What do you think of this argument for God?

[SuperSentient]

I will respond again:
Because God is supposedly a necessary being, which mean he exists in all possible worlds.

Why would an omnipotent God have to reside where He doesn't want to, you are placing restrictions on a being you have no control over. What makes you believe there is any world outside of this one.

He can't choose to, he is logically necessary. God has restrictions, he is restricted by his characteristics. By all possible worlds, I mean every world that is possible, not necessarily a multiverse.

God is, He has always been and He will always be, is this what you mean by necessary? God exists outside our flawed minds so what we perceive as logic has no bearing on God. I've asked before and will again what other possible worlds, describe them? What makes you believe there are any other worlds? Why is it you believe that the all powerful God has to do anything that you deem necessary?

Yes. Possible worlds are just whatever world is possible. For example, in 2012, Russia and the U.S. start a nuclear war. That is one possible scenario, but it never happened in our world. Whether there is literally a world ensemble has no impact on possible worlds. God had to create the universe, that is logically true since God represents an immutable state of mind. God being is necessary. I didn't make this up, theologians would agree on much of this, they derived these concepts of God.

Again why, He is all powerfully and do as He chooses. There are no other worlds, He gave us this one and we've screwed it up, He is not going to allow such in another, the new one He promises.

There are other possible worlds, I am not saying there is another world that is coming. 
However, I would agree that God's existence would necessitate this world. 

Circular reasoning. If He exist here He must exist there because He exists here.

No circular reasoning here. This is part of being logically necessary.

It's not a misunderstanding on my part I clearly understand that you are trying to apply flawed logic through a philosophical idea that in no way can apply to the supreme being God is. The only thing that is necessary with God is He must be who He says He is.

Yeah, this confirms you misunderstand the concept of God.

Of course, I find no reason to believe that God is a logically necessary concept myself, but Christian theologians have been asserting this for centuries.

[RoadRunner79]

---

This is where we get into modal logic, which is one of those places where theistic philosophy gets most notoriously stupid.

In theory, there's nothing wrong with modal logic. It's a simple extension from statements that are straightforwardly true or false - it allows for the concept of possibility, such as "it is possible that it will be cold today". The two main concepts of it, then, are possibility and necessity - what could be true and what must be true. From there, of course, it gets much more complicated; it's a very deep field, with a lot of theoretical applications that I won't get into here.

But, as it applies to this discussion, we don't need to get deep. It's enough to deal with the concepts of possibility and necessity.

You see, to model statements made in modal logic, we are asked to consider "possible worlds" - ways that the world might have been, but isn't. In essence, if a coherent statement can be made, then it can be expressed in terms of a possible world (note the use of the word coherent; statements like "this mouse is smaller than itself" and "one times one equals two billion" are not coherent, while statements like "the United States never existed" are). Most reasonable students of modal logic accept that these "possible worlds" are simply abstractions, but there are a handful - most notably Alvin Plantinga, the apologist who formulated the modal ontological argument, which is basically what we're currently dealing with - who maintain that these possible worlds are worlds that actually exist, a la alternate dimensions in science fiction.

The other thing to understand is that, when using modal logic, you need to set down a set of axioms that define how the operators within it work. One set of axioms that sees common use is referred to as "S5". Again, in theory, there's nothing wrong with S5, but it has the misfortune of being the set of axioms that Plantinga chooses to abuse for his modal argument.

The thing about S5 that makes it useful to Plantinga is that, under S5, strings of modal operators can be cut down to the last one, no matter what came beforehand - that is, if something is "necessarily necessarily possibly necessarily possibly possibly true", then, under S5, you can cut that down to say that it is simply "possibly true". The specific thing that this enables that Plantinga cares about is that, if something is possibly necessary, then it is simply necessary under S5.

Now, again, S5 is valid. It isn't the only axiomatic system that modal logic can make use of (other, more refined modal logic systems exist that can handle much more complex statements), but it's useful in its own way. The problem does not lie with S5, but with the argument Plantinga tries to make with it.

Plantinga's modal argument runs thusly:

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W.
   
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
   
3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness.
   
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
   
5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
   
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
   

The first two points are definitions, and I do not care to dispute them (though a lot of people certainly like to, as the various formulations of the problem of evil demonstrate).

The third point is the ipse dixit/bare assertion point that I raised in my last serious analysis. It is still the point at which the argument collapses on its face, and no other grounds for rejection is necessary. Even Plantinga concedes this, as I have pointed out previously. For the sake of clarification, however, I will continue.

