Fundamental Arrogance in Christianity

[Mister Agenda]

My lacking belief in your God and finding your claims about your God incredible is in no way contradictory, they mesh perfectly. Why would you expect me to believe something I find incredible in advance of being convinced that I am wrong about that? That said, your claims are not wrong just because I find them incredible.

The proposition "God exists"? is either true or not true - credulous or incredulous. Those are your only options as per the law of the excluded middle. I feel that if you are incredulous then you should be able to adequately give an account for it. The idea that the default stance is non-belief is based on a non-sequitur. Even if there is no compelling reason to accept either P or not-P, it does not mean one should accept not-P. That is an unjustified move from 'is' to 'ought'.

That's some bullshit right there. I flew around the house this morning via mind-waves. If you think the burden of proof is on you to account for how I didn't do that, you're a fool.

[Harry Nevis]

Lately I've been finding it interesting that many of the same people who say that personal beliefs regarding religion are meaningless to them, somehow think that personal beliefs regarding gender identity are sacrosanct, to the point of wanting government to force others to accept such beliefs, or at least the practical ramifications of them.

Maybe because religion is what you choose to believe, and gender identity and sexuality is what you are?

[Neo-Scholastic]

The proposition "God exists"? is either true or not true - credulous or incredulous. Those are your only options as per the law of the excluded middle. I feel that if you are incredulous then you should be able to adequately give an account for it. The idea that the default stance is non-belief is based on a non-sequitur. Even if there is no compelling reason to accept either P or not-P, it does not mean one should accept not-P. That is an unjustified move from 'is' to 'ought'.

That's some bullshit right there. I flew around the house this morning via mind-waves. If you think the burden of proof is on you to account for how I didn't do that, you're a fool.

For your example, I am incredulous and happy to admit that I am so. In this case you have presented evidence in the form of personal testimony. For starters I believe the evidence is insufficient because 1) I do not think your account is trustworthy and 2) your testimony has no collaboration. The point is that incredulity entails various beliefs.

With respect the proposition "God exists" atheists do not simply lack belief. In fact their atheism entails many beliefs- beliefs about evidence presented by theists. They are basically saying they believe the evidence in favor of the proposition is not sufficient. All I am asking is for atheists to do is own up to their own incredulity which in practical terms means being willing to defend their objections.

Now the second question is whether the default assumption should be in favor of any given proposition or not. That depends on whether the belief is properly basic. In the case of the proposition "God exists" I believe that qualifies as properly basic. Nearly everyone has some apprehension of the sublime and ineffable. These are naturally attributed to the divine whereas to attribute those experiences to something else requires justification.

---

Lately I've been finding it interesting that many of the same people who say that personal beliefs regarding religion are meaningless to them, somehow think that personal beliefs regarding gender identity are sacrosanct, to the point of wanting government to force others to accept such beliefs, or at least the practical ramifications of them.

Maybe because religion is what you choose to believe, and gender identity and sexuality is what you are?

Sexuality is what you objectively are biologically. Gender identity is what you subjectively believe you are.

[The Industrial Atheist]

You say the sublime and the ineffable are naturally attributable to the divine but haven't given a reason for that. That's the same thing as saying "Arizona Green tea tastes really good, only the fairies that live under the tree in my yard could have made it."

[Angrboda]

Now the second question is whether the default assumption should be in favor of any given proposition or not. That depends on whether the belief is properly basic. In the case of the proposition "God exists" I believe that qualifies as properly basic. Nearly everyone has some apprehension of the sublime and ineffable. These are naturally attributed to the divine whereas to attribute those experiences to something else requires justification.

Attributing them to the divine requires the same justification. You don't get something for free just because there exists a tradition of attributing it to the divine. There also exists a tradition of not attributing it to the divine.

In inferential statistics, the term "null hypothesis" is a general statement or default position that there is no relationship between two measured phenomena, or no association among groups.[1] Rejecting or disproving the null hypothesis—and thus concluding that there are grounds for believing that there is a relationship between two phenomena (e.g. that a potential treatment has a measurable effect)—is a central task in the modern practice of science, and gives a precise criterion for rejecting a hypothesis.

The null hypothesis is generally assumed to be true until evidence indicates otherwise.

[Mister Agenda]

With respect the proposition "God exists" atheists do not simply lack belief. In fact their atheism entails many beliefs-  beliefs about evidence presented by theists. They are basically saying they believe the evidence in favor of the proposition is not sufficient. All I am asking is for atheists to do is own up to their own incredulity which in practical terms means being willing to defend their objections.

I believe the evidence for the proposition that God exists is insufficient, therefore I lack belief in God. Being too obtuse to get this is a conscious choice, NS.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Attributing them [epiphanies] to the divine requires the same justification.  You don't get something for free just because there exists a tradition of attributing it to the divine.  There also exists a tradition of not attributing it to the divine.

