What do you think of this argument for God?

[SteveII]

Maydole defines a perfection as a property which is better to have than not to have

Which is a value judgment, and therefore not objective, and not something that can have a "maximal" value.

and something is supreme if there is nothing which is even possibily greater or as great as.

There is still no coherent basis for positing a "greatest possible" value. See above.

No, you confuse assessing comparative value with a "value judgement". They are not the same thing. The first can certainly be objective (and is, in this case) and the other is always subjective.

Regarding the property of seeing, is it better to see or not to see? The property of hearing, is it better to hear or not hear? Regarding the property of knowledge, is it better to know something or not know something? Regarding the property of physical ability, is it better to have the power to actualize or no power to actualize? Then there are degrees: Is it better to see near and far or only near? Hear near and far or only near? 


It's funny, that your arguments against the Ontological Argument (which you said you could dismiss in a few sentences) are nothing like better atheist thinkers like Oppy (who has debated Maydole on this very subject). Makes you wonder who understands the argument and who doesn't.

 

[Nonpareil]

Which is a value judgment, and therefore not objective, and not something that can have a "maximal" value.

There is still no coherent basis for positing a "greatest possible" value. See above.

No, you confuse assessing comparative value with a "value judgement". They are not the same thing.

No, Steve, I don't. I didn't bring comparing two subjective values into it at all, because it doesn't matter. I am simply pointing out that the subjective judgment of "greatness" cannot have a maximum value, as there is no objective means of measurement that can be said to apply, let alone one that has a maximum possible value. You can compare how "great" you think two movies are and say that you consider one greater, but there is no "maximal greatness" that a movie could achieve, because "greatness" is not quantifiable.

The concept is incoherent and meaningless.

Regarding the property of seeing, is it better to see or not to see? The property of hearing, is it better to hear or not hear? Regarding the property of knowledge, is it better to know something or not know something? Regarding the property of physical ability, is it better to have the power to actualize or no power to actualize? Then there are degrees: Is it better to see near and far or only near? Hear near and far or only near?

That depends on what you consider "better".

Which is subjective, as above.

It's funny, that your arguments against the Ontological Argument (which you said you could dismiss in a few sentences) are nothing like better atheist thinkers like Oppy (who has debated Maydole on this very subject).

I am no one but myself. I am not required to take the same tack as anyone else. There are many different philosophers who have taken their own angles of attack against the argument. The fact that it can be disproved in so many different ways isn't exactly a point in its favor.

You can try to insinuate my lack of understanding all you like, but unless you can actually demonstrate it, no one is going to care very much.

[SteveII]

No, you confuse assessing comparative value with a "value judgement". They are not the same thing.

No, Steve, I don't. I didn't bring comparing two subjective values into it at all, because it doesn't matter. I am simply pointing out that the subjective judgment of "greatness" cannot have a maximum value, as there is no objective means of measurement that can be said to apply, let alone one that has a maximum possible value. You can compare how "great" you think two movies are and say that you consider one greater, but there is no "maximal greatness" that a movie could achieve, because "greatness" is not quantifiable.

The concept is incoherent and meaningless.

Regarding the property of seeing, is it better to see or not to see? The property of hearing, is it better to hear or not hear? Regarding the property of knowledge, is it better to know something or not know something? Regarding the property of physical ability, is it better to have the power to actualize or no power to actualize? Then there are degrees: Is it better to see near and far or only near? Hear near and far or only near?

That depends on what you consider "better".

Which is subjective, as above.

If you want to consider the above examples subjective, then so be it. I can't argue with someone who just says the same things over and over and over again the same way even when presented with an argument that philosophers of all types consider to be sound. I'm done.

[Nonpareil]

If you want to consider the above examples subjective, then so be it. I can't argue with someone who just says the same things over and over and over again the same way

Because you haven't actually answered them, Steve.

If you want me to provide new material, you need to actually start dealing with what's presented.

even when presented with an argument that philosophers of all types consider to be sound.

Steve, you yourself pointed out that Maydole's justification is contentious at best, and has been attacked from a variety of different angles by philosophers other than myself. I think that you have an exceptionally warped view of how the ontological argument is actually seen by philosophers.

Outside of people who explicitly study philosophy of religion (and those who regularly debate those people), no one cares about it, regardless of whether they believe in God or not. It is important only from a historical standpoint, because it influenced a lot of other Christian philosophers. It is not, and has never been, considered particularly coherent or convincing. It has been ripped apart from every angle, including the ones that I employ, since the day it was put forth, even by other theist philosophers.