The fourth point is simply an extension of the definitions given above. Plantinga defines a "maximally great" being as one which possesses "maximal excellence" in all possible worlds - that is, a "maximally excellent" entity that is also necessary. Since the previous premise is that this being is also possible, we can now define a "maximally great entity" as a possibly necessary maximally excellent entity.

From there, S5 allows us to discard all but the last modal, and leaves us with the asserted maximally great entity being simply necessary.

And so we're back at the original issue that I pointed out in my last post. This version of the ontological argument, as with all other versions, simply boils down to defining "God" as "something that, if it is possible, must exist", and hoping that the assertion of possibility will be accepted without justification.

The assertion is not accepted, and the argument is discarded.

---

NonPareil,

I'm addressing this to you, because you do seem interested in actually discussing the argument. There are a number of atheist and also unfortunately Christians who argue it, and clearly don't even understand the syntax being used. For instance up until recently, I largely ignored it, because I thought that possible worlds was speculation about the multiverse.

First I was curious about your referenceing ipse dixit in regards to premise 3 and citing Plantinga as conceding this. I would just like to see it in context.

I found the following commentary on the discussion, and I wanted to get your opinion: http://www.randyeverist.com/2012/01/moda...ument.html

It uses the modal form of the argument that I have normally heard used

It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If it exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

What I found interesting was the conclusion

So it seems the crucial premise is the first one. Epistemically, one may say it is possible God does exist and possible he does not. However, we are interested in metaphysical possibility. It is on these grounds one must object. That objection can come in two forms: A. The concept of a maximally great being is incoherent,[2] or B. We do not (and/or cannot) know whether or not the concept of a maximally great being is metaphysically possible. With respect to (B), it’s not at all clear why we cannot justifiably intuit such a being is metaphysically possible (even if it’s not epistemologically compulsory that we do). With respect to (A), it seems the maximum values of what we would call “great-making” properties are coherent, and hence it follows they are metaphysically possible.[

John Feinberg, a Christian theologian, remarks on his interest in the ontological argument but seems to show agreement with its critics. He wrote, “what . . . [the ontological argument] proved is that a contingent being could not be God. Any being worthy of the title ‘God’ must be a necessary being.”[4] The philosophical rub Feinberg seemed not to catch, however, was this: in modal logic, a being or truth that is necessarily true means it is impossible not to exist. A necessary corollary or entailment of some being or truth being necessary is that if it does turn out to be false, it is necessarily so. So the MOA demonstrating the maximally great being’s necessary existence does more than give us a curious fact. Rather, it establishes that God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. Either the maximally great being is possible or impossible. This is why it is such a great argument!

I hate to quote so much, but this is closest to my view, and this author says what I mean in a much clearer way. I have also heard William Lane Craig mention a similar two conclusions to the argument but he didn't discuss the why of the "not possible conclusion" very well (so I didn't give it much though) I do think that there could be some issues with this view, but they reside else ware, and don't impact the logic or premise's of the argument itself.

Anyway... curious as to your thoughts, and to have a discussion concerning this.

[Nonpareil]

I'm addressing this to you, because you do seem interested in actually discussing the argument. There are a number of atheist and also unfortunately Christians who argue it, and clearly don't even understand the syntax being used.  For instance up until recently, I largely ignored it, because I thought that possible worlds was speculation about the multiverse.

There are people who treat it as that, yes. Plantinga is one of them. I obviously disagree, as do most others who make use of modal logic; a "possible world" is simply an abstract concept, a logically coherent way that the universe "might" have been. It does not possess any sort of existence beyond this.

This is just clarification, by the way; I'm not intimating that I think you would disagree with this.

First I was curious about your referenceing ipse dixit in regards to premise 3  and citing Plantinga as conceding this.   I would just like to see it in context.

I mentioned this in my first in-depth dissection post, but for full reference:

Alvin Plantinga is a Christian apologist (I don't say this to disparage him, just to make it plain that this is the explicit basis that he uses for all of his positions) with a particular interest in the various ontological arguments. In 1974, he authored the version of the modal ontological argument that I showed in my previous post - the one that makes use of the S5 axiom set to define God as necessary. He published this argument in his book The Nature of Necessity, wherein it was presented as a reformulation of Saint Anselm's original argument.