In inferential statistics, the term "null hypothesis" is a general statement or default position that there is no relationship between two measured phenomena, or no association among groups...The null hypothesis is generally assumed to be true until evidence indicates otherwise.

That's all fine and good in the abstract but it doesn't work as a universal principle. Deferring to the null hypothesis is an epistemological preference within a specific discipline. You have extrapolated a methodological preference to cover the evaluation of all binary propositions and at the same time tacitly introduced an ethical obligation.

The general question is whether for any given proposition of P versus not-P, in which there is insufficient evidence to justify either P or not-P, someone should always assume not-P to be the case. In isolation, if there is no compelling reason to accept either P or not-P, it does not mean one should accept not-P. That is an unjustified move from 'is' to 'ought'. The position that not-P "should" always be preferred is flawed unless it is conditioned by the content of the proposition. Justification for having a default stance includes things like self-evidence, prior experience, instinct, and expediency.

For example, suppose the proposition is "There is a bear in this dark cave." If the default is not-P then a skeptic would be justified, though highly ill-advised, to enter the dark cave without checking for danger. After all, he lacks any burden of proof, doncha' know?

Clearly not all the default positions are correct. An uniformed person, having no awareness of arguments to the contrary, would be justified believing that living systems are designed. There is no burden of proof to defend the proposition that "Living things are designed" but there is a burden of proof to not accept reasonable defeaters once someone becomes aware of and understands them. In a post-Darwin world, the defeaters are compelling.

So I say that in the absence of sufficient defeaters, belief in God is justified as the default position for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are peak experiences, transcendent bliss, and encounters with the ineffable all of which have been commonly and consistently reported throughout human history. Likewise, apprehension of ourselves in relation to being-as-such is both powerful and primal. The issue is not whether those experiences are to be trusted, but rather why we should not trust them.

You apparently believe that things like optical illusions, hard-wired instincts, metal illnesses, and logical paradoxes are reasonable defeaters for respecting the authenticity of subjective experiences and the efficacy of reason. I respect your opinion enough to give an account for my incredulity. Nevertheless I find those objections neither sufficient nor significant enough to overcome the default position that "God exists."

[Angrboda]

So I say that in the absence of sufficient defeaters, belief in God is justified as the default position for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are peak experiences, transcendent bliss, and encounters with the ineffable all of which have been commonly and consistently reported throughout human history. Likewise, apprehension of ourselves in relation to being-as-such is both powerful and primal. The issue is not whether those experiences are to be trusted, but rather why we should not trust them.

They may be evidence of something, but just what they are evidence of is the tricky part. That's why the default is no relation. You've simply linked them to God because there is a convention of doing so. And that is improper.

[Neo-Scholastic]

So I say that in the absence of sufficient defeaters, belief in God is justified as the default position for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are peak experiences, transcendent bliss, and encounters with the ineffable all of which have been commonly and consistently reported throughout human history. Likewise, apprehension of ourselves in relation to being-as-such is both powerful and primal. The issue is not whether those experiences are to be trusted, but rather why we should not trust them.

They may be evidence of something, but just what they are evidence of is the tricky part.  That's why the default is no relation.  You've simply linked them to God because there is a convention of doing so.  And that is improper.

I can think of at least 3 peer-reviewed studies that suggest belief in God is instinctive rather than conventional:

Boston Study; Oxford Study; Skin Conductivity

Of course all of these studies are silent as to whether the instinct refers to something real or only imagined, but that does not affect my argument. It is natural for humans to believe in the divine by default.

[Angrboda]

They may be evidence of something, but just what they are evidence of is the tricky part.  That's why the default is no relation.  You've simply linked them to God because there is a convention of doing so.  And that is improper.

I can think of at least 3 peer-reviewed studies that suggest belief in God is instinctive rather than conventional:

Boston Study; Oxford Study; Skin Conductivity

Of course all of these studies are silent as to whether the instinct refers to something real or only imagined, but that does not affect my argument. It is natural for humans to believe in the divine by default.

I disagree. The question is what does it mean for it to be natural to believe in gods and the afterlife, and your argument very specifically makes the inference that one interpretation of that meaning should be the default position. That's a flawed inference. Whether that instinct refers to something real or imagined is indeed relevant to your argument. It may be natural to believe in the afterlife for reasons having nothing to do with an actual afterlife. The null hypothesis isn't about what is natural or conventional, but about the relationships between causes and effects. There is no reason why a natural concept should necessarily correspond to a veridical one. Until you demonstrate that there is a relationship, the null hypothesis is that there is none.