Conversion

[Tiberius]

Except there is a significant difference. The problem, as I see it, resides in the term "created" and the sense it has of causing P to come into being or to bring P about—that is, its implication of a contingent state of affairs (i.e., could have been otherwise). Such a meaning is consistent with the divine command theory of ethics (DCT) but it simply cannot square with the divine nature theory of ethics (DNT) of Christian theism. It ebbs and flows from contradiction to fallacy. Consider: If P is eternal and immutable, then P was not caused by some S to come into being, or brought about by some S. Ergo, trying to use the word "created" to describe P either flies in the face of the very definition of the word (produces a contradiction) or flies in the face of what is actually asserted about P (produces a fallacy). The word "created" is just too problematic on this issue. (Although, as I said, it works fine for DCT.) And the problems are exacerbated as we explore your argument further.

For example, they emphatically are not both "a product of an attribute of God." The DNT is identified with the very nature of God, which is much more than any one attribute. The DCT, on the other hand, certainly can be described as a product of an attribute of God, viz. omnipotence or his creative powers. You said that "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's creative powers." That is true only if given the DCT. God's creative powers is referenced under the attribute of omnipotence, so actually "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's omnipotence," the power of divine fiat—which is the case only under the DCT, a theory that is not at any rate the subject of our discussion.

"Morality itself for humans is the sum of all the commands of God," you said, "and is therefore a creation of God." That is what the DCT argues for, Adrian. That is decidedly a different beast. Under the DNT, morality in itself for humans is (not the sum of his commands but) the sum of his nature, which is not the same thing as an act or an attribute. The word "created" simply cannot find any foothold in the DNT because under this theory morality is not identified with (i) an act of God, e.g., commands, nor (ii) an attribute of God, e.g., omnipotence or his creative powers. It is identified with the nature of God, which on the one hand is eternal and immutable, etc., and on the other hand is not the same thing as an act of God or an attribute of God.

Fair enough, but the problem still remains in how this morality affects us. I can understand how a created sense of morality can be associated with humanity, but not how one which is simply "God's nature". God's nature includes many things which humans do not possess, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. I guess what I'm asking is (a) how humans can have morality when it is not part of their own nature (or indeed not created as part of them), and (b) how something that is the nature of God can affect anything else at all.

Well no, sorry. That nature is ordered is not something assumed (a priori), it is something observed (a posteriori). Although science does progress from antecedent results, it is not based on those results in the axiomatic sense that I was referring to. Some of the unprovable assumptions that science is based on in the axiomatic sense being discussed were listed; e.g., science operates under the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform, but it cannot use those assumptions to prove the assumptions; as you recognized, that would be viciously circular. That is precisely why such assumptions are "baseless" or unprovable axioms.

But, as I said, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven, that does not in itself cut the rug out from underneath it (otherwise every structure built upon unprovable assumptions must be discarded, lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy). And, thankfully, you agreed.

You contradict yourself, possibly because you got confused over what I meant by "order". I agree with you that science operates on the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform; this is what I meant by "ordered". In other words, the universe has an order to it, it doesn't randomly change for no reason; it follows "laws". That nature is "ordered" is both a priori and a posteriori in that it is the assumption by which science works, and also the observation that science returns to us. The observation cannot be used to prove the assumption because there may very well be a time in the future when our observation contradicts order, thereby showing us that our assumption is in err.

That is by definition an a posteriori argument, Adrian. But the TAG is an a priori argument. It does not argue that P happens to work well with Q by an a posteriori evaluation. It is an a priori argument that in order for Q to be the case (e.g., human experience is intelligible) P must be the case; in other words, that P is the precondition necessary for Q to be the case. An a priori argument (analytic) by definition is not an a posteriori evaluation (empirical). If some assumption P is shown to be necessary in order for some case Q (which describes a real human experience), then one is justified in holding that P—and by "necessary" it is meant that every ¬P assumption fails to account for some case Q; i.e., the impossibility of the contrary.