In the conclusion of that same book (page 221, specifically, which can be found on Google Books if you're curious), he stated:

"Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion. And perhaps that is all that can be expected of any such argument."

The "central premise" that he refers to is that it is possible for a being with maximal greatness to exist. And, as I have pointed out, while Plantinga asserts that acceptance of this premise is rational, he cannot actually show how or why this would be so. As such, the premise is bare assertion (it is his attitude towards it being bare assertion, his attempt to simply tell people to accept it anyway, even though he knows it's faulty, that leads me to use the label "ipse dixit" here). And, again as even Plantinga himself admits, this is the best that can ever be expected from any version of the ontological argument.

And this is entirely without getting into all of the other potential issues with the argument, such as incoherent definitions (as "goodness" is subjective) and misuse of axioms. As I mentioned previously, while S5 is valid, it is not the only set of axioms that modal logic can make use of, and each set of axioms has very specific limitations and applicability. Modal logic is not my particular specialty, so I haven't taken the time to sit down and work out whether or not Plantinga should have been working under S4 or another set of axioms instead, but I suspect that he might have - and, under those other sets, he would not be able to pull the sleight-of-hand trick with "possibly necessary" that his argument rests on.

But, as I said, I haven't actually verified that personally, because it doesn't really matter. Whether or not S5 applies, the central premise of the argument remains bare assertion, by Plantinga's own admission.

As such, the argument is discarded.

It uses the modal form of the argument that I have normally heard used

Yes. That is Plantinga's argument, slightly rephrased to put the language of modal logic in layman's terms. You can swap the phrases "exists in every possible world" and "is necessary" without changing anything, mechanically speaking.

Epistemically, one may say it is possible God does exist and possible he does not. However, we are interested in metaphysical possibility. It is on these grounds one must object. That objection can come in two forms: A. The concept of a maximally great being is incoherent,[2] or B. We do not (and/or cannot) know whether or not the concept of a maximally great being is metaphysically possible.

Correct, but with the slight quibble that it is entirely possible for both of these objections to be true.

It is also demonstrable that the latter objection is true; we have no idea whether or not the existence of a god is possible. That is why the argument fails to establish its conclusion. It is precisely the premise that both Plantinga and myself have pointed out as being unsupported. If we knew that the existence of this necessary being were possible, we really wouldn't need to have this discussion - but since the concept cannot even be coherently defined, let alone be established as possible, the argument is a non-starter.

Rather, it establishes that God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. Either the maximally great being is possible or impossible. This is why it is such a great argument!

I'm not sure I would call it a great argument for establishing that the concept of God includes the fact that he is necessary. An important definition, maybe, and something that might influence someone's thoughts on God, but the argument itself is just kind of dead on arrival.

I have also heard William Lane Craig mention a similar two conclusions to the argument

As a general rule, I would discourage listening to anything that William Lane Craig has to say. He's an idiot.

And I don't mean to say that he is an idiot because he is a theist. Plantinga is a theist, and while his formulation of the ontological argument fails to establish its conclusion, he is at least an intelligent man who can build a coherent argument within the laws of modal logic. He understands how prepositional calculus works, and how to employ sets of axioms, and so on. He is an intelligent man who just happens to let his beliefs color his thinking a bit farther than is advisable (and, admittedly, doesn't understand the theory of evolution and mouths off about it more than he really should). I don't agree with much of what he says, but he does at least have some legitimate grounding as a philosopher, and he is at least honest about the failings in his formulation of the ontological argument.

Craig is an idiot of the highest caliber. I am honestly surprised that he possesses the necessary brain function to walk and chew gum at the same time. His one and only talent is as a bullshit artist. Do not be fooled by the "Doctor" in front of his name; while he does technically possess a Ph.D. in Philosophy, this is only because the institute that he went to did not offer doctorate degrees for anything more specific. He has always and only ever studied philosophy of religion, and without any actual critical eye turned towards any of it.

Again, I'm not just saying this to try and be dismissive (I mean, obviously I'm dismissing Craig, but you get what I mean). If you actually want to learn anything about philosophy, logic, or really anything at all, you would be best served by ignoring Craig and everything that he says or does. Even if he were an atheist, and arguing against the existence of God, I would say the same thing. The man simply has zero understanding of logic as a system, and any argument that he advances can be safely thrown into the garbage bin without a second glance, as it is guaranteed to be full of more holes than a sieve.

