The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[MindForgedManacle]

And contrary to what our entrepid Christian/Muslim friends would have us believe, Dawkins' objection to the (I think?) ontological argument quoted above is actually hitting on the right path, which admittedly isn't always the case with Dawkins. It's generally seen as problematic by philosophers since Immanuel Kant (himself a devout Christian) to try and use modal logic (namely axiom S5, which Plantinga's argument uses) to try and say something about metaphysics. In fact, analytic philosophy in general has, for the last 70-ish years, effectively abandoned metaphysics because it is generally seen as vacuous unless it is taking in the newest science, among other things. Metaphysics can be interesting (and difficult), but divorced from the evidence of the actual world we experience, analytic philosophers are more tempted to see it as... well, maybe not exactly mental ejaculation but at least extremely uncertain throughout.

[Rational AKD]

And as I thought, you really didn't have an answer. If God, say, popped into existence ex nihilo his existence would be contingent, yet that has nothing to do with diminishing omnipotence in the slightest. If you got rid of that event, then you'd get rid of God, sure. But then it becomes a "so what?" moment. God is still capable of doing anything logically possible (for the most part) regardless. Now, you can add to the concept of omnipotence that it must include non-contingence, but you are trying to disguise what you're doing.
And again, if God were contingent, why would that mean he was made of matter?

to pop into existance ex nihilo is impossible. nothing is the absence of anything, which means no things, no properties, no anything. as such, nothing can't "do" anything. if something popped into existence, caused by nothing, you would essentially be saying nothing caused something which is logically absurd. if something exists and it is possible for it not to exist, there must be a reason it exists rather than not.

How can I know that when all I have is epistemic possibility?

so Stanford is wrong then? also i think it's funny you think something can only be known metaphysically possible if it is physically demonstrated. yet what if the metaphysically possibility is known a priori? for example, logic dictates its metaphysical possibility. then according to Kant, such a thing would be "necessarily possible" which can simply be reduced to possible using axiom S5 (the one you hate so much even though there's nothing wrong with it).

Er, hence "theoretical" in my post. But hey, ignoring words is your game so by all means continue.

you claimed it was theoretical as though that is proof it is metaphysically possible yet it's not even shown to be mathematically possible yet. this was after you claimed you can only show it is metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated. you were intentionally misleading as an attempt to avoid admitting defeat concerning the Stanford example.

In a real sense, all I have is epistemic possibility that it's possible. After all, it hasn't been demonstrated, and is as far as we know physically impossible in this world. So sure, within the language-game of an epistemic-metaphysical distinction, I only have epistemic possibility, and so do you, about certain things. Of course, whichever stance you take on this distinction, accept or reject, basically defeats your argument because on the former the argument is inert and on the latter it is stalemated, hence why I say it's useless for this sort of thing.

not even Kant would agree with you there. he gives distinction between a priori and a posteriori and both are said to prove metaphysical possibility or necessity. you're making your own baseless assertions.

Are you referring to Madoyle's argument? Both of tye versions of his argument run into the same problem as Plantinga's argument. How does Maydoyle know that "great-making" properties are better to have than to lack? How does Maydoyle know that certain

that is how they are defined. if X is a perfection, then it is better to have X than lack it. this would be what is called a priori, just as 2+2=4 is a priori. so how does this come into play?
1. greater making properties don't entail their negation of lesser making properties.
2. omnipotence is a maximally great making property.
3. therefore omnipotence cannot entail its negation of non-omnipotence.
since it can't entail its negation, it can't be impossible which means it is possible.

"great-making" properties are even compatible when held by the same object? Again, confusing epistemology with metaphysics.

in this case, there is only one great making property necessary here. so there's no conflict between multiple great making properties.