"Maximal greatness" is an incoherent concept. It cannot be established that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist. If you wish to move beyond that, into the details of specific formulations, it cannot be established that the human mind can actually conceive of maximal greatness, and so on and so forth.

I'm sorry you don't like it, but it's not going to change.

Even if God exists, the ontological argument does not succeed in demonstrating it.

[Harry Nevis]

If you want to consider the above examples subjective, then so be it. I can't argue with someone who just says the same things over and over and over again the same way even when presented with an argument that philosophers of all types consider to be sound. I'm done.

Why the hell not? You expect us to.

[SuperSentient]

True, God is the postulated to be the greatest possible being in theistic thinking, but this argument fails to demonstrate neccessity and what this being is. {A}

As for the ontological argument you mentioned, the greatest conceivable being is no better since that relies on epistemic possibility rather than metaphysical possibility. {B}  Also, how do you define 'greater'? It suffers from the same problem as the "possibility" argument, that would be, How do you define what is 'conceivable'? I cannot conceive a being that is outside space-time, immaterial, and omnipresent at the same time, therefore the monotheist concept of God doesn't count in this argument, since it is inconceivable. Being conceivable is dependent upon experience and knowledge. {C}

I fail to see any more success in that argument.

The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3) and as such, you need to clearly understand how the word is used. The opposite of necessary is contingent. Since being contingent on something is a defect it would not be considered maximally great to be contingent. A maximally great being would be a necessary being because it could not be contingent on another (then that would be a greater being).  It is important to understand the S5 modal logic that if something is even possibly necessary, it is actually necessary. If God necessarily exists in one possible work, then he exists necessarily in all possible worlds.

B. The key is understanding the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

C. When Anselm first wrote this argument, he was careful to distinguish between what we could think of as the greatest possible being and God is the greatest being possible, that is to say, it is impossible for there to be any being greater than God. While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not. If a description of God allowed for a greater being, then God would not be God because that being would be God and the definition becomes a logical impossibility. Even a limited grasp of God's properties does not entail that our conception of God is false because it would be impossible to have full knowledge of God.

The main problems with this argument is with 1 and 3. First, "great" is a value statement which is contingent upon the subjective viewer. The question is, what constitutes objective greatness? 1 is simply an assertion with no basis in reality than what anyone would personally think to be true.

3 is false since greatness is logically separable from logical necessity. Value statements have no basis in possibility. Just as you can't derive an ought from an is, you can't derive an is from an ought. 

Elvis Presley is a great being to many people, I can say that he is a necessary being. It would be no less accurate to say that than to say God is a necessary being. The assertion that God is necessary has no justification. Maximal greatness is subjective if you accept that greatness is subjective, since the measurement of greatness would be subjective, it would apply to whatever you would measure to be the "greatest".

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I heard an argument like this:

1. God is the greatest possible being.

True

2. God is a necessary being, which means that God exists in every possible world (If God exists). 

Define all the possible worlds. Why would God have to exist in all of them?

3. If God exists in one possible world, God must logically exist in every possible world. 

Why, this is stating something an omnipotent being must do in reference to the physical?

4. Since God is the greatest possible being, it follows that every aspect of God (being possible) exists in some possible world.

In #3 you said every possible world, now your down to some possible world, why?

5. Therefore, God exists (in all possible worlds, including ours).

You have once again switched from some to all, why? Why is it necessary for God an omnipotent being to exist in any world but this one, why are any other worlds even necessary?

I actually just structured the premises this way myself but is the same idea as an argument I heard before. 

What do you think of it?

As you can see by my questions I have serious doubt.

GC

2- Basically, every possible event, scenario, and existing thing. 
3- If God is necessary, then God exists in all possible worlds.
4- Every possible world includes every one individual possible world.
5- No other worlds are necessary, this argument claims that this being exists in all possible worlds.

This argument is a failure, but you don't seem to quite understand it.

[Godscreated]

---

The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3) and as such, you need to clearly understand how the word is used. The opposite of necessary is contingent. Since being contingent on something is a defect it would not be considered maximally great to be contingent. A maximally great being would be a necessary being because it could not be contingent on another (then that would be a greater being).  It is important to understand the S5 modal logic that if something is even possibly necessary, it is actually necessary. If God necessarily exists in one possible work, then he exists necessarily in all possible worlds.

