Do you believe in free will?

[Norfolk And Chance]

Wow 30 pages of philosobabble to answer the question "do you believe in free will?"

I know of free will because I have it.

Fuck me that was easy.

[NoMoreFaith]

Norfolk,

The reason we know that God exists is because He has told us so, and has revealed Himself to us.

Sound familiar. Same thing. Private Internal Conviction of a fact, does not make it a fact.

[Norfolk And Chance]

No but being a fact makes something a fact.

There's cacti in the Sahara Desert, I have my own free will, both facts.

[NoMoreFaith]

No but being a fact makes something a fact.

There's cacti in the Sahara Desert, I have my own free will, both facts.

That's troll logic and you know it lol

I'll bite however, you can observe a cacti in the desert, however you can't observe a decision which is free from the electrical and biological activity in your brain.

[Norfolk And Chance]

No but being a fact makes something a fact.

There's cacti in the Sahara Desert, I have my own free will, both facts.

That's troll logic and you know it lol

I'll bite however, you can observe a cacti in the desert, however you can't observe a decision which is free from the electrical and biological activity in your brain.

You've probably been on this thread too long, man. I haven't read it and don't plan to, because I know it will burst my eyeballs...

I have free will which can be observed in the decisions I make.

[genkaus]

You better throw out God's omniscience then. I assume you are aware of the argument from free will and omniscience.

He is a theist. I wouldn't assume he is aware of anything.

---

You better throw out God's omniscience then. I assume you are aware of the argument from free will and omniscience.

In short;
1. If God is omniscient, he knows all things
2. We have free will, defined by being able to make an uncoerced choice between alternatives.
3. For free will to exist, there must be uncertainty about what choice you will make.
4. Uncertainty implies doubt about the outcome.
5. An omniscient God cannot doubt about the outcome.
5. Therefore an omniscient God does not exist.

Playing devil's advocate here.
The problem here would be the third premise: For free will to exist, there must be uncertainty about what choice you will make.

How would you justify that free-will requires uncertainty of choice? That's not a part of definition of free-will.

[R-e-n-n-a-t]

No but being a fact makes something a fact.

There's cacti in the Sahara Desert, I have my own free will, both facts.

That's troll logic and you know it lol

I'll bite however, you can observe a cacti in the desert, however you can't observe a decision which is free from the electrical and biological activity in your brain.

You've probably been on this thread too long, man. I haven't read it and don't plan to, because I know it will burst my eyeballs...

I have free will which can be observed in the decisions I make.

But do you make your decisions, or does a stimulus make your decisions? Your personality dictates how you will respond. Even if you say "*** it" and say the opposite of what you normally would, a combination of nature and nurture still decided for you that you would respond that way. You're using theist logic.

[NoMoreFaith]

How would you justify that free-will requires uncertainty of choice? That's not a part of definition of free-will.

Fair point, in terms of playing devils advocate. If the choice is certain, you must defend it was freely made between alternatives.

If there is only one choice that can be made, it is determined.

[Angrboda]

Chrysippus argued that uncaused events, such as creation out of nothing, are impossible, and was, like the Atomists, a causal determinist. Every change is the result of some action or cause, and every change leads to further changes. He identified four sorts of cause, (1) operative cause, which occurs at same time as its effect, (2) antecedent cause, which occurs before the effect, (3) intensifying causes, which are not sufficient of themselves to produce the effect but increase it, (4) and joint causes, which are necessary but insufficient parts of a group of causes sufficient in itself to produce the effect. Human actions have both external and internal causes, the latter being “in our power,” even if they are determined. They arise from our will and character, which determine our response to events, and so our actions from internal sources are free and we are morally responsible. Chrysippus apparently was interested in establishing moral responsibility on the ground that it was oneself that caused one’s action, not on the possibility that one could have acted otherwise than he did, but he did claim there was a sense, sometimes, in which one could have acted otherwise, that is to say, it may be that nothing prevented one from doing so other than, say, one’s own beliefs and character ,which led to the action one in fact performed.

Sometimes it is argued that if the future is already determined, then no action of ours can make any difference to it, that is, fatalism is deduced from determinism. Chrysippus replied that many things are fated only on the condition of one’s taking or omitting to take certain actions. It does not follow from the fact that you are fated to recover from your illness that you will recover whether you call a doctor or not, for your recovery is predicated on your calling the doctor, which is something you are responsible for doing, and consistent with your character, even though it is also fated.