Anyway. I'm more than happy to carry on this discussion, though I admit to being slightly hazy on what particular part of the quoted section you wanted my thoughts on. I picked out what appeared to be the most important points and gave a brief rundown of each, but if I missed anything, just let me know.

[Sal]

I heard an argument like this:

1. God is the greatest possible being.

This is just semantics.

2. God is a necessary being, which means that God exists in every possible world (If God exists). 

Non Sequitur.

3. If God exists in one possible world, God must logically exist in every possible world. 

wat

4. Since God is the greatest possible being, it follows that every aspect of God (being possible) exists in some possible world.

Even if the 3 preceding assumptions are given, this is the same as saying that something existing at A also must exist at B, with no further information.

5. Therefore, God exists (in all possible worlds, including ours).

I actually just structured the premises this way myself but is the same idea as an argument I heard before. 

What do you think of it?

I think it's bollocks and semantical toying.

[RoadRunner79]

---

First I was curious about your referenceing ipse dixit in regards to premise 3  and citing Plantinga as conceding this.   I would just like to see it in context.

I mentioned this in my first in-depth dissection post, but for full reference:

Alvin Plantinga is a Christian apologist (I don't say this to disparage him, just to make it plain that this is the explicit basis that he uses for all of his positions) with a particular interest in the various ontological arguments. In 1974, he authored the version of the modal ontological argument that I showed in my previous post - the one that makes use of the S5 axiom set to define God as necessary. He published this argument in his book The Nature of Necessity, wherein it was presented as a reformulation of Saint Anselm's original argument.

In the conclusion of that same book (page 221, specifically, which can be found on Google Books if you're curious), he stated:

"Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion. And perhaps that is all that can be expected of any such argument."

The "central premise" that he refers to is that it is possible for a being with maximal greatness to exist. And, as I have pointed out, while Plantinga asserts that acceptance of this premise is rational, he cannot actually show how or why this would be so. As such, the premise is bare assertion (it is his attitude towards it being bare assertion, his attempt to simply tell people to accept it anyway, even though he knows it's faulty, that leads me to use the label "ipse dixit" here). And, again as even Plantinga himself admits, this is the best that can ever be expected from any version of the ontological argument.

And this is entirely without getting into all of the other potential issues with the argument, such as incoherent definitions (as "goodness" is subjective) and misuse of axioms. As I mentioned previously, while S5 is valid, it is not the only set of axioms that modal logic can make use of, and each set of axioms has very specific limitations and applicability. Modal logic is not my particular specialty, so I haven't taken the time to sit down and work out whether or not Plantinga should have been working under S4 or another set of axioms instead, but I suspect that he might have - and, under those other sets, he would not be able to pull the sleight-of-hand trick with "possibly necessary" that his argument rests on.

But, as I said, I haven't actually verified that personally, because it doesn't really matter. Whether or not S5 applies, the central premise of the argument remains bare assertion, by Plantinga's own admission.

As such, the argument is discarded.

It uses the modal form of the argument that I have normally heard used

Yes. That is Plantinga's argument, slightly rephrased to put the language of modal logic in layman's terms. You can swap the phrases "exists in every possible world" and "is necessary" without changing anything, mechanically speaking.



Correct, but with the slight quibble that it is entirely possible for both of these objections to be true.

It is also demonstrable that the latter objection is true; we have no idea whether or not the existence of a god is possible. That is why the argument fails to establish its conclusion. It is precisely the premise that both Plantinga and myself have pointed out as being unsupported. If we knew that the existence of this necessary being were possible, we really wouldn't need to have this discussion - but since the concept cannot even be coherently defined, let alone be established as possible, the argument is a non-starter.



I'm not sure I would call it a great argument for establishing that the concept of God includes the fact that he is necessary. An important definition, maybe, and something that might influence someone's thoughts on God, but the argument itself is just kind of dead on arrival.

I have also heard William Lane Craig mention a similar two conclusions to the argument

As a general rule, I would discourage listening to anything that William Lane Craig has to say. He's an idiot.

And I don't mean to say that he is an idiot because he is a theist. Plantinga is a theist, and while his formulation of the ontological argument fails to establish its conclusion, he is at least an intelligent man who can build a coherent argument within the laws of modal logic. He understands how prepositional calculus works, and how to employ sets of axioms, and so on. He is an intelligent man who just happens to let his beliefs color his thinking a bit farther than is advisable (and, admittedly, doesn't understand the theory of evolution and mouths off about it more than he really should). I don't agree with much of what he says, but he does at least have some legitimate grounding as a philosopher, and he is at least honest about the failings in his formulation of the ontological argument.

