Not Convinced Determinism Makes Sense of Moral Responsibility. Convince Me It Does

[Mudhammam]

Thanks for the responses, I have found them very thoughtful and satisfactory. I would like to clarify one point made by genkaus. You said,

So, in the end, while your existence is still deterministic in nature, there are two parts to your programming - one which is alterable by yourself and one which is a given. Any action attributable to the alterable component can have a moral dimension. Given this, the idea of free-will that I find relevant to moral responsibility is freedom from any unalterable factors such as external constraints or biological conditions.

Can you expound more on the part of our programming that is alterable by ourselves? In a deterministic universe, it doesn't seem that any of us could actually *choose* to alter anything as our illusion of choosing to do so is also part of the chain of causality which we ultimately have no control over. So how is this different from external constraints or biological conditions?

I'd like to switch gears slightly, from determinism-morality to determinism-rationality. My brother, who is a fundamentalist Christian, put forth this argument:
"Naturalism is the belief or idea that nature is all that exist (and no intelligent being exists). On naturalism, laws and constants randomly came into being that could sustain life (against odds of 1 to billions), simultaneously with space, time, and energy that was determined to become mass (form stars), then a life sustaining planet, then life from chemistry (the odds of this are presently unknown but estimated at zero on probability since there is no knowledge of how abiogenesis could even take place or if it did), then life developed into life with consciousness, and then conscious life with an abstract idea (naturalism is true), that you assert is justifiable to believe. But if you hold this view, you must also hold that such an idea arises as the result of merely determined physical forces (from the origin of the universe), in which case there would be no grounds for holding this particular worldview to be particularly true but excellent grounds for holding it to be highly likely to be false since you believe that it is the mere result of determined chemical reactions in the brain presenting to you your belief. So it seems you have a defeater for your belief on your very beliefs. Your grounds for naturalism being true, are sufficient grounds for holding that naturalism is almost certainly false. You say that naturalism is true, but that not only seems extremely unlikely on the face of it, the idea that naturalism is true is a determined belief that is the result of non-rational chemical reactions that brought you to that belief." He quotes C.S. Lewis as basically making the same point: "The point, of course, is that naturalism is precisely a worldview that entails our reasoning processes being the product of irrational causes. One’s beliefs are determined, not by following an argument to its logical conclusion, but by the chemical processes in the brain, or the psychological processes in the subconscious; in which case, they are the product of irrational causes."

Now I don't personally find this argument to be very strong and I can share the response I gave him if anyone is interested, but I'm curious to hear how others would answer this.

[pocaracas]

The fine tuning argument...
Everything in it has been quite nicely explained by apo a few months ago...
https://atheistforums.org/thread-17548-p...#pid427264

[Mudhammam]

The fine tuning argument...
Everything in it has been quite nicely explained by apo a few months ago...
https://atheistforums.org/thread-17548-p...#pid427264

I don't think that is the point of this argument, though he did fudge in there some silly mathematical calculations perhaps to make his argument sound better.

[Angrboda]

I'm going to delete that post yet.



For another take.... http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.4647

[pocaracas]

I'm going to delete that post yet.

Why? You don't like it?
I think that post should be given its own thread and stickied somewhere for quick reference when someone comes by using this argument.

For another take.... http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.4647

70 pages? I find your version much easier to read!

---

I don't think that is the point of this argument, though he did fudge in there some silly mathematical calculations perhaps to make his argument sound better.

Whenever someone argues that everything is random and then claims that each iteration had an infinitesimal chance of occurring, they are using the fine tuning argument.

You can also read something about it here: http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?t...g_argument

[genkaus]

Can you expound more on the part of our programming that is alterable by ourselves? In a deterministic universe, it doesn't seem that any of us could actually *choose* to alter anything as our illusion of choosing to do so is also part of the chain of causality which we ultimately have no control over. So how is this different from external constraints or biological conditions?

"Choice" is a difficult concept to analyze without the metaphysical preconceptions. Specifically, within the classical determinism/free-will debate, the concept of "choice" is regarded as antithetical to determinism. And it is those ideas about choice that inform our view about "control".

