determinism versus indeterminism

[Purple Rabbit]

As Dennett says free will is compatible with determinism.

Come on, that's not critical thinking, challenge yourself.

As I have said this is if the future is not known.

Known by who? Do we need to have knowledge about existence of an all-knowing agent first?

Whether I believe in free will or not I'm still just as free unless I think that means I have to just lie down on the floor because I can't do anything.

If your body lies itself on the floor you can do nothing about it.

That of course is not what free will means. I am just as free if I don't believe in free will as if I do. The belief doesn't change the reality! People who believe in free will aren't any freer than those who don't.

You think you are free, but how do you know it?

Why would I hope to unite something when my whole point is it makes no real difference in a practical sense either way. We still live in the same world we always have.

Yeah as a robot who thinks he has free will.

I'm interested in whats true. If there's no free will then thats fine by me.

Most people, me included, find that very disturbing. Wouldn't you like to know if you are something other than a robot?

If there is that's also fine by me. Either way my change in belief in free will - either way - doesn't change my free will whether I have it or not. Right?

Sounds like you believing in free will no matter what facts might tell you. That's a belief for sure.

[Edwardo Piet]

Come on, that's not critical thinking, challenge yourself.

I don't think its really critical thinking if I criticise something just for the sake of it. I don't know what to criticise? Dennett is using a different definition of free will. He just means evitability if I have understood him correctly. Whether we have a choice in that evitability, or not.

Known by who? Do we need to have knowledge about existence of an all-knowing agent first?

Well we can't absolutely know whats going to happen at all can we? We can only make predictions. And how can we predict what we are going to do before we have done it? If we are going to do something no matter what and we have no choice in the matter whatsoever. How do we know what that thing we are going to HAVE to do IS? I'm talking about IF we don't know. If no one can KNOW what our next action will be for sure - then yes there is obviously going to be a future. But since we don't know what it is. We can still of course avoid things. Whether we have any choice in the matter or not. Because we don't know what we are going to do. We might think we are going to do one thing and then change our mind. Whether we did the changing on purpose or not. Even if we had no choice in the matter we still didn't know what we were going to do.

We can still avoid things even if we don't have a choice in the matter. Maybe not free to choose but its not like we're powerless in the sense we still have all the freedom that we've always had since we were born. I mean whether I believe in free will or not I'm still just as free. Whether thats free or not. I can still do things and 'make decisions' even if I have no choice in the matter.

If your body lies itself on the floor you can do nothing about it.

Yes. But I might get up might I?

All I mean is whether I believe in free will or not it doesn't make me any more or less free. if my body lies on the floor and I don't believe in free will I can get up. If I do believe in free will I can get up.

If I'm lying down it doesn't mean I can't get up.

If I don't believe in free will I'm just as free as if I do. So If I'm lying on the floor I can get up just as easily if I don't believe I have free will as I can if I do believe I have free will. Because there is evitability whether I have free will or not.

Even if there is no 'free will', no 'free' evitability - there is still evitability. Because we avoid stuff, right? We may have had 100% to avoid it. But we still avoided it.

Even if I HAD to dodge something. IF I didn't, hypothetically speaking I may have got hit by it - because I didn't move out of the way.

So if I HAVE to avoid something. I still avoided it whether I did it or not. Its not like I have to stand still. It I DO have to stand still I do.

But if I don't believe I have to then I won't do it. If I do believe I have to. that isn't determinism. Because evitability is still there. If I didn't believe I had to then I wouldn't have to do that.

What I mean is: If the future is determined that doesn't mean nothing can be avoided. Because you don't know whats going to happen. Determinism of course, doesn't mean you HAVE to believe that you are powerless, you have no freedom. No free will or whatever.

Because there is evitability anyway. There is avoidability. THE future isn't avoidable, but A hypothetical future is avoidable because we don't know which future is going to happen because we don't know for sure which future WILL happen. I think? What do you think?

You think you are free, but how do you know it?

I don't. Did I ever claim I knew?

I just mean that if I believe I am free it doesn't make me any more free. And if I don't believe I am free it doesn't make me any less free.

Whether I am free or not.

Yeah as a robot who thinks he has free will.

I believe I am a biological robot. I don't know whether I have any choice to do things or not.

If my future is determined - I don't know what that future is anyway. So I may be able to avoid things whether I have any choice in the matter or not.

If someone rolls a ball at me very slowly I can move out of the way of it quite easily - whether I have any choice in the matter or not. Whether I move or not. I still can. If I don't believe in free will that doesn't give me any less freedom. I can still move out of the way. So there is still evitability whether I have a choice in avoiding (or not avoiding) the ball - or not.

Most people, me included, find that very disturbing. Wouldn't you like to know if you are something other than a robot?

