On naturalism and consciousness

[Surgenator]

But what if experience isn't what we think it is? What does that say about everything else?

I'm going to agree with ShaMan on this one. Your trying to look for something that probably doesn't exist, and there is no way to know.

[bennyboy]

But what if experience isn't what we think it is? What does that say about everything else?

I'm going to agree with ShaMan on this one. Your trying to look for something that probably doesn't exist, and there is no way to know.

Huh? Using only experience, you've adopted a philosphical model in which we do not explain things in experiential terms, but rather in terms of an inferred objective reality. But here's a hint: Occam's Razor was not meant as an additive tool; you can disagree with me, but you cannot sensibly disagree by arguing that the web of assumptions and inferences that we call physical monism is the simplest possible expression of the truth.

The simplest model of experience is (and should obviously be) that reality is intrinsically experiential, i.e. that an idealistic monism is true.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Darn it! You guys are already 8 pages into my favorite topic.

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I don't believe consciousness can be explained by way of a naturalistic account. …

The first thing to note is that what you have is an argument from ignorance. "I can't imagine X, therefore not X." This is a minor point, so let's move on.

Let’s not. People that see an “argument from ignorance” typically accept that physical monism as the default position. I think the real question for these people is this: If all naturalism can offer is its own promissory note then why should it be preferred over any other theory? Sensible people take things as they appear to be until shown otherwise. Since dualism appears to be the case, why not accept it until the naturalists can actually produce a robust theory of consciousness.

Presuming that you're not a Chinese speaker, suppose I teach you the phonemes "qū xiàn." When you think about it, they're not "inherently" about anything. But they translate as curved. What makes these phonemes not inherently "about" curved objects before I teach you its meaning? Once you've been taught their meaning, do they then magically have a new property that the thought of them in your mind is now "inherently about" curved things?

You just exemplified the opposite of what you intended to show. To me "qū xiàn" is a set of signs, either sounds or marks, without not the significance. Thus the meaning, or significance, of the term is not found in the physical manifestation, or sign. In French the sign “chien” and the English sign “dog” have no physical characteristics in common, and yet they convey the same meaning. My point is that significance is not a physical feature or property, in keeping with the idea that physical things as physical things “just are” and do not have intentionality. The same applies to the relationship between the physical correlates of the brain, which are signs, and the mental properties, or the significance of the signs. Every human brain, beyond an overall rough structure, is at the functional level completely unique. The neural correlates of a specific idea will be more different from one person to another than the words “chien” and “dog” are different from each other. Based on this fact, anyone can see that the mind=brain concept is absurd since it does not allow from shared meaning from one brain to another.

…it must also explain how thought is inherently about things. Until you can do that, you're left with the rather unsatisfying "it just is”[/i]

That is an unfair demand. Subjectivity is experienced directly and without mediation. You know thoughts are about things because that’s how thoughts, and other qualitative experiences, are known.

[Angrboda]

The first thing to note is that what you have is an argument from ignorance. "I can't imagine X, therefore not X." This is a minor point, so let's move on.

Let’s not. People that see an “argument from ignorance” typically accept that physical monism as the default position. I think the real question for these people is this: If all naturalism can offer is its own promissory note then why should it be preferred over any other theory? Sensible people take things as they appear to be until shown otherwise. Since dualism appears to be the case, why not accept it until the naturalists can actually produce a robust theory of consciousness.

This is all irrelevant to the question of whether the argument posed is a fallacious argument from ignorance. It has nothing to do with the physicalist position being assumed. Nor with whether dualism is sensible. These are red herrings that obfuscate the primary fault with the argument. As posed, the argument is invalid. No amount of whining about default positions will change that.

…it must also explain how thought is inherently about things. Until you can do that, you're left with the rather unsatisfying "it just is”[/i]

That is an unfair demand. Subjectivity is experienced directly and without mediation. You know thoughts are about things because that’s how thoughts, and other qualitative experiences, are known.

And yet that's the same demand which you made of physicalism above. That's special pleading.

None of your declarations about what experience is establish that it is what you say. They're just bare assertions.

[Neo-Scholastic]

That is an unfair demand. Subjectivity is experienced directly and without mediation. You know thoughts are about things because that’s how thoughts, and other qualitative experiences, are known.

And yet that's the same demand which you made of physicalism above. That's special pleading.

None of your declarations about what experience is establish that it is what you say. They're just bare assertions.

What I said had nothing all to do with what experience is on a metaphysical level. All that matters is what can be known. Any thing beyond what can be known is unfounded speculation.

[Surgenator]

Using only experience, you've adopted a philosphical model in which we do not explain things in experiential terms, but rather in terms of an inferred objective reality. But here's a hint: Occam's Razor was not meant as an additive tool; you can disagree with me, but you cannot sensibly disagree by arguing that the web of assumptions and inferences that we call physical monism is the simplest possible expression of the truth.

Your definition of "experience" is too broad that it encoposses everything I could possible use. So your first sentence should go like this, "Using everyting I have access to, i've adopted a philosphical model in which we do not explain things in experiential terms, but rather in terms of an inferred objective reality." I do this, because there is way to distinguish the two according to your definition of "experience" and I occam razor the other possibilities.

Again, it is like asking to explain the science of gravity, but complaining that I'm using science to do it.

The simplest model of experience is (and should obviously be) that reality is intrinsically experiential, i.e. that an idealistic monism is true.

Idealistic monism doesn't explain the existing "experiences" we have. Like peoples experiences can be changed by drugs whether they like it or not. Hense, it isn't even an option for occam's razor.

I really hate it when people misuse occam's razor. It is NOT just the simplest view. It is the simplest that explains ALL of the observable "experiences."