Craig is an idiot of the highest caliber. I am honestly surprised that he possesses the necessary brain function to walk and chew gum at the same time. His one and only talent is as a bullshit artist. Do not be fooled by the "Doctor" in front of his name; while he does technically possess a Ph.D. in Philosophy, this is only because the institute that he went to did not offer doctorate degrees for anything more specific. He has always and only ever studied philosophy of religion, and without any actual critical eye turned towards any of it.

Again, I'm not just saying this to try and be dismissive (I mean, obviously I'm dismissing Craig, but you get what I mean). If you actually want to learn anything about philosophy, logic, or really anything at all, you would be best served by ignoring Craig and everything that he says or does. Even if he were an atheist, and arguing against the existence of God, I would say the same thing. The man simply has zero understanding of logic as a system, and any argument that he advances can be safely thrown into the garbage bin without a second glance, as it is guaranteed to be full of more holes than a sieve.

Anyway. I'm more than happy to carry on this discussion, though I admit to being slightly hazy on what particular part of the quoted section you wanted my thoughts on. I picked out what appeared to be the most important points and gave a brief rundown of each, but if I missed anything, just let me know.

---

NonPareil,

Perhaps it is a result of when I grew up, and some of the changes I have seen and always hearing quotes like those below, but from my view of the semantics in modal logic, I think that possible is the more neutral and default term.   It is possible, if and only if; it is not necessarily false.  This is independant of whether it is actually true or false.   It is saying, that the claimant doesn't find any reason to find it logically impossible.  How would you go about showing that something is possible in this sense?

 

I have learned to use the word impossible with the greatest caution. – Wernher von Braun
The positive thinker sees the invisible, feels the intangible and achieves the impossible. – Anonymous
When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong. – Arthur C Clarke

Now you main objection as I see it, is that you consider the definition of maximally great in the premise to be incoherent.  I am assuming (from what you have stated thus far) that you mean incoherent in an ambiguous sense, and not that it is logically incoherent.  From this, at best, I think that the best that you can say is that you cannot comment on it, because you do not know what it means.   In one view, this may make it a bad argument because people may come at it with different views.  Christians certainly have a longstanding view of what constitutes greatness concerning God, and I don't think that most of it would be considered controversial.  However; I don't think that most would argue that nothing is greater in an objective sense.  Is Love and self sacrifice greater than hate  and self serving?  Is greater potential in power greater than weakness?  Even if different people disagree on what is considered greatness.  They can be incorrect, and it doesn't make it subjective.   This has to do with epistemology not ontology.  And with this argument even if we differ greatly, only one attribute is needed for agreement in the area of greatness.

As to what you are unsure of that I quoted and you mentioned at the end of the post.   Would you agree, that apart from simply not taking a view on the argument (which is equivalent to pleading ignorance on the topic); that the argument makes the concept of God either impossible or necessary?  That God is either possible, or logically incoherent.   I think that is a pretty tall order to support the latter.   It's possible, that we are simply not smart enough or lacking knowledge to articulate reasons to why it is impossible.   However I think that it's the science nerd in me, that say's I need a reason for why not, and not to default to impossible, simply because I don't know.

(Note:  I do see an issue with the argument I quoted.  I think that this particular form of the argument, somewhat assumes that the hearers are familiar with previous forms of the argument; and doesn't show how it moves from existing in some possible world, to existing in every possible world.   However this could easily be corrected.  I could see some other issue that could arise, but they don't really deal with the argument itself and are really off topic)

[Nonpareil]

NonPareil,

Perhaps it is a result of when I grew up, and some of the changes I have seen and always hearing quotes like those below, but from my view of the semantics in modal logic, I think that possible is the more neutral and default term.   It is possible, if and only if; it is not necessarily false.  This is independant of whether it is actually true or false.   It is saying, that the claimant doesn't find any reason to find it logically impossible.  How would you go about showing that something is possible in this sense?

By showing that it is a logically coherent definition with parameters that can actually be fulfilled.

It is quite possible, for example, to challenge the coherence (and, therefore, possibility) of a definition that is "omniscient, omnipotent, and 'wholly good'", as none of these concepts are particularly well-defined and the latter is completely nonsensical, as "goodness" is a value judgment and has no objective standard.