I don't find it disturbing. Because if humans don't have free will guess what - they never have! What's changed? Nothing.

If I can't choose to avoid something that doesn't mean I can't avoid something. There is still evitability. Whether I have a choice in the matter or not I still have exactly the same power (or lack of power) as I always have.

If I don't believe in free will and I'm not sure I do because you seem to think I believe in 'free will' but I am using a different definition. I just mean evitability. I think our future is determined because of course, guess what - the future will happen! Whatever the future is: it WILL happen. Does that mean I can't dodge balls rolled at me very slowly, to give a very obvious example of the absurd idea that not believing in free will means you have less freedom? LOL, NO. I have just as much evitability as I ever have whether I have any choice in the matter - or not.

Sounds like you believing in free will no matter what facts might tell you. That's a belief for sure.

I believe I have free will as in evitability. Not really as in 'free will'. Different definition. The future will happen. If I have no choice in dodging a ball rolled at me very slowly, or not - that doesn't mean I can't! I can just as easily as before whether I believe in free will or not! There is still just as much evitability whether I have any choice in dodging the ball or not! If I wanted to dodge it I'm pretty sure I could lol. Whether I had any choice in wanting to dodge it and then dodge it or not!

I'm just as free without free will as with 'free will'. I'm still responsible for my actions without 'free will'. Heck if I shouldn't take responsibility who the hell should? There is still free will as in evitability. We have as much 'free will' as those who believe in 'free will' even if it isn't free will. Whether we believe in 'free will' or not.

We still have freedom as in evitability. I can still 'dodge' (lol) a very slowly moving ball rolled at me whether I have any choice in the matter or not.
Evf

[Purple Rabbit]

Come on, that's not critical thinking, challenge yourself.

I don't think its really critical thinking if I criticise something just for the sake of it. I don't know what to criticise? Dennett is using a different definition of free will. He just means evitability if I have understood him correctly. Whether we have a choice in that evitability, or not.

It seems to me that there is a lot to criticise on changing words as a means to solve a philosphical dilemma. If you go by the authority of Dennett alone, then for sure it's not critical thinking.

Known by who? Do we need to have knowledge about existence of an all-knowing agent first?

Well we can't absolutely know whats going to happen at all can we? We can only make predictions. And how can we predict what we are going to do before we have done it? If we are going to do something no matter what and we have no choice in the matter whatsoever. How do we know what that thing we are going to HAVE to do IS? I'm talking about IF we don't know. If no one can KNOW what our next action will be for sure - then yes there is obviously going to be a future. But since we don't know what it is. We can still of course avoid things. Whether we have any choice in the matter or not. Because we don't know what we are going to do. We might think we are going to do one thing and then change our mind. Whether we did the changing on purpose or not. Even if we had no choice in the matter we still didn't know what we were going to do.

We can still avoid things even if we don't have a choice in the matter. Maybe not free to choose but its not like we're powerless in the sense we still have all the freedom that we've always had since we were born. I mean whether I believe in free will or not I'm still just as free. Whether thats free or not. I can still do things and 'make decisions' even if I have no choice in the matter.

It is not needed to know the future in detail to make decisions. Decisions can be in the form of IF-scenarios, IF this happens I'll act in THAT manner. If avoiding is going to happen anyway then what freedom is there in the act itself? With an afterwards interpretation of an action in terms of 'avoiding' you merely show that you afterwards play a film in your head with you in the lead role and considering other possible courses of action that aren't there in reality. If things just happen, there is nothing but that what happens, ergo there is no avoidance.

If your body lies itself on the floor you can do nothing about it.

Yes. But I might get up might I?

All I mean is whether I believe in free will or not it doesn't make me any more or less free. if my body lies on the floor and I don't believe in free will I can get up. If I do believe in free will I can get up.

A snail can go from A to B, a fly can land on your nose, a stone can fall, does that mean they have free will?

If I'm lying down it doesn't mean I can't get up.

If you get up you afterwards can rightfully say you got up, but you can't claim that you decided to get up and that your decision made you do so.

If I don't believe in free will I'm just as free as if I do. So If I'm lying on the floor I can get up just as easily if I don't believe I have free will as I can if I do believe I have free will. Because there is evitability whether I have free will or not.

Evitability is a word Dennett introduces which on the one hand suggests that an agent in advance can decide to take some action and on he other hand Dennett only uses it to interpret action after it took place. Don't let yourself get fooled by redefinition of terms. You can get up from the floor and afterwards say that you decided so but you cannot say that it is independent decision prior to the act that made your body do so.

Even if there is no 'free will', no 'free' evitability - there is still evitability. Because we avoid stuff, right? We may have had 100% to avoid it. But we still avoided it.

Avoiding stuff is a story we tell ourselves after things have happend.