..WHAT? No. To be logically valid is to say the argument's conclusion follows from the premises

that's a rewording of what i said. the conclusion follows (or is true) from the premises. you can also say the truth of the conclusion is directly related to the truth of the premises. again, you're playing semantics. and the way i worded it is also worded similarly in many sources:

A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

An argument is valid just if it would be impossible for its premises all to be true and its conclusion false simultaneously.
http://logic.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/tutorial1/Tut1-07.htm

A valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion.
http://www.unc.edu/~megw/Logic.html

i.e free from logical fallacies.

no. an argument without a logical fallacy can still be invalid. furthermore, an argument with an informal fallacy can still be a valid argument.

SOUNDNESS deals in the actual truth of the premises themselves.

yes, it is sound if it is valid and the premises are true.

If there is even a SINGLE possible world in which metaphysical naturalism is true, then God cannot exist, period. Why? Just think about your own argument and take into account what Alex K has been trying to tell you. God is defined as a necessary being. A being who, if and ONLY IF he exists, he exists in all possible states of affairs. But if there is even ONE possible world that is a Metaphysically natural one, God does not exist there. But if God does not exist in any possible world, he exists in none of them because God only exists if he exists in all possible worlds by your own argument.

is that not what i said from the beginning? you really need to learn how to listen..

what you seem to miss is that argument can only be valid given the modal ontological argument is valid (which you obviously don't think is true).

and i also answered why it's not a stalemate.

so if hypothetically we were to say the MOA is valid, then your modal naturalism argument would be valid; however, you can only show P1 is true by showing P1 of the MOA is false. so it still doesn't get around debunking the MOA even if your argument is valid.

so in other words if the MOA is valid then yes, if naturalism is true in one possible world God doesn't exist in any. but that also means in order to show naturalism is true in a possible world, you must show P1 of the MOA is false. so it still all comes down to proving P1 is false. the MOA in this case has a clear advantage because you must prove it is necessary God doesn't exist in order to prove P1 MOA false and i must only prove it is possible God exists to prove P1 MOA true. this is the problem you have in building the validity of your argument upon the validity of an opposing one.

Hence, the only way to to defeat this is to say that metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, and thus not true in any possible world.

wrong. again, you built the validity of that argument upon the validity of the MOA. if the MOA is invalid, so is your argument. but, if the MOA is valid, then if P1 is true then P1 in your argument is false. so you must prove P1 of the MOA false to prove P1 of your argument true. it is not a stalemate.

A god that is made of anything can be affected by some thing, even if not matter.

this is not the problem. the problem is if it can be broken down or destroyed. if something is comprised of an indestructible fundamental substance, then it can be omnipotent. i would argue mind is this substance.

The brain is produced by the mind?

yes, all matter is derived from mind.

So you admit to a lack of evidence?

no, i'm pointing out your lack of evidence.

At the very least, lack of evidence for independent sentiencies should not lead to the conclusion that they are likely to exist.

i never once said that. i said that means you can't rule it out.

I recall you saying that something is metaphysically possible so long as it is not internally contradictory. How about physically?

unless the concept is physical in nature and has a property that contradicts its physical nature then no.

Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.
...
Φ is physically possible with respect to physical laws L if and only if Φ is logically consistent with L.
Example: Given the actual laws of physics, it is physically possible for a train to travel at 150 mph.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

Energy is not matter, agreed.

mind can't be broken down to energy either.

Is dualism falsifiable? If not, then there is no point in discussing it.

if you mean substance dualism, then yes actually. 2 substances can only interact if they share a property. for mind and matter to interact, either mind must have a physical property with matter or matter must have a mental property with mind. substance dualism states both mind and matter are fundamental. but if both are fundamental, they can't share a property and therefore they can't interact. this falsifies substance dualism. and this goes a little into the introspective argument.

Laws of nature and laws of logic, only.

first, you are making an arbitrary limitation. if those laws can be necessary, then why can't anything else be necessary? second, laws of nature are not necessary, or at least not metaphysically necessary. we can easily imagine a world where nature is different. what if relativity wasn't true? what if friction didn't produce heat but instead some other energy? what if energy can be created and destroyed? such things are physically impossible in our world, but they are not metaphysically impossible.

