How Free Will and Omniscience Works

[idunno]

Free-will and knowledge of the future is a paradox.

A problem with the OP is in the following:


Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting.

If this is the case, while he does will for democrats, it's not free-will if it's all determined. For example, if he thinks about the prospect about immediate American defeat in Iraq and therefore will definitely not vote for Democrats, then that negates his free-will. Just thinking about the issue will force him to a decision.

If various factors make Donald vote either way - and free-will is not a factor, then there is no free-will.

For free-will to be a factor, you cannot say Donald will vote x given y or t given s, there must be a choice, in which you cannot say he will vote either way and it's not deterministic.

Therefore a problem with your analogy is that it had determinstic view from the start.

Another problem is that it has nothing to do with future knowledge, because, while the device can force the person to stop his free-will decision and will ignoring the whole deterministic part from the start, it cannot have forced the person to originally will either way, only having forced one will AFTER he wills the other way, and in this case, we know his will was originally free but then impeded upon...but the problem with future knowledge is that there is no orginal free-will as in the case of the analogy (ignoring the whole determinstic problem already mentioned).

OK MK, first you're correct in that the analogy presupposes determinism. Harry Frankfurt was a determinist attempting to refute the notion often forwarded by libertarians that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is necessary for free will. Now, his work here doesn't necessarily refute the libertarian brand of free will, rather it shows (in my opinion, but I've had Christians disagree with me on this as well) that the PAP isn't necessary for a choice to actually be free.

Second, in the case of the device overriding his initial choice, this is simply meant to mirror how foreknowledge removes the possibility to choose contrary to what God foreknew you'd choose.

There is a free aspect to our choosing though that isn't done away with by foreknowledge.

I'll try this again (at first with God out of the picture)


You're given a choice between A or B

B please

Now having chosen B can you choose A? I don't see how. But your initial choice was between A or B.

It's "cake or death", not "or death"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNjcuZ-LiSY

It's the same thing with God's foreknowledge. You're presented with options, but you're stuck with your choice....be it cake or death.

[The Grand Nudger]

Unless a precognitive entity foresaw "or death" at which point it -is- or death, or the entity is not precognitive. You seem to be getting hung up on what our (flawed) perception of the event would be, but since you're the one invoking the precog perhaps you should be a little more thorough and willing to accept the consequences of your proposal? That which is determined before the fact can only be considered "choice" in the fevered dreams of apologists. Don't get me wrong, perhaps this is precisely the position we find ourselves in (ala Calvinist garbage), but it doesn't work for me (and it doesn't work for the myth of choice, consequence, and retribution).

[idunno]

Determined by what Rhythm? God's knowing what I would choose?

[The Grand Nudger]

No, and I don't know how many times I'll have to explain this (or to how many people) before it sticks...determined by the requirements that would allow any precognitive entity to know this IE, that the outcome was set in advance.

[idunno]

Are you pushing for a form of causal determinism? I understand that's the route IATIA was going but haven't picked that up from you.

[Mystic]

Idunno, you've just repeated the argument but haven't at all addressed the following two points:

1) There was no free-will in the example you showed (so it no way shows free-will is possible). Stating he accepts determinism and says it's compatible with free-will is just circular reasoning when you have not shown free-will occurred at all.
2) Given there is free-will, it would be due to the fact that the person CAN will two things, but on willing one, will be forced to will another thing....but there is still an initial choice between two things, only one choice will have their mind changed and forced to do another thing. The point is there is an initial freedom to chose between two things. In the case of God knowing the decision you are going to make, there is no two possible choices, there is only one.

So the analogy fails in these two aspects.

[idunno]

1. OK, in the event where he votes Democrat without the coercion of the device, how is it not a free choice?

2. In the analogy, should he try to vote Republican, the device kicks in and causes him to vote Democratic. However, unlike the device, omniscience doesn't even have the potential to override your decision. Replacing the device with God's omniscience in the voting analogy, should Donald actually start to choose Republican, omniscience doesn't steer him back to Democrat.