Even if I HAD to dodge something. IF I didn't, hypothetically speaking I may have got hit by it - because I didn't move out of the way.

So if I HAVE to avoid something. I still avoided it whether I did it or not. Its not like I have to stand still. It I DO have to stand still I do.

But if I don't believe I have to then I won't do it. If I do believe I have to. that isn't determinism. Because evitability is still there. If I didn't believe I had to then I wouldn't have to do that.

You only have shown that you can use 'avoid' in past tense.

What I mean is: If the future is determined that doesn't mean nothing can be avoided. Because you don't know whats going to happen. Determinism of course, doesn't mean you HAVE to believe that you are powerless, you have no freedom. No free will or whatever.

Because there is evitability anyway. There is avoidability. THE future isn't avoidable, but A hypothetical future is avoidable because we don't know which future is going to happen because we don't know for sure which future WILL happen. I think? What do you think?

Well, I am not sure either EvF, I'm just playing the devil's advocate here. I think there is something wrong with Dennett's stance. It at the moment really seems a word trick to me. Free will becomes 'evitability' and Dennett underwater changes to past tense wherever evitability and avoidance pop up. I hope Freedom Evolves is to become the first selected book for the Bookclub. Then we might get to the bottom of Dennett's stance.

You think you are free, but how do you know it?

I don't. Did I ever claim I knew?

You do when you claim you can intentionally avoid things. You don't when you claim that avoidance is that what happened in a situation where afterwards you see other possible continuations of the situations you could have steered towards if mind to body interaction would have been possible.

Yeah as a robot who thinks he has free will.

I believe I am a biological robot. I don't know whether I have any choice to do things or not.

Then what is consciousness about? Is it merely a word?

Most people, me included, find that very disturbing. Wouldn't you like to know if you are something other than a robot?

I don't find it disturbing. Because if humans don't have free will guess what - they never have! What's changed? Nothing.

There are numerous consequences, for instance on the accountability of behaviour.

Sounds like you believing in free will no matter what facts might tell you. That's a belief for sure.

I believe I have free will as in evitability. Not really as in 'free will'. Different definition. The future will happen. If I have no choice in dodging a ball rolled at me very slowly, or not - that doesn't mean I can't! I can just as easily as before whether I believe in free will or not! There is still just as much evitability whether I have any choice in dodging the ball or not! If I wanted to dodge it I'm pretty sure I could lol. Whether I had any choice in wanting to dodge it and then dodge it or not!

I'm just as free without free will as with 'free will'. I'm still responsible for my actions without 'free will'. Heck if I shouldn't take responsibility who the hell should? There is still free will as in evitability. We have as much 'free will' as those who believe in 'free will' even if it isn't free will. Whether we believe in 'free will' or not.

We still have freedom as in evitability. I can still 'dodge' (lol) a very slowly moving ball rolled at me whether I have any choice in the matter or not.
Evf

It's becoming kind of repetitive but changing the words just does not do the trick for me.

[Edwardo Piet]

It seems to me that there is a lot to criticise on changing words as a means to solve a philosphical dilemma. If you go by the authority of Dennett alone, then for sure it's not critical thinking.

Well its all I know of so far. I am only recently much more interested in science than before (the past few months). And I'm of course open to alternatives. What's your alternative(s)?

It is not needed to know the future in detail to make decisions. Decisions can be in the form of IF-scenarios, IF this happens I'll act in THAT manner. If avoiding is going to happen anyway then what freedom is there in the act itself? With an afterwards interpretation of an action in terms of 'avoiding' you merely show that you afterwards play a film in your head with you in the lead role and considering other possible courses of action that aren't there in reality. If things just happen, there is nothing but that what happens, ergo there is no avoidance.

Well to me, so far at least, it means that if we are convinced that no 'free will' - as in not being able to purposefully make decisions - means no evitability as in not choosing to avoid things means we don't avoid things (as in we have to just 'give up' since this is just a misunderstanding of what no free will means - if you don't have free will you can still do things!). This belief could compel us to be more close minded and 'give up'. So the effect is we would be less free as in less open to possibilities. Whether we have any choice in the matter or not. So its good to know that no free will does not mean we have no evitability as in we are incapable of avoiding things.

So yes - perhaps if we avoid something we HAD to avoid it. Maybe there was no choice in the matter! But that doesn't require us to believe that will compel us to behave 'less free' as in 'give up' even if we're not free anyway. Because I think to believe so is just a cartoon of what 'no free will' actually is. It does not mean you HAVE to 'give up' because you are 'power less' it means whether you have no free or not. Thats a fact! No free will would be a science I think not a philosophy. If we can't choose to do things that doesn't mean we HAVE to be more close minded and 'act' less free.