Even if you could demonstrate this, though, you would still have to demonstrate that it is possible for an entity with these characteristics to exist. You would, in fact, have to be able to show that the universe is logically compatible with the existence of a maximally excellent entity - but you don't know enough about the universe's characteristics to be able to argue that.
 

Now you main objection as I see it, is that you consider the definition of maximally great in the premise to be incoherent.  I am assuming (from what you have stated thus far) that you mean incoherent in an ambiguous sense, and not that it is logically incoherent.

No. I mean logically incoherent - or, at least, semantically incoherent, which is essentially the same thing, as incoherent definitions necessarily lead to incoherent propositions. See above.

"Omniscient", "omnipotent", and "wholly good" have never been particularly well-defined terms.

From this, at best, I think that the best that you can say is that you cannot comment on it, because you do not know what it means.

Even if that were the case, it wouldn't actually help the ontological argument. It would just mean that we don't know enough to know if its definition is any good - which is precisely the issue that we have anyway.

In one view, this may make it a bad argument because people may come at it with different views.  Christians certainly have a longstanding view of what constitutes greatness concerning God, and I don't think that most of it would be considered controversial.  However; I don't think that most would argue that nothing is greater in an objective sense.  Is Love and self sacrifice greater than hate  and self serving?  Is greater potential in power greater than weakness?  Even if different people disagree on what is considered greatness.  They can be incorrect, and it doesn't make it subjective.

No. The fact that a measure of "greatness" is a judgment of value, and therefore by definition subjective, makes it subjective.

Would you agree, that apart from simply not taking a view on the argument (which is equivalent to pleading ignorance on the topic); that the argument makes the concept of God either impossible or necessary?

That is how the argument defines "God", so yes. If it weren't necessary, the argument would not recognize it as God.

That God is either possible, or logically incoherent.

No. Again, even if the definition of "God" can be shown to be logically incoherent, it can only be shown to be so with respect to itself. It is not a matter of whether or not the definition is coherent; it is a matter of whether or not it is compatible with the definition of "universe".

This is where we get into the issue of S5 not necessarily being the appropriate set of axioms for Plantinga to use. It is the only axiom set which allows him to move from "possibly necessary" to "necessary", but the specific axiom set that you use is dependent on exactly what sense in which you mean "possible" or "necessary".

The two ways in which these can be used, for purposes of this argument are the epistemic and the metaphysical. Epistemic possibility has to do with whether the thing is actually possible in our world, while metaphysical possibility only cares about whether or not there is a logically coherent abstract world in which it could be true. S5 is a set of axioms specifically designed for use with epistemic statements, but Plantinga is asserting the metaphysical possibility of his necessary entity. Again, modal logic is not my particular area of expertise, but it is entirely possible that S5 does not apply, and that Plantinga should instead be working under, say, S4, which does not allow for the leap from "possibly necessary" to "necessary" - and if he is working under S5, then he still needs to establish that it is actually epistemically possible for this being to exist.

[Mystic]

You guys don't find it odd, that if a Necessary being is possible, then it definitely exists?

[Jesster]

I find it odd that you consider any being necessary.

[Mystic]

I find it odd that you consider any being necessary.

If all existence is not necessary, then they are not necessary to exist and possibly could not have existed. If things are not necessary, the question, is why do they exist?

Everything is possible.

A universe can have different laws, etc....

I believe if you think about the teleological argument, then it further confirms why there must a necessary being.

That is because everything requires an explanation of why it's here, and God being the necessary being is the only being that is an explanation of why he/it/her exists.

It's in fact intuitive whatever REALLY defines existence is that which must always have existed and cannot but exist wherever existence is found.

Everything else get's it's existence and creation and definition from it.

Existence is Existence. It necessarily must exist. That is a simple proof that the Necessary being is the REAL existence by which all things exist.

God is necessary as well for morality which is part of reason and life.

Without God, there is no morality. With God, there is no purpose.

[Jesster]

If all existence is not necessary, then they are not necessary to exist and possibly could not have existed. If things are not necessary, the question, is why do they exist?

No. You said necessary being. Don't change the subject. Show that a necessary being is at all possible.

Everything is possible.

No. I'll just stop you there. Not everything is possible.


All of this has been covered in this thread at least 10 times now. Did you just skip to the end without reading anything?