For example, suppose I go to a restaurant, look over the menu and consider the following factors a) the steak here is good and within budget, b) the lobster is better but expensive, c) the chicken was undercooked last time. Thus, I come to a decision and make the "choice" of ordering steak. Now, a determinist would say that since these factors were processed by my consciousness to give a logical result, there was no actual choice involved. A believer of free-will might argue that "I" had a certain leeway, that the output of these factors was not binding and therefore the element of choice was involved.

Where both these positions go wrong is with the assumption that "I" am an observer apart from the actual causal chain. Even the determinist regards the processes that went into the decision making as somehow separate from the "I" - and the question both parties argue over is whether or not that observer can affect the causal chain while remaining separate from it and they give their opinion regarding choice based on it. They assume that if this a-causal observer can affect the causal chain, then he can exert control and has choice and if he can't, then both control and choice are illusions

But if we accept that the observer, the "I", is a part of the causal chain, then the previous idea regarding choice becomes meaningless. Both control and choice cannot come from something beyond but must be a part of the causal chain itself. So, in this scenario, the way we re-examined our idea about free-will (what is it supposed to be free from), we also need to re-examine the idea about choice and control.

My view on the matter is that a system needs the capacity to consider and evaluate alternate scenarios and make decision accordingly in order to have the idea of choice apply. That the decision can be attributed to the nature of programming does not negate the fact that the program did have control and made a choice.

I'd like to switch gears slightly, from determinism-morality to determinism-rationality. My brother, who is a fundamentalist Christian, put forth this argument:
"Naturalism is the belief or idea that nature is all that exist (and no intelligent being exists). On naturalism, laws and constants randomly came into being that could sustain life (against odds of 1 to billions), simultaneously with space, time, and energy that was determined to become mass (form stars), then a life sustaining planet, then life from chemistry (the odds of this are presently unknown but estimated at zero on probability since there is no knowledge of how abiogenesis could even take place or if it did), then life developed into life with consciousness, and then conscious life with an abstract idea (naturalism is true), that you assert is justifiable to believe. But if you hold this view, you must also hold that such an idea arises as the result of merely determined physical forces (from the origin of the universe), in which case there would be no grounds for holding this particular worldview to be particularly true but excellent grounds for holding it to be highly likely to be false since you believe that it is the mere result of determined chemical reactions in the brain presenting to you your belief. So it seems you have a defeater for your belief on your very beliefs. Your grounds for naturalism being true, are sufficient grounds for holding that naturalism is almost certainly false. You say that naturalism is true, but that not only seems extremely unlikely on the face of it, the idea that naturalism is true is a determined belief that is the result of non-rational chemical reactions that brought you to that belief." He quotes C.S. Lewis as basically making the same point: "The point, of course, is that naturalism is precisely a worldview that entails our reasoning processes being the product of irrational causes. One’s beliefs are determined, not by following an argument to its logical conclusion, but by the chemical processes in the brain, or the psychological processes in the subconscious; in which case, they are the product of irrational causes."

Now I don't personally find this argument to be very strong and I can share the response I gave him if anyone is interested, but I'm curious to hear how others would answer this.

While others have given more than sufficient replies to answer your brother's position, I'll leave you with this little nugget. When dealing with arguments such as these, try and see is the "fallacy of stolen concept" is being applied. Figure out which premises need to apply for the the idea behind the argument to work and see if the argument itself contradicts them.

For example, whether or not something is regarded as random is determined by whether or not it fits our idea of "order", i.e. whether or not it is in accordance with the known natural laws. Thus, regarding the origin of those laws themselves as "random" or "orderly" would be ignoring the basic concept behind it.

Similarly, when spouting probabilities regarding possibility of our existence, one should examine the idea behind probability. For example, when considering the probability of a coin-toss or a card-draw, we base our calculations on the knowledge of other possible outcomes. We know that those other outcomes are possible because we know them to occur. So we don't have a way to determine the "probability" of this universe in its current state because we have no knowledge of other universes to compare it to.

Further, even if those arguments about randomness and unlikeliness were correct - all it'd establish is the probability of naturalism being true as low. It does not prove that it is "almost certainly false" nor is it an argument against it. In fact, I'd say that probability calculation is a flawed way of going about determining the truth or falsehood of a claim, because it simply gives you a general idea about its possibility, not its actuality. It may be improbable for a person to survive an 8-storey fall, but that probability is not evidence that a person who fell 8-storeys and is now standing is, in fact, dead.