So evitability I think is like a new definition of free will to show that no 'free will' doesn't mean you don't have free will as in evitability. As in you can still avoid things whether you have a choice in the matter not. The abscence of belief in free will does not mean you are any less free than you have ever been! Because if you have no 'free will' - you've always had no 'free will'. So if in the past you believed you had free will you were no more free than you are now!

So not believing in free will does of course not imply you have to adopt a belief of the meaning of 'no free will' that compels you to 'give up' as it were.

If you have no free will and you BELIEVE that it DOES compel you to adopt that. Then it does. But if you happen to hear explanations that explain you do not HAVE to believe that... - then that might help you change your mind.

And that is what I am trying to explain whether you or whoever agrees or disagrees or not - and I am of course - open to the criticism and alternatives.

Because it certainly doesn't imply that you have to adopt that belief.

A snail can go from A to B, a fly can land on your nose, a stone can fall, does that mean they have free will?

No. It doesn't mean they have 'free will'. But it doesn't mean they don't have evitability. If I try to swat a fly and it moves out the way - it of course didn't decide to move out of the way. But it still moved out of the way.

My point is that I MIGHT get up. That's what I said. Whether I have any choice in the matter or not. I might. Who knows?

If you get up you afterwards can rightfully say you got up, but you can't claim that you decided to get up and that your decision made you do so.

Yeah. Pretty much correct I think. I don't think I choose my thoughts and I think my thoughts just happen in the brain. And so I don't think I choose my decisions either.

But I can say in ordinary conversation that I decided to do something whether I had any choice in the matter or not.

Have I claimed that I can intentionally and consciously make my own decisions? Have I claimed that I believe in free will in that sense?

I hope not. Because I believe it would be a mistake because it would misrepresent what I actually believe.

And I'm kind of agnostic on the matter but choosing your thoughts and making your own decisions literally when you are a biological organism doesn't really gel with me.

I don't believe I have 'free will' but I don't believe that compels me to feel any worse than if I did believe it. I still believe I have evitability.

If its not me doing the choice - it doesn't really matter because I still have just as much freedom as in the past when I was sure that I had 'free will'.

Because if I have no freedom in the sense I have no 'free will'. Its the same as before when I was younger! And I didn't feel helpless then!

I still have exactly the same evitability. Whether I have choice in the matter or not. I can still do and not do the same things! Who cares if its me doing it or my brain just has thoughts and my body just does things?

I would like to know the answer for sure but it certainly doesn't worry me. It doesn't make any practical difference to me! Its just interesting science!

I do wonder if it would make a difference if we could know our whole future and have to follow it! Because then included in that future would be our reaction to seeing that future. Which I think perhaps could change our beliefs drastically in a negative way - or perhaps not.

I'm not sure. I find that idea interesting.

Evitability is a word Dennett introduces which on the one hand suggests that an agent in advance can decide to take some action and on he other hand Dennett only uses it to interpret action after it took place. Don't let yourself get fooled by redefinition of terms. You can get up from the floor and afterwards say that you decided so but you cannot say that it is independent decision prior to the act that made your body do so.

I'm not 100% certain but I do agree.

Avoiding stuff is a story we tell ourselves after things have happend.

As above. I'm not 100% sure because I haven't looked into free will much. But I do agree and that does make a lot of sense to me.

I mean I do not believe we can choose to decide to do things, deliberately, consciously, on purpose, etc.

You only have shown that you can use 'avoid' in past tense.

Yes and that's pretty much my point. Not believing in 'free will' does not have to make us feel any less free. Because if there is no free will - we are just as free as we have never been - with our no 'free will'!

We do avoid things and if we believe we can and should we are more likely to try to do so.

Not believing in free will shouldn't make us have to believe that we are any more helpless than we actually are.

It can. But its not required! We are just as free with no free will as with free will! No free will is just as free. Because we have been exactly the same as we ever have whether we believed in free will or not?

What's the difference other than interesting speculation?

And what would happen if we knew the whole future absolutely and could see exactly what we were going to do and we could do nothing about it?

If we don't know what we are going to do and we have no 'free will' - how are we practically any less free than we have ever been? We're the same person as before! If we have no 'free will' now, we had no 'free will' back then when we believed we DID have 'free will' - when we didn't.

Well, I am not sure either EvF, I'm just playing the devil's advocate here. I think there is something wrong with Dennett's stance. It at the moment really seems a word trick to me. Free will becomes 'evitability' and Dennett underwater changes to past tense wherever evitability and avoidance pop up. I hope Freedom Evolves is to become the first selected book for the Bookclub. Then we might get to the bottom of Dennett's stance.

I think free will becomes evitiability because there very probably isn't really any 'free will' as in what most people think of as free will.

Because if we are going to do something in the future. Then whatever that is -we are going to do it!

