What do you think of this argument for God?

[SuperSentient]

I love to take these threads and replaced "God" with "Santa".

Well, you could say Santa is the greatest conceivable being or the supreme being.

[Godscreated]

I understand the argument, what l do not understand, why didn't you answer my questions if you are going to respond to my post.

GC

I did respond.

Those answers lack a as a real response.

GC

[SuperSentient]

I did respond.

Those answers lack a as a real response.

GC

I will respond again:

Define all the possible worlds. Why would God have to exist in all of them?

Because God is supposedly a necessary being, which mean he exists in all possible worlds.

Why, this is stating something an omnipotent being must do in reference to the physical?

Because since God is supposedly necessary, God's existence entails that if he exists in one possible world, he must logically exist in every possible word, otherwise, he wouldn't be necessary.

In #3 you said every possible world, now your down to some possible world, why?

Because if God exists in every possible world, then he surely exists in each one of those possible worlds.

You have once again switched from some to all, why?

They are interchangeable since each possible world is part of all possible worlds, which God exists in. If God exists in every possible world, then surely he exists in each one of those possible worlds.

Why is it necessary for God an omnipotent being to exist in any world but this one, why are any other worlds even necessary?

This question shows a misunderstanding of what I am saying here.
God would exist in every possible world, including ours. I never claimed any of these worlds are logically necessary, but that God exists in each and every one of these possible worlds.

[Mystic]

1. It's possible a Necessary Being exists.
2. What's possibly necessarily, then necessarily.
3. Therefore a Necessary Being exists.

2 is proven by model logic.

As for 1 there is nothing irrational and impossible about a necessary being existing, it's possible in the same way unicorns are possible in some possible world.

And 3 then follows.

[Nonpareil]

1. It's possible a Necessary Being exists.

Found the bare assertion.

Try harder.

As for 1 there is nothing irrational and impossible about a necessary being existing, it's possible in the same way unicorns are possible in some possible world.

So... not, then. Since no one can actually coherently define what sort of magical powers it would have to have, and how these might work, and therefore state that it might actually be possible for it to exist.

[Cyberman]

Let's grant that this Necessary Being exists in some possible world, in the same way as unicorns. Why should that be our world? How can you know?

[Simon Moon]

1. It's possible a Necessary Being exists.
2. What's possibly necessarily, then necessarily.
3. Therefore a Necessary Being exists.

2 is proven by model logic.

As for 1 there is nothing irrational and impossible about a necessary being existing, it's possible in the same way unicorns are possible in some possible world.

And 3 then follows.

How did you prove that it is possible that a necessary being exists?

And, even if that is a possibility, how did you get to it being a necessity?

You have some 'splaining to do...


And let me add, to further sink your argument, that Alvin Plantinga, foremost supporter of the Modal Ontological argument, said this about this argument, "although the first premise is not rationally established, it is not contrary to reason".

"Not contrary to reason". Well, isn't that a real strong statement....

[Godscreated]

Those answers lack a as a real response.

GC

I will respond again:

Define all the possible worlds. Why would God have to exist in all of them?

Because God is supposedly a necessary being, which mean he exists in all possible worlds.

Why would an omnipotent God have to reside where He doesn't want to, you are placing restrictions on a being you have no control over. What makes you believe there is any world outside of this one.

Because since God is supposedly necessary, God's existence entails that if he exists in one possible world, he must logically exist in every possible word, otherwise, he wouldn't be necessary.

God is, He has always been and He will always be, is this what you mean by necessary? God exists outside our flawed minds so what we perceive as logic has no bearing on God. I've asked before and will again what other possible worlds, describe them? What makes you believe there are any other worlds? Why is it you believe that the all powerful God has to do anything that you deem necessary?

Because if God exists in every possible world, then he surely exists in each one of those possible worlds.

Again why, He is all powerfully and do as He chooses. There are no other worlds, He gave us this one and we've screwed it up, He is not going to allow such in another, the new one He promises.

They are interchangeable since each possible world is part of all possible worlds, which God exists in. If God exists in every possible world, then surely he exists in each one of those possible worlds.

Circular reasoning. If He exist here He must exist there because He exists here.