[bennyboy]

Your definition of "experience" is too broad that it encoposses everything I could possible use.

That's kind of the point. Experience does in fact encompass everything that we think, perceive, or know about.

Again, it is like asking to explain the science of gravity, but complaining that I'm using science to do it.

No, it's not like that.

Idealistic monism doesn't explain the existing "experiences" we have. Like peoples experiences can be changed by drugs whether they like it or not. Hense, it isn't even an option for occam's razor.

Drug use and its effect on the mind are not incompatible with idealistic monism at all. I think you're thinking of solipsism.

I really hate it when people misuse occam's razor.It is NOT just the simplest view. It is the simplest that explains ALL of the observable "experiences."

Grrrr I hate that too. We should talk about it.

Okay let's play a game. I'll claim that reality is intrinsically experiential, and that our interactions with the objective universe are a category of experience, and not provably more than that. You claim that the universe is intrinsically physical in nature, and then explain, since you are master of the proper use of Occam's razor, "ALL of the observable 'experiences'." Hint: be prepared to present a plausible theory of the physical mechanism of mind.

[Surgenator]

Again, it is like asking to explain the science of gravity, but complaining that I'm using science to do it.

No, it's not like that.

Please explain why it isn't like that.

Okay let's play a game. I'll claim that reality is intrinsically experiential, and that our interactions with the objective universe are a category of experience, and not provably more than that. You claim that the universe is intrinsically physical in nature, and then explain, since you are master of the proper use of Occam's razor, "ALL of the observable 'experiences'."

I would love to hear your explaination of your world view to a third party. You understand that I have to be an illusion created by your mind. Of course I'm assuming you are an idealistic Monist that follows the below definition.

Idealistic Monism: (also see the section on Idealism)
This doctrine (also called Mentalistic Monism) holds that the mind is all that exists (i.e. the only existing substance is mental), and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Thus, there is but one reality, immutable and eternal, which some (including the ancient Hindu philosophers) have termed God (Idealistic-Spiritual Monism), while others, such as the Pre-Socratic philosophers like Parmenides, were content to label as Being or "the One". This type of Idealistic Monism has recurred throughout history, from the Neoplatonists, to Gottfried Leibniz and George Berkeley, to the German Idealism of G. W. F. Hegel.

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_monism.html

How do you explain a third party? How would you explain consistency of 'experiences' and their repeatability between third parties? How would you explain new knowledge? Why don't people change in to rabbits like they do in your dreams?

My world view can explain these 'experiences' by a very simple model that there are more than one mind existing in a physical universe.

Hint: be prepared to present a plausible theory of the physical mechanism of mind.

No, I don't need to explain the physical mechanism of the mind to understand that we are two minds in a physical reality.

[bennyboy]

I would love to hear your explaination of your world view to a third party. You understand that I have to be an illusion created by your mind. Of course I'm assuming you are an idealistic Monist that follows the below definition.

Given what you quoted, it is not necessary to arrive at the statement about third parties that you are asserting here.

How do you explain a third party? How would you explain consistency of 'experiences' and their repeatability between third parties?

Because the individual parties are subsets of a greater whole. When I say the universe is idealistic, I'm not claiming that I made it with my mind, or that only what I personally can experience is able to exist. That's solipsism.

My world view can explain these 'experiences' by a very simple model that there are more than one mind existing in a physical universe.

That's not a very good explanation. Not only does it not provide any description of how minds come to exist, it doesn't even give specific criteria for identifying what physical structures do, and what don't, have minds.

No, I don't need to explain the physical mechanism of the mind to understand that we are two minds in a physical reality.

You just went on record saying that you've used Occam's razor to arrive at a physical monism because it most simply "explains ALL of the observable 'experiences.'" Okay, go ahead: explain them. Or, alternately, demonstrate how you can use your subjective experiences to arrive at a surety that there's an objective physical universe "out there," as opposed to you being in the Matrix, or the Mind of God, or a BIJ.

[Surgenator]

How do you explain a third party? How would you explain consistency of 'experiences' and their repeatability between third parties?

Because the individual parties are subsets of a greater whole. When I say the universe is idealistic, I'm not claiming that I made it with my mind, or that only what I personally can experience is able to exist. That's solipsism.

So you and I are figments of some larger mind. I find this even harder to swallow. These mind subsets still do not explain consistency and repeatability between the subsets.

My world view can explain these 'experiences' by a very simple model that there are more than one mind existing in a physical universe.

That's not a very good explanation. Not only does it not provide any description of how minds come to exist, it doesn't even give specific criteria for identifying what physical structures do, and what don't, have minds.

I don't know how a mind works; I'm not a neuroscientist. More importantly, I don't need to explain how a mind works to understand that there is more than one.

No, I don't need to explain the physical mechanism of the mind to understand that we are two minds in a physical reality.

You just went on record saying that you've used Occam's razor to arrive at a physical monism because it most simply "explains ALL of the observable 'experiences.'" Okay, go ahead: explain them. Or, alternately, demonstrate how you can use your subjective experiences to arrive at a surety that there's an objective physical universe "out there," as opposed to you being in the Matrix, or the Mind of God, or a BIJ.
[/quote]
I arrive at physical monism because it is the best model to explain all the observations I have experience. Like talking with other people, learning new things, distinquishing reality from dreaming, the consistency of observations and their repeatability. These are the things that convinced me that physical monism is the best possible answer.

As far as a possible physical explanation of a mind arrising from physical mechanisms, read up on neural networks. It's a general algorithm that can learn and make predictions. It's used to buy and sell stock in the stock market. Also, it's based off how the neurons in our brains work.