Does that mean we are any less free than we have ever or never been? No. We can still do the same things!

Unless that because of our misunderstanding of 'no free will' the belief that there is 'no free will' compels us to be more close minded and 'act' or behave more helpless than we actually are.

The belief in no 'free will' certainly does not require that. Once again, the belief that I have 'no free will' doesn't make me any less free than I have ever/never been!

So evitability used to mean free will just means we have the same free will that we always have even if it wasn't really 'free will'.

We are just as free as we ever/never were!

You do when you claim you can intentionally avoid things.

Did I? when? If I did then I am sorry because I do not believe that.

Probably a semantics thing. If I say I make decisions it doesn't mean I have any choice in the matter. Its just that I'm not really sure what else to say?

When I decide to do something what should I say instead to describe it?

When I am choosing a certain flavour of a packet of crisps should I say: I am compelled to pick up this flavour of crisps because I want it - but I have no choice in the matter of wanting to pick up that flavour. And I have no choice in whether my desire, or whatever, to pick up that particular flavour of crisps - compels me and makes me pick it up or not. Its all entirely automatic but I am picking it up nevertheless. Put simply I guess its because I want it - but I have no choice in wanting it or whether the want is strong enough to make me pick that packet up.

Lol probably could put it a bit simpler than that! But its tricky! I'd rather just say I decide or choose even if I have no choice in the matter of my decisions and choices. Unless there's another alternative?

Then what is consciousness about? Is it merely a word?

I don't think there's anything special about it. Perhaps its just the thoughts I'm conscious of? Or you? or whoever's conscious.

Dennett has described consciousness as 'the fame in the brain'.

I find it interesting because I have intuitively thought simular before I ever knew about Dennett. I thought - perhaps my consciousness is just what's 'winning'.

If I have understood correctly?

And if you have any alternative views or explanations then I'm more than willing to hear them (or see them rather).

Most people, me included, find that very disturbing. Wouldn't you like to know if you are something other than a robot?

There are numerous consequences, for instance on the accountability of behaviour.

Could you elaborate on that? I used to 100% believe in 'free will'. Now I don't believe 'free will' exists but I am not 100% certain.

I don't feel any less free at all. Why should I? I'm the same as I was before either way!

Either its me making these 'decisions' or I'm just doing stuff. Either way I can still do stuff! And if I believe I can I am more likely to try.

And I believe I can do stuff because that's bloody obvious - I've been doing stuff all my life. Whether I believe in free will or not doesn't really make ANY practical difference for ME at least.

If there is no free will then I never had it. I did stuff then. I do stuff now. And I am no more limited than before because I was just as limited then!

Sounds like you believing in free will no matter what facts might tell you. That's a belief for sure.

I don't believe in 'free will'. I believe I can avoid stuff whether I have a choice in the matter or not! I still can avoid stuff!

If I am going to do something in the future then that will happen! So I think the usual meaning of 'free will' is perhaps - rather silly.

The future is going to happen because - that's what the future is right? What happens in the future? The future is what happens in the future lol! And if I will do something in the future then I will do that something in the future.

So I think because some/many people seem to think we are less free than we have ever/never been if we don't believe in free will.

I think that its good that 'free will' should be defined as evitability because why worry about something that makes no difference!

We have just as much freedom with free will as without it. If I make decisions consciously then I don't feel or behave any more free than if I don't believe in free will!

If I believed in 'free will' now - I wouldn't be any more free than I AM.

What exactly would making decisions be? If I am choosing to type this it doesn't make any difference than if I'm not does it?

I am still doing it and I still have the evitability to type: monkey fish omelette. Whether I had a choice in the matter - or not. What's the diffence? I believe there are interesting scientific differences - because the truth is damn interesting!

But I am interested in hearing practical differences. Because I used to believe in free will and now I don't. As in - how the hell can you change the future? The future is going to happen. And whatever I do in the future I will do in the future! Whether I like it or not!

Because I am NOT separate from reality!

But - it has made no practical difference to my life that I no longer believe in 'free will'. I only believe in evitability. I may not CHOOSE to avoid things but I still avoid them and try to do so if I believe I can and should.

It's becoming kind of repetitive but changing the words just does not do the trick for me.

Well I think the thing is if you can't change the future because the future is the future and whatever happens to you will happen to you. Because its the future. Whether you are a determinist or INdeterminist - then the 'free will' thing is kind of a points thing to think about.

But since so many people are 'hung up' about it when they shouldn't be. I think the point of the redefiniton of 'free will' is that you have just as much 'free will' as you ever (or rather never) have whether you believe in free will or not! So what are you worrying about?