B. The key is understanding the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

C. When Anselm first wrote this argument, he was careful to distinguish between what we could think of as the greatest possible being and God is the greatest being possible, that is to say, it is impossible for there to be any being greater than God. While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not. If a description of God allowed for a greater being, then God would not be God because that being would be God and the definition becomes a logical impossibility. Even a limited grasp of God's properties does not entail that our conception of God is false because it would be impossible to have full knowledge of God.

The main problems with this argument is with 1 and 3. First, "great" is a value statement which is contingent upon the subjective viewer. The question is, what constitutes objective greatness? 1 is simply an assertion with no basis in reality than what anyone would personally think to be true.

3 is false since greatness is logically separable from logical necessity. Value statements have no basis in possibility. Just as you can't derive an ought from an is, you can't derive an is from an ought. 

Elvis Presley is a great being to many people, I can say that he is a necessary being. It would be no less accurate to say that than to say God is a necessary being. The assertion that God is necessary has no justification. Maximal greatness is subjective if you accept that greatness is subjective, since the measurement of greatness would be subjective, it would apply to whatever you would measure to be the "greatest".

---

---

True


Define all the possible worlds. Why would God have to exist in all of them?


Why, this is stating something an omnipotent being must do in reference to the physical?


In #3 you said every possible world, now your down to some possible world, why?


You have once again switched from some to all, why? Why is it necessary for God an omnipotent being to exist in any world but this one, why are any other worlds even necessary?


As you can see by my questions I have serious doubt.

GC

2- Basically, every possible event, scenario, and existing thing. 
3- If God is necessary, then God exists in all possible worlds.
4- Every possible world includes every one individual possible world.
5- No other worlds are necessary, this argument claims that this being exists in all possible worlds.

This argument is a failure, but you don't seem to quite understand it.

I understand the argument, what l do not understand, why didn't you answer my questions if you are going to respond to my post.

GC

[SteveII]

---

The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3) and as such, you need to clearly understand how the word is used. The opposite of necessary is contingent. Since being contingent on something is a defect it would not be considered maximally great to be contingent. A maximally great being would be a necessary being because it could not be contingent on another (then that would be a greater being).  It is important to understand the S5 modal logic that if something is even possibly necessary, it is actually necessary. If God necessarily exists in one possible work, then he exists necessarily in all possible worlds.

B. The key is understanding the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

C. When Anselm first wrote this argument, he was careful to distinguish between what we could think of as the greatest possible being and God is the greatest being possible, that is to say, it is impossible for there to be any being greater than God. While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not. If a description of God allowed for a greater being, then God would not be God because that being would be God and the definition becomes a logical impossibility. Even a limited grasp of God's properties does not entail that our conception of God is false because it would be impossible to have full knowledge of God.

---

The main problems with this argument is with 1 and 3. First, "great" is a value statement which is contingent upon the subjective viewer. The question is, what constitutes objective greatness? 1 is simply an assertion with no basis in reality than what anyone would personally think to be true.

3 is false since greatness is logically separable from logical necessity. Value statements have no basis in possibility. Just as you can't derive an ought from an is, you can't derive an is from an ought. 

Elvis Presley is a great being to many people, I can say that he is a necessary being. It would be no less accurate to say that than to say God is a necessary being. The assertion that God is necessary has no justification. Maximal greatness is subjective if you accept that greatness is subjective, since the measurement of greatness would be subjective, it would apply to whatever you would measure to be the "greatest".

That is a common objection, but there are answers to it. I posted a response a few pages back that I will repost below. Great making properties of god are not subjective like a preference to Elvis' music. These are not properties subject to tastes, aesthetics, etc. It is also important to note that it doesn't matter to the argument if we can even comprehend them. 

---

Consider these three premises from Robert Maydole's Moral Perfection Argument:

M1: A property is a perfection only if its negation is not a perfection.
M2: Perfection entails only perfection
M3: The property of being supreme is a perfection of that property.

Maydole defines a perfection as a property which is better to have than not to have and something is supreme if there is nothing which is even possibily greater or as great as.

Suppose that it is not possible (necessarily so or as you say 'nonsensical) that there exists a being with supreme (maximally great) properties . In that case, for any property x, it is necessarily the case that property x is not an example of being supreme. Well, if that is the case then, necessarily, for any property x, if x is supreme, then x is not supreme.

