organism without that function could lead to that more developed organism, all the way back to the first cell and beyond. (Not directly relevant, but think of the bacterial flagellum and the Type III secretory system.) We don't have to show probability or even have a complete map of the process to conclude from the evidence of the past 100 years that abiogenesis is a significant possibility.

So, in a nutshell, talk of "used to accomplish a desired function" doesn't work as function can be attributed to intelligent and natural causes. It's not a divider.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Jor, I think you're putting too much thought into it. You're right the typical argument is basically, "if it looks designed, then it was designed". I'm not so sure that is exactly what Dembski and Behe are saying. I think they are saying that if something looks designed and there is no satisfactory competing explanation, then design should be the default position. It isn't an entirely unreasonable position but it also isn't a whole lot for a creationist to hang his hat on.

In passing I would like to point out that language referring to function implies intentionality. Properly speaking, a materialist referring to functions in naturally occurring systems would be speaking figuratively.

[Mister Agenda]

Look up scientific materialism:

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all phenomena, including mental phenomena and consciousness, are results of material interactions. Materialism is closely related to physicalism, the view that all that exists is ultimately physical. 

That's how I was using the word, and it was used correctly. That takes care of about 99/100 ths of your reply.

You may have found that definition by typing 'scientific materialism' into Google, but it's the definition of metaphysical or philosophical materialism. The closest you can come to 'scientific materialism' is methodological naturalism, the position that science can only discover natural explanations for phenomena, not supernatural explanations...it's not the position that the supernatural doesn't exist, but that if it does, it's not something science can study.

[Angrboda]

In passing I would like to point out that language referring to function implies intentionality. Properly speaking, a materialist referring to functions in naturally occurring systems would be speaking figuratively.

Yes, that would be the begging the question which I referred to earlier. If all that function accomplishes is to smuggle in intentionality then it's no better than saying, "It's designed because I say so." There's also the argument that all use of function, intention or not, is figurative and so your point ends up being moot, at least in this context.

[Asmodee]

Look up scientific materialism:

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all phenomena, including mental phenomena and consciousness, are results of material interactions. Materialism is closely related to physicalism, the view that all that exists is ultimately physical. 

That's how I was using the word, and it was used correctly. That takes care of about 99/100 ths of your reply.

Also, I don't disagree with the fact that some Christians are trying to deceive, but the idea that Christians can't be good scientists is ridiculous. Also, I disagree with your assertion that I'm inherently ignorant of basic scientific understanding.

Okay, materialism is a philosophical concept, not a scientific one.  While philosophy is an integral part of science it is very much not synonymous with science.  So "teaching science" is still not "teaching a materialistic worldview", as you claimed.  So that 99% of my response you thought you took care of is only reinforced, once again, by you clouding and confusing the issue, an inherently dishonest thing to do.
I NEVER said that Christians in general were trying to deceive.  I gave only a few specific examples in which I thought the deception to be purposeful, such as Jehovah's Witness printed materials and the intelligent design movement.  I also NEVER said that Christians can't be good scientists.  Let me quote what I had to say on that.

...Christianity IS synonymous with "bad science".  Christians can do good science.  Christians can and do contribute to science.  But whenever CHRISTIANITY (NOT "Christians")  tries to "contribute" to science it is ALWAYS junk science intended to push their beliefs.

That I had to write a response explaining the difference between philosophy and science only reinforces my belief that you are inherently ignorant of basic scientific understanding.  You made the claim that schools taught "only a materialistic world view".  Then you, yourself, point out that materialism is a philosophy.  So essentially what you are saying is that because there is a philosophical idea called materialism all of science bows to this philosophy and all school children are taught that this philosophical concept is truth.  You MIGHT be taught materialism in a philosophy class.  You WON'T be taught materialism in a science class.  That I have to point that out because you apparently hold the belief that all of science adheres to one specific philosophical view and that philosophy is specifically taught in schools is actually pretty strong evidence to support everything that I'm saying, that you are inherently ignorant of basic scientific understanding and that you are being deceptive.  FOR THE RECORD, I do not believe you to be intentionally deceptive.  You are not trying to give me false information, ie, "lie to me".  But that doesn't change the fact that your argument is riddled with false information.