I don't think that the truths are necessary, per se, rather, they are axiomatic. For all I we know, the universe could have had very different laws of physics for whatever reason.

that goes back to what i just said. laws of nature can be different, laws of logic cannot. among non-falsifiable things are: law of identity, law of non-contradiction, and law of excluded middle.

So, if I define the wonderful cosmic cheeseburger as "a non-physical entity that projects the illusion of a cheeseburger into people's minds, whose existence is not contingent on anything, but is otherwise limited in power", does it now exist?

Déjà vu. we've been through this before and you've forgotten everything. a cheeseburger only has physical properties. an immaterial cheese burger would have no properties. so all you're doing is saying "what if this thing, which is nothing, had omnipotence?"

In fact, would said cheeseburger not be more likely to exist, because it is not infinite?

God is not infinite in a mathematical sense. he is only infinite in a valued sense.

Surely true omnipotence would require infinite power

no, it only requires total power over everything. if everything is not infinite, neither is omnipotence.

I again direct you to objection one.

the argument deduces that conclusion, not arbitrarily adds it. unless omnipotence is impossible, it is metaphysically necessary. thus an omnipotent being is either impossible or necessary.

Biologist Richard Dawkins, in his book The God Delusion, rejects the argument as "infantile". Noting that he is "a scientist rather than a philosopher", he writes: "The very idea that such grand conclusions should follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically." Also, he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

except it does feed a single piece of data from the real world. this is in P1. that premise is a statement about the real world, because modal properties can still be real world properties. for example, it is impossible for rocks to condensate. this is a real world property that is modal in nature.

[Angrboda]

We don't know enough about the something to speak knowledgably about it's absence. You say you know the bounds of nothing. I say you do not.

[Rational AKD]

We don't know enough about the something to speak knowledgably about it's absence. You say you know the bounds of nothing. I say you do not.

we can know the bounds of something if it is a concept we have defined and there are logical absurdities tied to that definition. as i said, nothing is defined as the absence of anything. as such, i can easily say non-properties can't be properties. non-things can't be things. therefore to speak of nothing as though it is a thing capable of action is logically absurd.

[Darkstar]

yes, all matter is derived from mind.

So you admit to a lack of evidence?

no, i'm pointing out your lack of evidence.

For what, exactly? The falsity of a non-falsifiable hypothesis? Do you have any evidence other than "metaphysical possibility" that independent minds can exist?

At the very least, lack of evidence for independent sentiencies should not lead to the conclusion that they are likely to exist.

i never once said that. i said that means you can't rule it out.

According to your logic, nothing can ever be ruled out unless it is a logical contradiction. While this is technically true, if we see a balloon floating, do we immediately assume that gravity has been reversed? No, just in the same way that there is no reason to assume that the mind is magically seperate from the body.

[quote=Stanford]Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.
...
Φ is physically possible with respect to physical laws L if and only if Φ is logically consistent with L.
Example: Given the actual laws of physics, it is physically possible for a train to travel at 150 mph.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

But if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than the speed of light, then would not things that are metaphysically possible not necessarily be actually possible?

Energy is not matter, agreed.

mind can't be broken down to energy either.

Electrical impulses? At least we can prove those exist.

Is dualism falsifiable? If not, then there is no point in discussing it.

if you mean substance dualism, then yes actually. 2 substances can only interact if they share a property. for mind and matter to interact, either mind must have a physical property with matter or matter must have a mental property with mind. substance dualism states both mind and matter are fundamental. but if both are fundamental, they can't share a property and therefore they can't interact. this falsifies substance dualism. and this goes a little into the introspective argument.

I mean whatever dualism you are talking about. While substance dualism at least sounds vaguely possible, a "non-substance dualism" sounds like it would have to be straight up magic.