Now the Stoics accepted that if an event was necessary, then one could not be held responsible for its occurrence, and that one could be held responsible for anything done freely, and so argued that something is necessary only if one cannot prevent it due to his own intrinsic lack of power, or due to something external that prevents him from applying his power. So, if someone can smash a jewel, that is, he is strong enough to do so and knows how to direct the blow, and nothing external prevents him, that is, the jewel is not a thousand miles away or locked away in a vault or any such thing, and one does not smash the jewel, then it is not necessary that one does not smash the jewel, and he can be held responsible for not smashing it. Of course, it is causally determined that the jewel will not be smashed on this occasion, but part of the cause for this is one’s own causally determined decision not to smash it, given that one could do it and nothing prevented one from doing it. With this much in place, they went on to define possibility, impossibility, and non-necessity. This 133means that logical or causal necessity is not what concerns the Stoics, but rather that necessity an event has which prevents one from doing anything about it. That all one’s actions are determined by Fate, then, is quite consistent, on their view, with the view that many events are not necessary, and that many things that are possible do not in fact occur. In particular, every human choice is non-necessary, for one could always have made other choices, given one’s nature, and the choice that one does not make is possible whenever nothing external prevents one from making that choice.

One argument against the Stoic view here would hold that whatever follows from a necessary proposition is necessary. So, given that the past is necessary (we can’t do anything about it), and given that sufficient causes for every future event are to be found in the past, and given that the Stoics deny that statements about the future lack truth value, it seems to follow that every future event follows from necessary propositions about the past, and so every future event is necessary. Chrysippus responded to this argument by pointing out that there is no logical connection between future and past, only a causal, and so logically contingent connection. Whenever that is the case with two propositions, the connection is to be formulated not as a conditional, but as a negated conjunction. So it is not that “if the (past) cause, then the (future) effect,” but rather “not both the (past) cause, and not the (future) effect.” Now necessity will be transmitted in a conditional, which is intended to express a necessary truth, but not in such a negated conjunction, which is not meant to. So assume a past cause, finding a coin on the ground, that has the future effect that one freely chooses to buy a pomegranate. The past cause is necessary, for it is not in the agent’s power to make it otherwise. He found the coin, and that is it. If the future effect were logically contained in the past cause, then the same things could be said of the future effect, the man’s free choice to buy the pomegranate, and so it would be necessary, and not under the man’s control after all. But the man’s choice is not logically contained therein, but rather is causally connected to the past event. Thus we should say not, “if the coin is found, then the man buys the pomegranate,” but rather, “not both the finding of the coin, and the man’s not buying the pomegranate,” which is not necessarily true. Why not? Well it is in the man’s power (though he will not do it) to refuse the pomegranate and keep the coin, despite the past cause. So this is true only because of the man’s choice, arising from his nature. So it is quite possible that even though the past cause is not something the man has the power to change, his current decision is, despite the fact that it will be caused by the past event. Of course, the past cause will cause him to choose not to choose any other way, but that does not mean he is necessitated to choose, for it is due to his nature, beliefs, etc. (his passion for pomegranates, for instance) that the past event causes the decision. Were he a different person, he would not respond in the way he does to the cause. Diodorus, it will be recalled, had proposed an inconsistent triad, consisting of the propositions that “every past event is necessary,” “something impossible does not follow from something possible,” and “something possible neither is nor ever will be true,” and challenged people to define their theory of necessity by choosing which of the three statements to reject. Cleanthes denied that past events are necessary, but Chryssipus, connecting the possible as he does with what we are capable of bringing about, accepted the necessity of past events, since we cannot change them. He accepts the second statement, however, only as long as logical implication is at issue, and rejected the third, as we have seen, since it may well be possible for one to do something, say, to eat meat, even though she never in fact does do it, and remains a consistent vegetarian all her life.

—

[genkaus]

Fair point, in terms of playing devils advocate. If the choice is certain, you must defend it was freely made between alternatives.

If there is only one choice that can be made, it is determined.

Now, moving away from the devil's advocate and coming to my own argument:-

The definition of free-will you used was "being able to make an uncoerced choice between alternatives". The freedom your will is required to have is from coercion - that is - freedom from imposition of another will upon yours.

Now, let's consider your arguments here.

"If the choice is certain, you must defend it was freely made between alternatives." - True that. The choice was made free from coercion and it was still certain.

"If there is only one choice that can be made, it is determined" - True that too. But as long as it is you who did the determining and there was no coercion involved - free-will is not contradicted.