[bennyboy]

I was watching YouTube videos earlier today, and I came across a channel called SciencNET. I watched a few of their videos, then I realized that the whole channel is basically just clips of different atheists talking about religion. Many of the featured atheists such as a Christopher Hitchens, Matt Dillahunty, and Bill Maher are not scientists even in a broad sense of the word. Other channels such as ScienceToday and Science and Atheism have similar content. 

It seems to me that these channels are trying to establish an association between science and atheism so that people will assume that atheism is the position of reason. I know there are plenty of religious channels that do the same thing, but I think we can agree that the atheistic worldview has done a better job of convincing the general population that it is the official position of science. 

This is frustrating to me because the scientific method is so effective because it (in theory) prevents personal bias from influencing the data. When we begin to call philosophical positions scientific, we are potentially confusing the people who have a narrow schema of science. The distinction is almost never made between the empirical sciences that are based on observation, error propagation, and statistical description of results vs. the philosophical speculation that people come to based on the results of the empirical studies. 

What do you guys think? Is atheism a scientific position? If so, why? If not, are you frustrated at the fact that there are people who seem to be trying to subliminally promulgate a philosophical position under the mask of science?

It's clearly not a scientific position, since almost all the early modern scientists were Christian, as are many modern ones.  That being said, certainly science is about that which can be empirically observed, and that is material.  You cannot observe God, or even the human mind.

"Everything we can measure empirically is material, therefore everything is material" is non sequitur and pretty poor logic, in my opinion. And the idea that Bill Maher is a scientist is just silly. That being said, any scientist who tries to use science in any form to support the God idea is probably not doing science correctly.

[Tonus]

I can appeal to peer-reviewed articles if you want.

That wasn't the point I was making. Are you saying that these peer-reviewed articles are questioning the validity of the theory of evolution? Have they found something that undermines some or all of the theory and is forcing the scientific community to scrap those ideas and seek answers elsewhere?

[LastPoet]

Well, my Biology knowledge goes so far as all leigh men and women should have. Yet, it is superior to the shown by the OP. It doesn't matter and the original goalpost was:

Is atheism a scientific perspective?

Nope. It is a skeptical response to a non scientific proposition. Granted there are alot of bullshit Arguments for the thing you call god. I do not need any science to dismiss that.

[Tonus]

I'm not so sure that is exactly what Dembski and Behe are saying. I think they are saying that if something looks designed and there is no satisfactory competing explanation, then design should be the default position.

I don't think that the position they take on the matter has any effect on the science since scientists are going to search for answers because they can't take the default position for granted.  Much of the early work of scientists --work that was groundbreaking and brilliant and the foundation for much of what we know today-- was done by religious people who likely had no doubt that God existed and that nature was His work.  That they did not find Him anywhere was of no consequence, they were learning things and making progress and building a world full of technological marvels.  If the scientists of today believe in God or not, it should not stop them from finding answers to questions and continuing to increase our knowledge.  And if God CAN be found, there's no reason they wouldn't find him regardless of which position they took on the matter.

Dembski and Behe are determined to insert God into the base of knowledge that has been gained, but they don't seem to be looking for God as much as they seem to be hoping that they can find some dead end where we would have to confirm that a conscious and determined intellect was required.  In the same way that 'science can never find a supernatural god', we are likely never to reach a definitive end-point in our knowledge where we could say for certain that we had run out of options.  Their approach seems, er... designed to keep certain ideas alive and certain questions unanswered by science.  It strikes me as a very unsatisfying way to 'know' something.

[Mudhammam]

Aquinas takes up the notion of Divine Simplicity in Question 3 of the Summa which I doubt many creationists or IDers have read or pondered. My understanding is that complexity arises from the great variety of deficiencies in contingent beings. It is analogous to a thousand different shards produced from a shattered crystal ball.

Yeah, but I would say that "Divine Simplicity" is another issue altogether, wherein is basically contained the idea that the deity is not a composite body or being consisting of matter and form.  In that sense, the "self" is also simple.  However, when Aquinas then tries to pass the divine property of infinite knowledge of all past, present, and future events (and nonevents) as a simple, all-encompassing act of intuition, I find the whole idea of "Divine Simplicity" to be suspect, if not incoherent.  But either way, the argument for Divine Simplicity cannot aid creationists, for the naturalist is equally at liberty to define the ultimate substance as simple too -- but without having to then make it compatible with a capacity of "infinite knowledge" or other such properties and relations that are often predicated upon a God, especially a trinitarian one -- and has the advantage of being far more consistent in their description of said simple substance or being.