[Angrboda]

I'm going to delete that post yet.

Why? You don't like it?
I think that post should be given its own thread and stickied somewhere for quick reference when someone comes by using this argument.

I don't like being quoted as an authority, period, much less as an authority on something my opinion is not authoritative for. The only reason that post exists is because I couldn't sleep, was irritable, and needed something to pass the time to distract me. There are exaggerations in it. Not many, but a few. But if people want to cite someone, they should cite actual primary or secondary literature, not the ramblings of a disgruntled internet poster.

[MindForgedManacle]

But that's boring.

[Mudhammam]

Can you expound more on the part of our programming that is alterable by ourselves? In a deterministic universe, it doesn't seem that any of us could actually *choose* to alter anything as our illusion of choosing to do so is also part of the chain of causality which we ultimately have no control over. So how is this different from external constraints or biological conditions?

"Choice" is a difficult concept to analyze without the metaphysical preconceptions. Specifically, within the classical determinism/free-will debate, the concept of "choice" is regarded as antithetical to determinism. And it is those ideas about choice that inform our view about "control".

For example, suppose I go to a restaurant, look over the menu and consider the following factors a) the steak here is good and within budget, b) the lobster is better but expensive, c) the chicken was undercooked last time. Thus, I come to a decision and make the "choice" of ordering steak. Now, a determinist would say that since these factors were processed by my consciousness to give a logical result, there was no actual choice involved. A believer of free-will might argue that "I" had a certain leeway, that the output of these factors was not binding and therefore the element of choice was involved.

Where both these positions go wrong is with the assumption that "I" am an observer apart from the actual causal chain. Even the determinist regards the processes that went into the decision making as somehow separate from the "I" - and the question both parties argue over is whether or not that observer can affect the causal chain while remaining separate from it and they give their opinion regarding choice based on it. They assume that if this a-causal observer can affect the causal chain, then he can exert control and has choice and if he can't, then both control and choice are illusions

But if we accept that the observer, the "I", is a part of the causal chain, then the previous idea regarding choice becomes meaningless. Both control and choice cannot come from something beyond but must be a part of the causal chain itself. So, in this scenario, the way we re-examined our idea about free-will (what is it supposed to be free from), we also need to re-examine the idea about choice and control.

My view on the matter is that a system needs the capacity to consider and evaluate alternate scenarios and make decision accordingly in order to have the idea of choice apply. That the decision can be attributed to the nature of programming does not negate the fact that the program did have control and made a choice.

I'd like to switch gears slightly, from determinism-morality to determinism-rationality. My brother, who is a fundamentalist Christian, put forth this argument:
"Naturalism is the belief or idea that nature is all that exist (and no intelligent being exists). On naturalism, laws and constants randomly came into being that could sustain life (against odds of 1 to billions), simultaneously with space, time, and energy that was determined to become mass (form stars), then a life sustaining planet, then life from chemistry (the odds of this are presently unknown but estimated at zero on probability since there is no knowledge of how abiogenesis could even take place or if it did), then life developed into life with consciousness, and then conscious life with an abstract idea (naturalism is true), that you assert is justifiable to believe. But if you hold this view, you must also hold that such an idea arises as the result of merely determined physical forces (from the origin of the universe), in which case there would be no grounds for holding this particular worldview to be particularly true but excellent grounds for holding it to be highly likely to be false since you believe that it is the mere result of determined chemical reactions in the brain presenting to you your belief. So it seems you have a defeater for your belief on your very beliefs. Your grounds for naturalism being true, are sufficient grounds for holding that naturalism is almost certainly false. You say that naturalism is true, but that not only seems extremely unlikely on the face of it, the idea that naturalism is true is a determined belief that is the result of non-rational chemical reactions that brought you to that belief." He quotes C.S. Lewis as basically making the same point: "The point, of course, is that naturalism is precisely a worldview that entails our reasoning processes being the product of irrational causes. One’s beliefs are determined, not by following an argument to its logical conclusion, but by the chemical processes in the brain, or the psychological processes in the subconscious; in which case, they are the product of irrational causes."