Now suppose being supreme is a perfection (M3) and that only perfection entails perfection (M2).

If these premises are true, and being supreme is not possible, it follows that not being supreme is a perfection. But if we accept M1, it is also the case then not being supreme is not a perfection. Now we have a contradicion: not being supreme is a perfection and not being supreme is not a perfection. Which one do you want to reject and why? If you can't, you must concede that a supreme property is possible and by extension, that it is possible there is a supreme (maximally great) being.

Now, all I have done (with help) has been to summarize the argument. The actual formal logic is 12 steps long. It then fits into the Ontological Argument, which is another 16 steps long. Since you probably don't have my book, you can get a copy of the argument in the link below.

So, it seems your claim of ability to refute the Ontological Argument "in a couple of sentences" is entirely based on your lack of understanding of the argument. Perhaps if you didn't lecture us like a condescending prick, this wouldn't be so funny.  

Adapted from Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Wiley-Blackwell 2012 pg. 580 ff. with additional commentary from https://calumsblog.com/apologetics/argum...-argument/ (to help me with some of the symbology)

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[Angrboda]

The main problems with this argument is with 1 and 3. First, "great" is a value statement which is contingent upon the subjective viewer. The question is, what constitutes objective greatness? 1 is simply an assertion with no basis in reality than what anyone would personally think to be true.

3 is false since greatness is logically separable from logical necessity. Value statements have no basis in possibility. Just as you can't derive an ought from an is, you can't derive an is from an ought. 

Elvis Presley is a great being to many people, I can say that he is a necessary being. It would be no less accurate to say that than to say God is a necessary being. The assertion that God is necessary has no justification. Maximal greatness is subjective if you accept that greatness is subjective, since the measurement of greatness would be subjective, it would apply to whatever you would measure to be the "greatest".

That is a common objection, but there are answers to it. I posted a response a few pages back that I will repost below. Great making properties of god are not subjective like a preference to Elvis' music. These are not properties subject to tastes, aesthetics, etc. It is also important to note that it doesn't matter to the argument if we can even comprehend them. 

There may be answers to it, but you haven't provided one. All you've done is regurgitate Maydole's flawed argument and asserted that it is sound, along with a bunch of irrelevant material and objections. Properties aren't better to have than not have, objectively speaking. Until you can show that they are, you've got nothing but a bunch of logic resting on an incoherent definition. Note that it isn't enough to say that you would prefer to have x rather than not have x, you need to show that the universe as an unfeeling body cares whether you have x or don't have x. This I strongly doubt you can show, because the universe as a whole has no opinion on the matter. It is not enough just to assert that some properties are better to have than not, you have to show why. Until you do, you're just spinning your wheels.

[SteveII]

That is a common objection, but there are answers to it. I posted a response a few pages back that I will repost below. Great making properties of god are not subjective like a preference to Elvis' music. These are not properties subject to tastes, aesthetics, etc. It is also important to note that it doesn't matter to the argument if we can even comprehend them. 

There may be answers to it, but you haven't provided one.  All you've done is regurgitate Maydole's flawed argument and asserted that it is sound, along with a bunch of irrelevant material and objections.  Properties aren't better to have than not have, objectively speaking.  Until you can show that they are, you've got nothing but a bunch of logic resting on an incoherent definition.  Note that it isn't enough to say that you would prefer to have x rather than not have x, you need to show that the universe as an unfeeling body cares whether you have x or don't have x.  This I strongly doubt you can show, because the universe as a whole has no opinion on the matter.  It is not enough just to assert that some properties are better to have than not, you have to show why.  Until you do, you're just spinning your wheels.

The 'subjective' objection is thought in popular circles to be the problem with the argument but isn't this just an escape route designed not to have to address the fact that being all powerful is greater than be limited in power, all-knowing is greater than limited knowledge, and morally perfect is greater than morally defective--and all three clearly great-making properties. The desired confusion that you want/need is when you start adding properties that are clearly not great-making properties. If you run across a property that different people could have an opinion on what is greater, then all you have identified a property that is not a great-making one. 

But the hurdle seems to be even less than that. Are the traditionally stipulated great-making properties of God coherent? If they are coherent, they are possible and as the rest of the argument explains, if they are possible, they exist.