So if you have just as much freedom as ever whether you believe in free will or not. I think the point is that you still have the 'free will' that you may or may not have thought you had in the past. So if back then you had no 'free will' but you thought you have. Well you still have the same 'free will' that you thought you had then - as in, you're just as free! Because if you aren't free now then you weren't free then! But back then you felt free - as in, you thought you had free will.

Hypothetically speaking.

If you get my drift
evf

[josef rosenkranz]

There is a most essential difference between our both views about the problem.
You exclude random based on ,I would say,hypotetical presumption that all laws of nature are causal linked between them.You affirm contrary to every ones deep feelings that there is no free will.

I didn't exclude randomness from nature. I gave an example (Casimir) of a phenomenon that to the best of current scientifc knowledge is purely random in nature. It is not clear to me what you mean by "that all laws of nature are causal linked between them", and I don't recognize it as any presumption I would have made. Do you mean that I presume that gravity is causally linked to for instance to the electromagnetic force? Please elaborate on this.

PR Hi
So you don't exclude randomness from nature or if you'll permit me to rephrase your statement you accept randomness as a part of laws of nature.
Now making a little step further I would ask, do you see randomness (synonim to indeterminism) as a marginal ,neglectable part of nature
or has it a major role within the general picture of natural laws known to man?
In my opinion randomness and casuality have an almost identical weight in the laws of nature.
Let me explain what I meant when I said that laws of nature are causal linked between them.
Every event taking place in the coordinates of time/space has always on the axis of time an event which preceed and an other which succeed,
linked between them according to a multitude of physical laws.No event is born out of nothing (except God who does not exist).
Now the problem is if we can affirm that there exists two sucessive events which are linked by an absolute causal law or that the causal link is flawed by randomness.
If you know of such an absolute causal law please speak up and I shall be happy to have learned something new.
In my opinion each physical law has a limited conventional validity where it is causal and beyond those limits it becomes more and more indeterministic.

Furthermore I also regret that from deterministic laws of nature it follows that free will, in the sense that man can intervene in causality and decide which action to take, does not exist. But that is the dilemma caused by deterministic laws. It is known as the problem of free will. Neurophysiological experiments done by (among others) Libet indicate that the brain activity associated with the preparation for movement starts a quarter of a second before the person being tested reports having decided to move (see for instance Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett, p 230).
\

Here I must vehemently be in discordance with you because what you say about the inexistence of the possibility of man to intervene in the future sounds close to the proof of the existence of the immuable Destiny which is borderline to the belief in God.
Sorry PR take no offense

Only that you can by no means present a complete system of equations which shall demonstrate ,not the fall of the meteorite or the free will which are most complicated things, but even a more simpler task as for instance the correct meteo prediction which no one, even with the most sophisticated computers, is able to solve.

Imho and if I understand you correctly, you are confusing 1) the laws of nature and 2) the ability of man to capture the laws of nature in arbitrarily precise prediction models. (2) is not what the philosophical issue on determinism versus indeterminism is about. At hand is the question whether free will exists given the deterministic nature of the laws of nature. The question is a philosophical one that abstracts from the abilities of man to construct precise models.

Here I can not but agree with you about the inability of man to construct precise models.
The problem is where from stems this inability.
Is it because of the limits of our knowledge about the laws of nature,or is it an inherent unsolvable possibility?
To say that in the future, as our knowledge of nature is going to be developed beyond our imagination, it will enable man to construct absolute precise models is nothing but speculative way of thinking.
The contrary seems more reasonable that due to a number beyond of limits definable parameters,a precise model is theorethically not obtainable nevermind the amount of our knowledge of nature.
This inability is just another expression of indeterminism which lies on the core of it.

I don't deny the objective existence of the laws of nature but I say the following:
1) The Heisenberg uncertainity principle ,which was extended by Stephen Hawking from the sub atomic domain to that of Black holes,add to that the "genetic drift" and other examples, could be marginalized from the general picture of laws of nature or on the contrary could be located in the center of it.Scientist are still debating about it without a final conclusion.

Quantummechanical uncertainty does not provide a mechanism to intervene in causality. You can place it at the center of things or not, that does not change the outcome: uncertainty forms no basis for causal intervention by intelligent agents.

2)The famous physicist Lord Kelvin said that if you have a theory which you can express in measurable units and numbers then you know something about it but if not then your knowledge of the problem is poor and unsatisfactory.
I say, as paraphrase to it,that if you have a finite number of equations to solve a physical existing parameter then you can demonstrate it's causality.But if you are not able to compound such a system due to an indefinable number of parameters,of an indefinable multitude, then your causal proof is poor and unsatisfactory.

What is your point with this? This is about the ability of man to construct precise models. It is not about the fundamental issue of determinism.

ditto

3) I have brought in other posts examples of indefinite numbers used as concrete definitions in basical mathemathics.

Again I feel this is about mathematical capabilities of man, ot about fundamental determinism of nature. Also indefinition in mathematical models does not add up to free will.