Laws of nature and laws of logic, only.

first, you are making an arbitrary limitation. if those laws can be necessary, then why can't anything else be necessary?

The cosmic cheeseburger is necessary, your argument is invalid. Or...would that make it valid?

second, laws of nature are not necessary, or at least not metaphysically necessary. we can easily imagine a world where nature is different. what if relativity wasn't true? what if friction didn't produce heat but instead some other energy? what if energy can be created and destroyed? such things are physically impossible in our world, but they are not metaphysically impossible.

Which is why I called them axiomatic, rather than necessary truths.

So, if I define the wonderful cosmic cheeseburger as "a non-physical entity that projects the illusion of a cheeseburger into people's minds, whose existence is not contingent on anything, but is otherwise limited in power", does it now exist?

Déjà vu. we've been through this before and you've forgotten everything. a cheeseburger only has physical properties. an immaterial cheese burger would have no properties. so all you're doing is saying "what if this thing, which is nothing, had omnipotence?"

Actually, I said it only causes hallucinations to make you think you see a cheeseburger. Additionally, it is not omnipotent, merely non-contingent.

Surely true omnipotence would require infinite power

no, it only requires total power over everything. if everything is not infinite, neither is omnipotence.

I presume this means that god cannot make an infinite number of things, then? Would that qualify as metaphysically impossible?

I again direct you to objection one.

the argument deduces that conclusion, not arbitrarily adds it. unless omnipotence is impossible, it is metaphysically necessary. thus an omnipotent being is either impossible or necessary.

I would go with impossible, unless you contend that the cosmic "cheeseburger" also exists. If I define the cosmic cheeseburger as non-contingent, and then give it a list of non-contradictory properties, I could define it into existence via this argument. I cannot think of any reason why it would be metaphysically impossible for a non-omnipotent being to be non-contingent.

except it does feed a single piece of data from the real world. this is in P1. that premise is a statement about the real world, because modal properties can still be real world properties. for example, it is impossible for rocks to condensate. this is a real world property that is modal in nature.

But what about your metaphysically possible particle exceeding light speed? As I said before (in this post, actually) not all things that aren't self-contradictory are actually possible. You can say that they technically might be, for all we know, but with that level of uncertainty, you might as well be arguing for Solipsism.

[Angrboda]

We don't know enough about the something to speak knowledgably about it's absence. You say you know the bounds of nothing. I say you do not.

we can know the bounds of something if it is a concept we have defined and there are logical absurdities tied to that definition. as i said, nothing is defined as the absence of anything. as such, i can easily say non-properties can't be properties. non-things can't be things. therefore to speak of nothing as though it is a thing capable of action is logically absurd.

You know that for a fact, do you. Where's your Nobel prize?

You don't know shit.

[Alex K]

...

Thanks for the elaboration,
I see, that's how it's supposed to be read... so it seems by putting the requirement of actual existence into the concept(*), coherence of the concept gets tied directly to actual existence. That means that if God exists, the concept is coherent, and if it doesn't, it is not? In this case, P1 is not only controversial, but effectively contains an assuption which is equivalent to the conclusion.

(*)Granted, you put actual omnipotence, not actual existence verbatim, so you include in the concept something which encompasses the latter.

[Rational AKD]

it is a philosophical position called idealism. as i said before i can give good evidence for it but it's off the topic of this thread.

For what, exactly? The falsity of a non-falsifiable hypothesis? Do you have any evidence other than "metaphysical possibility" that independent minds can exist?

why exactly is your hypothesis non-falsifiable? that just seems like an arbitrary statement to me. and do you even know what you're asking? "do you have any evidence for the possibility of brain independent minds other than their possibility?" if it is metaphysically possible and it is not physical in nature, it is possible for them to exist. i do have more firm evidence that they do exist but again

According to your logic, nothing can ever be ruled out unless it is a logical contradiction. While this is technically true, if we see a balloon floating, do we immediately assume that gravity has been reversed? No, just in the same way that there is no reason to assume that the mind is magically seperate from the body.

that's a false analogy and your point is irrelevant. as you said it's "technically true" it is possible for mind to exist independent of the brain, so i think it's time to move past this "mind can't exist apart from brain" point. it's dead and buried so move on.