The problem I have with this is that I have given you ¬P assumptions that account for every aspect of Q. You just ignore them. Your assumptions I hold as ultimately unprovable in any case, as they require the Christian worldview to be true, and I argue that this is in itself unprovable. Your impossibility of the contrary only reveals TAG as a non-proof, for you cannot possibly know every single ¬P (given that there are an infinite number of them) in order to make the statement that every ¬P fails to account for some case Q. Further, as I have stated, there do exist ¬P which explain Q.

Second, the TAG proves the Christian God not by arguing to God, as a conclusion to be reached, but from God, as a presupposition necessary for any conclusion to be reached.

Yet we have agreed previously that any assumption or presupposition cannot be held as proven. If you state God as a presupposition for the argument that logic, knowledge, morality cannot exist, you cannot then state that God exists because your argument is apparently sound. I don't think your argument is sound for the reasons previously given, but even if it were, if God is a presupposition, and thereby an assumption to the argument from which the conclusion is drawn, you cannot hold it as a proof of God, which is the very assumption!

That holds only if cultural relativism is a true account of morality qua morality, which is decidedly not what the TAG argues. As I had said before, begging the question is not a valid criticism but a fallacy; it is faulty reasoning to think one view can be refuted by simply assuming the truth of another view.

I'm not assuming the truth of another view; I'm pointing out the observation that morality is not static. You are simply trying to shift the burden of proof, as it is your claim that morality is static and the "nature of God". I presented evidence against your claim, which is that morality is not static, as observed through history and through our understanding of morality as a product of society rather than anything else. If you have any evidence you want to put forward for your claim, I would love to hear it. However to say that this only holds if cultural relativism is a true account of morality qua morality is to commit the very fallacy you accused me of, namely, to assume the truth of the other view.

The TAG does successfully counter other claims. (This does not include, however, those who try to refute a view by assuming the truth of a competing view, because such a tactic is logically invalid and does not require being countered.)

No it doesn't. Simply saying it does doesn't make it so. I'm not assuming the truth of a competing view, I'm showing you the evidence and explanation of knowledge, morality, and logic. Your unacceptance of these explanations does not refute them, and if TAG was such a great proof, it would easily point out the flaws in the explanations, but it doesn't. It can't because TAG is not a proof of anything, it is yet another attempt at an explanation for the existence of such things, but it is no more. It cannot be held as a proof because there exist ¬P that account for every aspect of Q, and the entire proof relies on there no existing any ¬P that account for Q.

2. These other claims or explanations are not presented as proofs... of?

They are no presented as proofs of anything, that was the point. They are explanations of morality, knowledge, logic, based on what science tells us and what the best reasoning tells us. They could very well be wrong, which is why they nobody considers them "proofs". TAG considers itself a proof, but it does nothing to proof God because it is full of assumption, as well as the assumption that there are no ¬P that account for every aspect of Q when there are plenty of them, and even if there weren't any known about, it does not mean that they do no exist.

Right. But begging the question does not qualify as a disproof of anything. It is a logical fallacy, Adrian. One does not disprove X by assuming the truth of Y. One disproves X by disproving X, either under its own terms or by proving the truth of ¬X (proving, not assuming or stating).

I'm not begging the question at all. What I am pointing out to you is that a proof relies on an assumption to work, is not a proof at all. An assumption by definition can either be true or false, and if the assumption for which the "proof" is based turns out to be false, the entire proof itself is equally false unless it can work around the false assumption with another. If we held the assumption that 1 = 3, we can deduce that based on this assumption, 1 + 1 = 6. However it is easy to show in mathematics that 1 =/= 3, so the conclusion of 1 + 1 = 6 does not hold any longer.

Nowhere did I assume the truth of Y; the entire point of my point was to demonstrate how TAG is not a proof, given that it must rely on an unproven assumption to operate, and if that assumption was proven wrong, it would fall apart.

First, "yes they can" is not a rebuttal but a fallacy; X is not refuted by simply assuming the truth of Y. Second, describing the details of a competing view does not a refutation make; X is not shown to fail by the mere existence of Y.