Sorry I never linked free will to mathematics only to indefinite numbers

4)Every physical law expressed as a mathemathic formula has its conventional limits so that if you try to deepen the law beyond those
limits you most probable will be trapped in uncertainity .

ditto

5) Every statistical law has by definition two areas : one at the core which expresses a certain law and the other at it's margins where the law becommes more and more blurred till to indefinition i.e.indeterminism.

Question: is a statistical law causal or correlative in nature?

As I said every statistical law has this dual aspect of causality within conventional limits and indeterministic the more you go beyond those limits.

---

Purple Rabbit Hi
I am sorry that my latest reply to you, posted some minutes ago is unclear because my answers to different quotations by you appear on white background instead of yellow background.
I still don't know the right procedure of how to insert answers between quotations and have asked Adrian to instruct me on this matter.
I'm confident that you have sufficient perspicacity to locate my answers
even if they are on white background.

[Purple Rabbit]

Purple Rabbit Hi
I am sorry that my latest reply to you, posted some minutes ago is unclear because my answers to different quotations by you appear on white background instead of yellow background.
I still don't know the right procedure of how to insert answers between quotations and have asked Adrian to instruct me on this matter.
I'm confident that you have sufficient perspicacity to locate my answers
even if they are on white background.

Josef, that's OK I will manage. Thanks for your posting.

Tip: In full edit mode select the text you want in quotes and use the third button from the right. Only downside of this method is that the name of whom you are quoting is not inserted.

[Purple Rabbit]

PR Hi
So you don't exclude randomness from nature or if you'll permit me to rephrase your statement you accept randomness as a part of laws of nature.
Now making a little step further I would ask, do you see randomness (synonim to indeterminism) as a marginal ,neglectable part of nature
or has it a major role within the general picture of natural laws known to man?
In my opinion randomness and casuality have an almost identical weight in the laws of nature.
Let me explain what I meant when I said that laws of nature are causal linked between them.
Every event taking place in the coordinates of time/space has always on the axis of time an event which preceed and an other which succeed,
linked between them according to a multitude of physical laws.No event is born out of nothing (except God who does not exist).
Now the problem is if we can affirm that there exists two sucessive events which are linked by an absolute causal law or that the causal link is flawed by randomness.
If you know of such an absolute causal law please speak up and I shall be happy to have learned something new.

In my opinion each physical law has a limited conventional validity where it is causal and beyond those limits it becomes more and more indeterministic.

Furthermore I also regret that from deterministic laws of nature it follows that free will, in the sense that man can intervene in causality and decide which action to take, does not exist. But that is the dilemma caused by deterministic laws. It is known as the problem of free will. Neurophysiological experiments done by (among others) Libet indicate that the brain activity associated with the preparation for movement starts a quarter of a second before the person being tested reports having decided to move (see for instance Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett, p 230).
\

Here I must vehemently be in discordance with you because what you say about the inexistence of the possibility of man to intervene in the future sounds close to the proof of the existence of the immuable Destiny which is borderline to the belief in God.
Sorry PR take no offense

I take no offense Josef. This is an open discussion and disagreement is anticipated.

But the laws of nature are such that they leave no room for interruption by intelligent agents. You may not like this, but not liking it won't make it go away. I'm not at all suggesting a belief in god. A fully determined universe would make a good case against god I'd say, for there is no room of free will for man, which is part of all ahabramitic religions (notwithstanding the possible contradiction that arises with an all-knowing god). Personally my preference would be that there is room for free will. But when you look at the laws of nature as we know 'm so far, determination prevails on the macro level. On the micro level there is room for some indetermination (as a result of Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle and quantum fluctuation) but there is no room for causal interruption by intelligent agents. Whether the evolution of the universe with everyting in it is deterministic or not does not matter, the laws seem to leave no room for intelligent causal interruption. This is a question philosophy of mind is wrestling with since long, but nature hasn't provided any openings so far. If you know of any please let me hear about them, I would be very interested.

If the laws of nature are deterministic every event has a causal predeccesor: ... A causes B causes C ... But there is no room such that the following occurs: ... A causes B > interrupt by intelligent agent forcing event D, D causes E ...

If the laws of nature are partially indeterministic some events have no causal predeccesor: randomly X occurs, X causes Y causes Z ... But there is no room such that the following occurs: randomly X occurs, on X there is an interrupt by an intelligent agent forcing event D, D cause E ...

Although in popular literature often is suggested that quantum uncertainty gives a basis to free will, no such thing is the case according to the laws of physics, neither has any of the sort ever been observed. These assertions are based on nothing but speculation or as Murray Gell-Mann said 'quantum flapdoodle'.