But if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than the speed of light, then would not things that are metaphysically possible not necessarily be actually possible?

i don't know what you mean by "actually possible." if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than light, then it couldn't happen in this universe so long as that physical law remained constant. but as i said before, physical laws aren't necessary. they can be different.

Electrical impulses? At least we can prove those exist.

there is no equivalence between mind and electrical impulses. as i'm sure you already know, electrical impulses can exist without mind, and electrical impulses don't share properties with mind. there is a correlation, not an equivalence so the mind can't reduce to energy either.

I mean whatever dualism you are talking about. While substance dualism at least sounds vaguely possible, a "non-substance dualism" sounds like it would have to be straight up magic.

why? is it logically absurd for the mind to create something that resembles what is physical? i don't think so. it is very possible for a mind to create concepts as well as a mind that receives information that it thinks is real.

Actually, I said it only causes hallucinations to make you think you see a cheeseburger.

then it is not a cheeseburger. it is a being that takes that form. the MOA can only show that an omnipotent being exists, it can't deduce anything else about such being. so yes, it is possible for that being to do this, but not necessary.

Additionally, it is not omnipotent, merely non-contingent.

that doesn't work. it has to have some property that makes it so it can't be contingent. in order for it to be non-contingent and exist it must be necessary. if it is necessary then it can't be destroyed. if it can't be destroyed, it is omnipotent.

I presume this means that god cannot make an infinite number of things, then? Would that qualify as metaphysically impossible?

if and only if actual infinities are impossible, and i'm rather skeptical about that.

But what about your metaphysically possible particle exceeding light speed? As I said before (in this post, actually) not all things that aren't self-contradictory are actually possible.

since God is not physical, physical impossibility doesn't apply to him. laws of physics don't apply to him.

You can say that they technically might be, for all we know, but with that level of uncertainty, you might as well be arguing for Solipsism.

you are the one claiming uncertainty, not me. you are the one choosing solipsism alternatively, not me. i take monotheistic idealism rather than solipsism.

---

You know that for a fact, do you. Where's your Nobel prize?

You don't know shit.

it's been known for quite some time. why don't you look up what a priori is, perhaps what Kant has to say on the subject.

[Angrboda]

You know that for a fact, do you. Where's your Nobel prize?

You don't know shit.

it's been known for quite some time. why don't you look up what a priori is, perhaps what Kant has to say on the subject.

You're suggesting that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth and therefore a fact?

While you're brushing up on your Kant, refresh your memory on the relationship between a priori truths and hypothetical analytical truths like the bullshit you've been spewing.

Then brush up on the relationship between analytical truths and a posteriori truths, such as your assertion about the behavior of "nothing."

Like I said, you don't know shit.

[Rational AKD]

Thanks for the elaboration,
I see, that's how it's supposed to be read... so it seems by putting the requirement of actual existence into the concept(*), coherence of the concept gets tied directly to actual existence. That means that if God exists, the concept is coherent, and if it doesn't, it is not? In this case, P1 is not only controversial, but effectively contains an assuption which is equivalent to the conclusion.

it is true that the first premise is equivalent to the conclusion, but they don't effectively mean the same thing. and though it is good of you to observe that the premise is equivalent to the conclusion, i must point out that's the entire purpose of the argument. to deduce that "it is possible a necessary God exists" is equivalent to "a necessary God exists." people often believe the first without accepting the second. since most people, even skeptics, would admit it is possible God exists; this argument becomes a powerful argument against those people.

---

You're suggesting that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth and therefore a fact?

yes, because an action can only be preformed by a thing and nothing is not something. it is a contradiction of the very definition of nothing to suggest nothing can "do" something.