X is a claim that there are no other explanations that account for something. To show that there are other explanations for that something is to show that X is wrong, or at least not a complete explanation of the "something". TAG claims that the Christian God is the only explanation for morality, knowledge, and ethics. This can be easily shown to not be the case by the other Gods scenario, which I have gone over.

If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG) and vice-versa, then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.

The problem with this is that it is not what I argued. I didn't say "God X has all the attributes of the Christian God and vice-versa". I said that God X has all the attributes of the Christian God (one way). God X could have more attributes, for instance the ability to lie (a Christian pastor once told me that God cannot lie, so I hold this as my example). I am sure there are many other attributes that one could think of, so please explain how God X does not fit the requirements of TAG.

[Ryft]

I am responding to this tomorrow, Adrian. I have a couple of business meetings in the morning, but after that the entire day is mine and I'll devote it to responding to you. (P.S. Don't respond to this, since tomorrow I am going to 'edit' this with my full response.)

[littlegrimlin1]

What would it take to convince a theist that they are wrong?

What would it take to convince an atheist that they are wrong?

Faith just misconstrues EVERYTHING. The faith of a theist will most likely blind him to your reason.. however, if you give him some of our strong arguements against his faith... possibly if he's open to a little thought, he will look into it.

Convincing an atheist? well... I have no idea, there is NO way I could be convinced to convert. I'm only 16 so... my parents could argue, pursuade me, or try to punish me to convert to their ways. If I was to give in and be passive, I would only pretend at the most. Otherwise, I will argue it to the death.

Atheism is a great thing! Everyone who agrees, give me a hoorah!!!

[Tiberius]

I refer to myself as a Strong Atheist because I not only do not believe in gods, but I believe they do not exist.

You think faith misconstrues everything yet you make a faith based statement like "I believe [gods] do not exist".

Contradiction much?

Atheism is a great thing, but not your kind of atheism. The only logical and rational form of atheism is that of agnostic atheism. Disbelieving whilst at the same time admitting that you simply do not know whether gods exist or not.

[littlegrimlin1]

I refer to myself as a Strong Atheist because I not only do not believe in gods, but I believe they do not exist.

Atheism is a great thing, but not your kind of atheism. The only logical and rational form of atheism is that of agnostic atheism. Disbelieving whilst at the same time admitting that you simply do not know whether gods exist or not.

Hmm, yes, does make sense. I shall look into it, thank you sir!

[Retorth]

Atheism is a great thing! Everyone who agrees, give me a hoorah!!!

Hoorah!


Just don't go militant on us LOL I ain't gonna salute you, bro

[Ryft]

Fair enough, but the problem still remains in how this morality affects us. I can understand how a created sense of morality can be associated with humanity, but not how one which is simply "God's nature." God's nature includes many things which humans do not possess, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. I guess what I'm asking is (a) how humans can have morality when it is not part of their own nature (or indeed not created as part of them), and (b) how something that is the nature of God can affect anything else at all.

The relationship between the DNT and our own moral compass is explicated in the doctrine of imago Dei (i.e., created in the image of God). We were designed to be sensitive and responsive to the ethical and rational normatives contained by our Creator. This is why only Judeo-Christianity can speak rationally and intelligibly about behavior and noetic equipment both functioning properly, a normative standard about how faculties ought to function (viz. something functions 'properly' insofar as it functions the way it is intended or ought to). When the atheist uses such language he is stealing intellectual currency that his own worldview cannot produce; any concept that relies upon or involves purpose or design is unintelligible under an evolutionary framework because selective forces in nature are adaptive, not teleological. The consistent atheist never utters statements about normative functioning, but rather (as per Plantinga) only statements about descriptive functioning, which is epistemically and ethically impotent. The matter is worse than this but I do not want to digress too far.

I agree with you, that science operates on the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform. That is what I meant by 'ordered' ... That [the laws of nature are uniform] is both a priori and a posteriori insofar as (i) it is the assumption by which science works and (ii) the observation that science returns to us.

