The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[MindForgedManacle]

And contrary to what our entrepid Christian/Muslim friends would have us believe, Dawkins' objection to the (I think?) ontological argument quoted above is actually hitting on the right path, which admittedly isn't always the case with Dawkins. It's generally seen as problematic by philosophers since Immanuel Kant (himself a devout Christian) to try and use modal logic (namely axiom S5, which Plantinga's argument uses) to try and say something about metaphysics. In fact, analytic philosophy in general has, for the last 70-ish years, effectively abandoned metaphysics because it is generally seen as vacuous unless it is taking in the newest science, among other things. Metaphysics can be interesting (and difficult), but divorced from the evidence of the actual world we experience, analytic philosophers are more tempted to see it as... well, maybe not exactly mental ejaculation but at least extremely uncertain throughout.

[Rational AKD]

[Angrboda]

We don't know enough about the something to speak knowledgably about it's absence. You say you know the bounds of nothing. I say you do not.

[Rational AKD]

We don't know enough about the something to speak knowledgably about it's absence. You say you know the bounds of nothing. I say you do not.

we can know the bounds of something if it is a concept we have defined and there are logical absurdities tied to that definition. as i said, nothing is defined as the absence of anything. as such, i can easily say non-properties can't be properties. non-things can't be things. therefore to speak of nothing as though it is a thing capable of action is logically absurd.

[Darkstar]

[Angrboda]

We don't know enough about the something to speak knowledgably about it's absence. You say you know the bounds of nothing. I say you do not.

we can know the bounds of something if it is a concept we have defined and there are logical absurdities tied to that definition. as i said, nothing is defined as the absence of anything. as such, i can easily say non-properties can't be properties. non-things can't be things. therefore to speak of nothing as though it is a thing capable of action is logically absurd.

You know that for a fact, do you. Where's your Nobel prize?

You don't know shit.

[Alex K]

...

Thanks for the elaboration,
I see, that's how it's supposed to be read... so it seems by putting the requirement of actual existence into the concept(*), coherence of the concept gets tied directly to actual existence. That means that if God exists, the concept is coherent, and if it doesn't, it is not? In this case, P1 is not only controversial, but effectively contains an assuption which is equivalent to the conclusion.

(*)Granted, you put actual omnipotence, not actual existence verbatim, so you include in the concept something which encompasses the latter.

[Rational AKD]

it is a philosophical position called idealism. as i said before i can give good evidence for it but it's off the topic of this thread.

For what, exactly? The falsity of a non-falsifiable hypothesis? Do you have any evidence other than "metaphysical possibility" that independent minds can exist?

why exactly is your hypothesis non-falsifiable? that just seems like an arbitrary statement to me. and do you even know what you're asking? "do you have any evidence for the possibility of brain independent minds other than their possibility?" if it is metaphysically possible and it is not physical in nature, it is possible for them to exist. i do have more firm evidence that they do exist but again

According to your logic, nothing can ever be ruled out unless it is a logical contradiction. While this is technically true, if we see a balloon floating, do we immediately assume that gravity has been reversed? No, just in the same way that there is no reason to assume that the mind is magically seperate from the body.

that's a false analogy and your point is irrelevant. as you said it's "technically true" it is possible for mind to exist independent of the brain, so i think it's time to move past this "mind can't exist apart from brain" point. it's dead and buried so move on.

But if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than the speed of light, then would not things that are metaphysically possible not necessarily be actually possible?

i don't know what you mean by "actually possible." if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than light, then it couldn't happen in this universe so long as that physical law remained constant. but as i said before, physical laws aren't necessary. they can be different.

Electrical impulses? At least we can prove those exist.

there is no equivalence between mind and electrical impulses. as i'm sure you already know, electrical impulses can exist without mind, and electrical impulses don't share properties with mind. there is a correlation, not an equivalence so the mind can't reduce to energy either.

I mean whatever dualism you are talking about. While substance dualism at least sounds vaguely possible, a "non-substance dualism" sounds like it would have to be straight up magic.

why? is it logically absurd for the mind to create something that resembles what is physical? i don't think so. it is very possible for a mind to create concepts as well as a mind that receives information that it thinks is real.

Actually, I said it only causes hallucinations to make you think you see a cheeseburger.

then it is not a cheeseburger. it is a being that takes that form. the MOA can only show that an omnipotent being exists, it can't deduce anything else about such being. so yes, it is possible for that being to do this, but not necessary.

Additionally, it is not omnipotent, merely non-contingent.

that doesn't work. it has to have some property that makes it so it can't be contingent. in order for it to be non-contingent and exist it must be necessary. if it is necessary then it can't be destroyed. if it can't be destroyed, it is omnipotent.

I presume this means that god cannot make an infinite number of things, then? Would that qualify as metaphysically impossible?

if and only if actual infinities are impossible, and i'm rather skeptical about that.

But what about your metaphysically possible particle exceeding light speed? As I said before (in this post, actually) not all things that aren't self-contradictory are actually possible.

since God is not physical, physical impossibility doesn't apply to him. laws of physics don't apply to him.

You can say that they technically might be, for all we know, but with that level of uncertainty, you might as well be arguing for Solipsism.

you are the one claiming uncertainty, not me. you are the one choosing solipsism alternatively, not me. i take monotheistic idealism rather than solipsism.

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You know that for a fact, do you. Where's your Nobel prize?

You don't know shit.

it's been known for quite some time. why don't you look up what a priori is, perhaps what Kant has to say on the subject.

[Angrboda]

You know that for a fact, do you. Where's your Nobel prize?

You don't know shit.

it's been known for quite some time. why don't you look up what a priori is, perhaps what Kant has to say on the subject.

You're suggesting that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth and therefore a fact?

While you're brushing up on your Kant, refresh your memory on the relationship between a priori truths and hypothetical analytical truths like the bullshit you've been spewing.

Then brush up on the relationship between analytical truths and a posteriori truths, such as your assertion about the behavior of "nothing."

Like I said, you don't know shit.

[Rational AKD]

Thanks for the elaboration,
I see, that's how it's supposed to be read... so it seems by putting the requirement of actual existence into the concept(*), coherence of the concept gets tied directly to actual existence. That means that if God exists, the concept is coherent, and if it doesn't, it is not? In this case, P1 is not only controversial, but effectively contains an assuption which is equivalent to the conclusion.

it is true that the first premise is equivalent to the conclusion, but they don't effectively mean the same thing. and though it is good of you to observe that the premise is equivalent to the conclusion, i must point out that's the entire purpose of the argument. to deduce that "it is possible a necessary God exists" is equivalent to "a necessary God exists." people often believe the first without accepting the second. since most people, even skeptics, would admit it is possible God exists; this argument becomes a powerful argument against those people.

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You're suggesting that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth and therefore a fact?

yes, because an action can only be preformed by a thing and nothing is not something. it is a contradiction of the very definition of nothing to suggest nothing can "do" something.