This question shows a misunderstanding of what I am saying here.
God would exist in every possible world, including ours. I never claimed any of these worlds are logically necessary, but that God exists in each and every one of these possible worlds.

It's not a misunderstanding on my part I clearly understand that you are trying to apply flawed logic through a philosophical idea that in no way can apply to the supreme being God is. The only thing that is necessary with God is He must be who He says He is.

GC

[Nonpareil]

Let's grant that this Necessary Being exists in some possible world, in the same way as unicorns. Why should that be our world? How can you know?

This is where we get into modal logic, which is one of those places where theistic philosophy gets most notoriously stupid.

In theory, there's nothing wrong with modal logic. It's a simple extension from statements that are straightforwardly true or false - it allows for the concept of possibility, such as "it is possible that it will be cold today". The two main concepts of it, then, are possibility and necessity - what could be true and what must be true. From there, of course, it gets much more complicated; it's a very deep field, with a lot of theoretical applications that I won't get into here.

But, as it applies to this discussion, we don't need to get deep. It's enough to deal with the concepts of possibility and necessity.

You see, to model statements made in modal logic, we are asked to consider "possible worlds" - ways that the world might have been, but isn't. In essence, if a coherent statement can be made, then it can be expressed in terms of a possible world (note the use of the word coherent; statements like "this mouse is smaller than itself" and "one times one equals two billion" are not coherent, while statements like "the United States never existed" are). Most reasonable students of modal logic accept that these "possible worlds" are simply abstractions, but there are a handful - most notably Alvin Plantinga, the apologist who formulated the modal ontological argument, which is basically what we're currently dealing with - who maintain that these possible worlds are worlds that actually exist, a la alternate dimensions in science fiction.

The other thing to understand is that, when using modal logic, you need to set down a set of axioms that define how the operators within it work. One set of axioms that sees common use is referred to as "S5". Again, in theory, there's nothing wrong with S5, but it has the misfortune of being the set of axioms that Plantinga chooses to abuse for his modal argument.

The thing about S5 that makes it useful to Plantinga is that, under S5, strings of modal operators can be cut down to the last one, no matter what came beforehand - that is, if something is "necessarily necessarily possibly necessarily possibly possibly true", then, under S5, you can cut that down to say that it is simply "possibly true". The specific thing that this enables that Plantinga cares about is that, if something is possibly necessary, then it is simply necessary under S5.

Now, again, S5 is valid. It isn't the only axiomatic system that modal logic can make use of (other, more refined modal logic systems exist that can handle much more complex statements), but it's useful in its own way. The problem does not lie with S5, but with the argument Plantinga tries to make with it.

Plantinga's modal argument runs thusly:

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W.
   
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
   
3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness.
   
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
   
5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
   
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

The first two points are definitions, and I do not care to dispute them (though a lot of people certainly like to, as the various formulations of the problem of evil demonstrate).

The third point is the ipse dixit/bare assertion point that I raised in my last serious analysis. It is still the point at which the argument collapses on its face, and no other grounds for rejection is necessary. Even Plantinga concedes this, as I have pointed out previously. For the sake of clarification, however, I will continue.

The fourth point is simply an extension of the definitions given above. Plantinga defines a "maximally great" being as one which possesses "maximal excellence" in all possible worlds - that is, a "maximally excellent" entity that is also necessary. Since the previous premise is that this being is also possible, we can now define a "maximally great entity" as a possibly necessary maximally excellent entity.

From there, S5 allows us to discard all but the last modal, and leaves us with the asserted maximally great entity being simply necessary.

And so we're back at the original issue that I pointed out in my last post. This version of the ontological argument, as with all other versions, simply boils down to defining "God" as "something that, if it is possible, must exist", and hoping that the assertion of possibility will be accepted without justification.

The assertion is not accepted, and the argument is discarded.

[Harry Nevis]

God is, He has always been and He will always be, is this what you mean by necessary? God exists outside our flawed minds so what we perceive as logic has no bearing on God. I've asked before and will again what other possible worlds, describe them? What makes you believe there are any other worlds? Why is it you believe that the all powerful God has to do anything that you deem necessary?

Does this make all logical arguments for god pointless?