That the laws of nature are uniform is actually not something that science returns to us. What we know a posteriori is that the laws of nature in this locality are consistent with the laws of nature in that locality, but by no means does that prove "the laws of nature are uniform" throughout every locality—especially when it is recognized that we've barely explored but 5% of the known universe. The uniformity of nature's laws is something we have assumed prior to investigation, not something we concluded from investigation. Moreover, assuming such a priori is what allowed us to even consider a posteriori investigations in the first place. Same goes for other assumptions by which science operates but cannot itself prove, like inductive inference which (as per Hume) cannot be proven except inductively, which is viciously circular. This is why 'logical positivism' in the early 20th century, and its bastard offspring 'scientism' today (see The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2005), are paralyzing dialectical loops and therefore irrational.

The problem I have with this is that I have given you ¬P assumptions that account for every aspect of Q.

Correction: you propose that ¬P assumptions adequately account for every aspect of Q. Whether or not it actually succeeds is quite a different matter, which our present discussion has not in any way examined. Until such an analysis is had, it is not a valid refutation of the TAG—hence the force of my rebuttal, that the TAG is not disproven by assuming the truth of a competing view. Do your ¬P assumptions succeed? The TAG contends that they do not, under an internal critique of their own terms (q.v. the "naturalistic fallacy" as per Moore, the "is/ought problem" as per Hume, the "arbitrary criteria" as per Butler, etc.). For example, under the ¬P-influenced framework you proposed, ethical statements are not normative and, therefore, are not even ethical statements (because ethics by definition are normative).

But now observe the extraordinary cognitive dissonance produced by what you argue next:

Your assumptions I hold as ultimately unprovable in any case, as they require the Christian worldview to be true, and I argue that this is in itself unprovable.

Adrian, do you not even realize how horrifically self-defeating this is? If we must reject as unprovable anything that is built upon unprovable assumptions, then we are left with Nihilism. Every product of human thought—including the esteemed natural sciences—is built upon some unprovable assumption or other, and therefore (by your above argument) must likewise be rejected as unprovable. Moreover, this includes and therefore destroys the basis of your above argument, and therefore the argument itself. (Notice, too, that it defeats your argument that ¬P assumptions account for every aspect of Q.) I would recommend abandoning such a position because the only thing it offers is a paralyzing dialectical loop.

[The TAG fails because] you cannot possibly know every single ¬P (given that there are an infinite number of them).

There are not an infinite number of ¬P. There is a finite number of them by definition; namely, just one. Butler draws our attention to Förster's point that transcendental arguments do not "set out to provide a uniqueness proof by refuting an indefinite or infinite number of worldviews. Rather the proof is provided by refuting the negation of the conceptual scheme or worldview that one is attempting to establish" (which in our discussion is identified as ¬P). Bahnsen articulated the point clearest when he indicated that every competing view is united at the basic level in setting aside the Christian conception of God: "The indirect manner of proving the Christian position is, thus, to exhibit the intelligibility of reasoning, science, morality, etc., within the context of biblical presuppositions ... and then to make an internal criticism of the presuppositions of autonomous thought (in whatever form it is presently being discussed) in order to show that it destroys the possibility of proving, understanding, or communicating anything" (Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1998. Print. pg. 489. See also: Förster, Eckart. "How are Transcendental Arguments Possible?" Reading Kant. Eds. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Print. pp. 3-20; Van Til, Cornelius. A Survey of Christian Epistemology. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969. Print. pg. xi).

If you state God as a presupposition for the argument that logic, knowledge, and morality exist, you cannot then state that God exists because your argument is apparently sound.

Either you are ignoring what the TAG does or you're trying to deny a tautology, for the TAG does not simply state God as a presupposition but rather argues that God is a necessary precondition. And if the argument proves that P is necessary in order for Q, then we most certainly can state that it has proven that P is necessary in order for Q. It follows tautologically. You can deny that the argument has made its case, but you cannot say that by making its case it has not made its case.

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MISCELLANY:

But even if [the TAG were sound], if God is a presupposition and thereby an assumption to the argument from which the conclusion is drawn, you cannot hold it as a proof of God, which is the very assumption!

The logical structure known as modus ponens is formally valid:

1. If Q (morality), then P (God)
2. Q (morality)
3. Therefore, P (God).

The TAG is that by which we establish the first premise, by arguing (not merely stating) that God is a necessary precondition (not merely a convenient assumption).

