Illustrating the burden of proof - pay me!

[Anomalocaris]

The simple answer is that physical models of reality appear to be accidental and arbitrary which suggests the various forces and constants could be otherwise. So why not?

Physical models closely approximate said reality, or they wouldn't be models thereof. I'm not sure how you can make such a statement about them and still breathe. You might be smart about something, but damfino what it s.

Which things?  Smart compared to what?

[The Grand Nudger]

I always wonder what about a god-made reality would be less accidental or arbitrary? The god model suggests that a god could have done other than whatever it has. So why not?

[Neo-Scholastic]

It's not the middle, but I think it's helpful to consider who is making the positive claim. If one side would be put in the position of trying to prove a universal negative, they don't really have the burden of proof, even if they brought it up first. It's undertood that their negative claim is a reaction to some other positive claim. If someone asserts that there are no such things as magical leprechauns, it's understood that the statement is a response to the idea that there ARE such things as magical leprechauns, even if no one in that particular conversation asserted that there are. The person you're talking to may not have claimed there are, but if they're going to disagree with the proposition, it's on them to demonstrate sufficient reason to believe leprechauns are real. As a matter of courtesy, you probably shouldn't assert there are no leprechauns apropos of nothing without being prepared to explain your reasoning if someone disagrees, but in the absence of contrary evidence, that's the default position no matter who brings it up first.

If it's not a universal negative, the person who asserts it (there's no visible elephant in my garage) has the burden of proof.

My remark was a bit tongue-in-cheek. While it's true that universal negatives may simply be an inartful response to a positive claim, it needs to be borne in mind that there are universal negatives that do bear a burden of proof. For example, if one were to argue that the bacterial flagellum could not evolve naturally, that would be a universal negative which bears a burden of proof. Otherwise, universal negatives which should be challenged are inappropriately given a pass. (A couple other examples to keep things clear, the claims that, "the second law of thermodynamic cannot be violated" and "a cause must precede its effect" implicitly contain universal negatives which would require support if they are critical premises in an argument.)

Maybe the distinction between positive and negative claims is not so clear. Sometimes a denial of an apparent 'positive' claim makes its own implicit claim. For example. The proposition that something non-physical exists or occurs seems like a positive claim but in one sense, the "non-" sets it up as a universal negative against the unspoken alternative positive universal claim that only physical things exist or occur.

[The Grand Nudger]

A person may think it's not true that only physical things exist or occur. How might they go about explaining why they think so, if they have any particular reason for thinking so?

[LadyForCamus]

What I’m mostly interested in is the rational justification for the proposition that physical reality itself must be contingent, and for what reasons a God’s existence has to be necessary where reality itself cannot be.

The simple answer is that physical models of reality appear to be accidental and arbitrary which suggests the various forces and constants could be otherwise. So why not?

I didn’t think this was the type of conversation that had simple answers. 😛

Perhaps it’s possible that the physical constants of this universe could have been different. I’d say it’s hardly a settled matter. Even giving that assumption though, we don’t know what might extend beyond this universe. For example; a multiverse can’t be ruled out.

[The Grand Nudger]

The question could (and would) be repeated in the case of a multiverse as well. It's a throwaway objection at any rate.

If we are genuinely concerned about arbitrary or accidental whatsits - then we would be concerned about those issues in any context they present themselves. If we're unconcerned about the arbitrary or accidental nature of a god or a god made universe, we are not genuinely concerned with the real, perceived, or asserted arbitrary or accidental nature of a physical model either.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Human observation is somehow less subjective than human apprehensions of evidence? 

By observation scientists mean anything that can be measured—isn't that the essence of objectivity?

But sure, even if you call everything subjective, the number of transformations that turns information into observation are less than the number of transformations turning it into evidence.

[The Grand Nudger]

You either do or don't have an example of the contention you made. Can we take this observation that you've failed to provide any such example as evidence that you had no idea what you meant when you explicitly made such a claim?

Is this different, in any way, with how you had hoped to use your observations of "what some people do" as evidence that the terms ought to be subbed out to prevent mistakes which you are incapable of specifying?

[John 6IX Breezy]

Physical models closely approximate said reality, or they wouldn't be models thereof.

Models don't approximate reality—they interpret it. That's how two competing models end up fighting over the same real estate.

[The Grand Nudger]

How should we resolve any dispute over real estate between two models? What would you refer to?