[Mystic]

1. OK, in the event where he votes Democrat without the coercion of the device, how is it not a free choice?

Because you are already stating the person will vote Democrat unless he thinks of an issue. The point is the way you are presenting it, is that he will chose something no matter what given x or y (without taking account of free-will). When you talk about something that is going to happen, then it's determined. If you stated, he might willingly chose x or be forced to be chose x, this is different then your analogy. The point it's not determined. Then there will be a further problem, because what happens when he is forced to chose x and it's unwillingly?

2. In the analogy, should he try to vote Republican, the device kicks in and causes him to vote Democratic. However, unlike the device, omniscience doesn't even have the potential to override your decision. Replacing the device with God's omniscience in the voting analogy, should Donald actually start to choose Republican, omniscience doesn't steer him back to Democrat.

The point is the analogy fails, because there is two initial wills. The person can freely chose x or freely want y but then forced to want x (the device kicks in). There is still an initial free-will.

The issue with God knowing the future, is that there is no free-will decision to start with, there is no initial choice between two things.

Therefore it's a false analogy.

The whole reason why it's free-will (ignoring the initial problem) is that there is an initial choice between two things. That initial choice when x, is free, but when is not x, and then forced to x, is not free.

There is two possibilities, 1) free choice of x, 2) forced choice of x after not willing x.....

The point is there is two possibilities, there isn't one possibility.

The case with God knowing the future, there is.

1) The choice God knows you are going to make and 2) There is no two or three or four.

[idunno]

MysticKnight, you're a genius! I do admire your critical thinking skills. I hadn't thought of it from this angle (perhaps a case of missing the forest for the trees), but I don't think the analogy is a complete failure. I'll most likely respond tomorrow but I did want to express my respect here.

[Jackalope]

OK, in the event where he votes Democrat without the coercion of the device, how is it not a free choice?

It depends on what you mean by "free choice" (and/or "free will").

The question of free will is one that's been debated since antiquity, and there is no consensus as to what "free will" is. My personal view is that if free will exists (and I am undecided if it does), then free will is incompatible with determinism (and therefore incompatible with precognition).

If you take the compatibilist viewpoint, and see free will as the freedom to act without coercion or restraint but not necessarily without pre-determination, your only problem is that you've redefined "choice" to mean something other what it means. Either that, or you've redefined what it means to be omniscient/precognitive.

Consider standard definitions of "choice", "omniscience", "precognition" and "knowledge":

• Choice: An act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities
  
• Omniscience: Knowing everything
  
• Precognition: The ability to know future events.
  
• Knowledge: Justified true belief.
  

When constrained by these definitions, there is no choice. If before you act, an omniscient/precognitive entity knows that you will choose A and not B, B is not a possibility at all. You cannot choose B when you invoke omniscience/precognition that knows otherwise - not without invalidating what it means to be omniscient/precognitive. If you could choose B, the entity's "precognition" that you would choose A would not be true, or known (things that are false are tautologically not known), and the precognition is not precognition at all (because to be precognition, the events forseen must necessarily be true).

There is no selection, no decision, and there is in fact only one option, and no choice is possible. This is true even if the omniscient/precognitive entity does not force your hand. There is no coercion, but your choice is restrained by the precognitive's future knowledge of your action.

You therefore have no capacity to act freely when you invoke a precognitive omniscient entity who knows your future actions, and your perception of free will in that case is illusory.

Now, you can certainly do as the compatibilists have done and redefine away the problem, but that strikes me as somewhat disingenuous and ad hoc. However, that is what you'd need to do to retain both free will and precognitive omniscience. You can "solve" any dilemma/paradox by redefining the terms - but is that really a solution?

I'll close by saying that an atheist who rejects the compatibilist view doesn't seem likely to find such an argument persuasive.