Now I don't personally find this argument to be very strong and I can share the response I gave him if anyone is interested, but I'm curious to hear how others would answer this.

While others have given more than sufficient replies to answer your brother's position, I'll leave you with this little nugget. When dealing with arguments such as these, try and see is the "fallacy of stolen concept" is being applied. Figure out which premises need to apply for the the idea behind the argument to work and see if the argument itself contradicts them.

For example, whether or not something is regarded as random is determined by whether or not it fits our idea of "order", i.e. whether or not it is in accordance with the known natural laws. Thus, regarding the origin of those laws themselves as "random" or "orderly" would be ignoring the basic concept behind it.

Similarly, when spouting probabilities regarding possibility of our existence, one should examine the idea behind probability. For example, when considering the probability of a coin-toss or a card-draw, we base our calculations on the knowledge of other possible outcomes. We know that those other outcomes are possible because we know them to occur. So we don't have a way to determine the "probability" of this universe in its current state because we have no knowledge of other universes to compare it to.

Further, even if those arguments about randomness and unlikeliness were correct - all it'd establish is the probability of naturalism being true as low. It does not prove that it is "almost certainly false" nor is it an argument against it. In fact, I'd say that probability calculation is a flawed way of going about determining the truth or falsehood of a claim, because it simply gives you a general idea about its possibility, not its actuality. It may be improbable for a person to survive an 8-storey fall, but that probability is not evidence that a person who fell 8-storeys and is now standing is, in fact, dead.

Thank you for taking the time to reply. So you would consider your position under the umbrella of compatibilism? As to my brother's argument, I want to get away from the fine-tuning argument he imbeds in his premises and get to the issue Darwin himself seemed unsure about in one his letters often quote-mined by creationists: "Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" So basically, if our claim is that naturalism is true, does it necessitate a skepticism about the reliability of our thought processes to the extent that it undermines our claim? (I think this phrasing might be misguided but this is essentially the argument I have encountered).

correction: the quote I earlier attributed to C.S. Lewis actually belonged to a "commentator on Lewis" (according to my brother) though Lewis basically made the same argument.

Also, how the hell do I hide this obnoxiously long quote so that you don't have to scroll through everything we already stated multiple times?

[MindForgedManacle]

C.S. Lewis was an idiot. A good writer perhaps, but what I've read of his forays into philosophy have been dreadful in my opinion.

Now, I know you didn't direct that question at me - which can be summed up as "If naturalism (and evolution) is true, then doesn't that undermine the basis for rationally holding to the belief that naturalism is true?" - but I'd like to take a stab at it, because it's basically just Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.

The simplest way I know of to answer that is that A = A, regardless of how A originated. Another way of going at it is to point out that it is the application of one's reasoning faculty that determines its capability to apprehend truth, not how it came about. If a calculator spontaneously appeared out of a quantum vacuum, yet still worked exactly as any other calculator, would its seeming miraculous origin actually matter in regards to its ability to solve mathematical problems? Of course not, that's a red herring fallacy. If it works, it works. To repeat, it's application, not originaion, that matters with things like this

And it rather confuses some thing about evolution, I think. The only way the argument can be consistent is to claim that being able to determine the truth about one's environment is not an ability that enhances a species ability to survive, which is self-evidently absurd.


Further, I could turn it around on theists: How do you know God is all-good (skipping the question of God's existence all together for the sake of argument)? Given he's omnipotent and omniscient, he could be an all-malevolent being who merely uses his infinite power to continuously fool you about everything via illusions and interfering with you having a functional capacity to reason. There's no way out of this, because God could merely interfere with your reasoning to prevent you from realizing this. Even if you asked him, he could lie and you'd be none the wiser. He could even make you miss or forget any contradictions between his word and reality.

See why this line of reasoning is pointless? I can always invent something that doesn't really tell you if it's true or not, despite being possible. Christian apologists really like their fatuous "Get out of Solipsism Free" card, not realzing it makes them look like tools. I don't aim this at you, but at people like Craig and Plantinga, who enjoy taking a dump on the discipline I've become interested in, as well as others like science and history.