I'm not assuming the truth of another view; I'm pointing out the observation that morality is not static.

Let me prove that you are, by having you answer the following question: Is the proposition "morality is not static" true?

If you have any evidence you want to put forward for your claim [that morality is absolute], I would love to hear it.

Okay: the DNT, as defended by the TAG.

Your unacceptance of [competing views] does not refute them.

True. But I never suggested such a thing in the first place. I said "the TAG does successfully counter other claims," by working to show that they refute themselves under an internal criticism of their own terms. If ¬P is impossible, then P is proven.

If the TAG was such a great proof, it would easily point out the flaws in the explanations, but it doesn't.

Instead of responding with a tedious "yes it does," let me instead request of you: What internal critique of a competing view have you observed the TAG failing to prove the flaws of? (Note: you cannot point to anything in our present discussion because no internal critique of a competing view has taken place yet.)

P is the claim that there are no other explanations that account for Q.

Incorrect. P would be delusional if it claimed such a thing, for there are many ¬P-influenced explanations for Q. Rather, it claims that ¬P cannot successfully account for Q, by an internal critique of its own terms.

I didn't say "DX has all the attributes of CG and vice-versa." I said that DX has all the attributes of CG [but not vice-versa]. DX could have more attributes, for instance the ability to lie. (A Christian pastor once told me that God cannot lie, so I hold this as my example). I am sure there are many other attributes that one could think of, so please explain how DX does not fit the requirements of the TAG.

If DX can lie, then he could deceive us in what he reveals about himself to us, and therefore we have no trustworthy means of defending the TAG (based as it is on DX's revelation).

[theVOID]

Arcanus:

You do realize that you can have the most logically coherent possible hypothesis for a phenomenon but without evidence to discern between your assumption and any other you have failed to meet the most basic requirements of a truth statement.

Even if your TAG was logically flawless (which it is not) it does not matter because you have no evidence to differentiate your hypothesis from any other imaginable hypothesis.

The idea that the universe was the product of two gay hippos having anal sex in the multiverse is no more unsupported that your God-concept, nor is any other, from an infinite universe to infinite regress to the multiverse to our universe being a white hole at the other side of a collapsed star... NONE of these are any more relevant than ANY other until you have evidence to weigh the possibilities.

It doesn't matter what belief you like the most, what one you feel more comfortable with, what one you grew up with or what one best fits your silly hypothetical models, without evidence you still haven't achieved anything!

[Ryft]

Without evidence to discern between your assumption and any other you have failed to meet the most basic requirements of a truth statement.

So then, "No proposition can be held as true unless it can be verifed either by empirical observations or logical tautology." Is that it?

Even if your TAG was logically flawless (which it is not) ...

Feel free to present its logical flaws. Let's see if you are correct.

The idea that the universe was the product of two gay hippos having anal sex ...

I think you have grossly misunderstood the TAG, for it is not a cosmological model.

[theVOID]

Without evidence to discern between your assumption and any other you have failed to meet the most basic requirements of a truth statement.

So then, "No proposition can be held as true unless it can be verifed either by empirical observations or logical tautology." Is that it?

No, not OR logical tautology(keep in mind this not need be the case for less significant claims), Evidence and Logical tautology. But for the most part i regard the human logic as rather meaningless without evidence when you get to the big questions. Quantum superposition and tunneling are fine examples where out predefined logical process is worthless. When you get to the first million trillionths of a second of the universe and everything is in the same state (unified field) and our logic and laws are worthless completely, so to make a statement about certain aspects of reality you need far more than just logical models.

Even if your TAG was logically flawless (which it is not) ...

Feel free to present its logical flaws. Let's see if you are correct.

Others on this forum have already done so.

The idea that the universe was the product of two gay hippos having anal sex ...

I think you have grossly misunderstood the TAG, for it is not a cosmological model.

No, it was a general example about statements of the unknown. Even the most stupid sounding thing you could imagine is equally valid an explanation when there is absolutely no evidence to use to distinguish one assumption from another.