On the other hand some stances vigourously defended in the scientific/philosophic community concerned with philosophy of mind, propose mental properties of physical matter. These proponents of property-dualism in general do not reach for quantum mystification. The reason thereof being that sheer speculation does not survive scientific scrutiny.

[josef rosenkranz]

Purple Rabbit wrote
(quote)
I didn't exclude randomness from nature. I gave an example (Casimir) of a phenomenon that to the best of current scientifc knowledge is purely random in nature.(unquote)

PR hi
It seems to be a very interesting new discovered phenomenon about which scientists are still debating.
What bothers me in your affirmation is the expression of "pure random".

I don't know of any phenomenon in nature which can be considered as "pure".
Take phenomena such as gravity,eloctromagnetic fields,chemical reactions, lest of all phenomena of life,none of them are pure but mixed up in each event taking place in space/time with other major or minor phenomena.
(Even when you come out of the shower you are not entirely pure)

Take the most basic law of measuring of material entities such as
1+1=2,not as an abstract mathematic expression but as a mode of summing up measurable identical entities.
Well even this most simple expression can by no means by considered as pure because identical entities exist only within conventional limits and are never absolute identical being always placed in other positions within space/time coordinates.

Now, even if you did not so exactly mean the expression of "pure" the meanning of randomness for the Casimir phenomenon as presented by you seems to lead to an instantly borne material entity out of nothing previous.
Such a conception contradicts all what we know and believe about laws of the material world as we totally deny instantaneous creation.
It could be manna from heaven for creationists who will caress their bellies and cry out for all to hear "we told you that after all God exists".

I hope that scientists after having pulled out one another beards will came to the conclusion that the Casimir phenomenon is after all a result of previous events even if it happens randomely.
If you have more knowledge about this phenomenon please present it
for the benefit of our members.

[Purple Rabbit]

Purple Rabbit wrote
(quote)
I didn't exclude randomness from nature. I gave an example (Casimir) of a phenomenon that to the best of current scientifc knowledge is purely random in nature.(unquote)

PR hi
It seems to be a very interesting new discovered phenomenon about which scientists are still debating.
What bothers me in your affirmation is the expression of "pure random".

I don't know of any phenomenon in nature which can be considered as "pure".

You should not focus on one word in my quote and ignore the rest of it. I clearly stated that it is random to the best of current scientifc knowledge. And as I have stated many times earlier elsewhere on this forum, scientific kowledge, much like any human knowledge, is not proven absolute. This means that whenever cutting edge science establishes a 'fact', there is room for some doubt, however small. In the case of randomness of the Casimir effect there is no empirical basis for doubt, in other words, doubt is based on none other than sheer speculation. I added the phrase "to the best of current scientifc knowledge" just to express that. So you are of course free to speculate, but when you stick to the facts that science present us the Casimir effect is random. Casimir's starting point was the predicted forming of virtual particles as a consequence of the thoroughly tested Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. A virtual particle is a particle that exists for a limited time and space as a result of applying Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle on the vacuum. In fact Casimir's attempt was to test the applicability of the principle on the vacuum, not an attempt to find virtual particles.

Take phenomena such as gravity,eloctromagnetic fields,chemical reactions, lest of all phenomena of life,none of them are pure but mixed up in each event taking place in space/time with other major or minor phenomena.
(Even when you come out of the shower you are not entirely pure)

You are mixing synonymous meanings of the word pure. My use of the word is related to the state of scientific knowledge only.

Take the most basic law of measuring of material entities such as
1+1=2,not as an abstract mathematic expression but as a mode of summing up measurable identical entities.
Well even this most simple expression can by no means by considered as pure because identical entities exist only within conventional limits and are never absolute identical being always placed in other positions within space/time coordinates.

This is like saying, no human knowledge is absolute, with which I already agreed.

Now, even if you did not so exactly mean the expression of "pure" the meanning of randomness for the Casimir phenomenon as presented by you seems to lead to an instantly borne material entity out of nothing previous.
Such a conception contradicts all what we know and believe about laws of the material world as we totally deny instantaneous creation.
It could be manna from heaven for creationists who will caress their bellies and cry out for all to hear "we told you that after all God exists".

You should definitely read the link I provided before attempting digressing on the subject. Energy is conserved with the creation of a matter-antimatter pair. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle predicts energy fluctuations of the vacuum and leaves room for short lived virtual particle pairs. To deny quantum fluctuations is to deny the heart of quantum mechanics. Be sure on what quest you decide to embark. And yes quantum mechanics is indeed very counterintuitive, it's quite astonishing that humans at all have been able to arrive at it.

[josef rosenkranz]

Purple Rabbit wrote
(quote)
I didn't exclude randomness from nature. I gave an example (Casimir) of a phenomenon that to the best of current scientifc knowledge is purely random in nature.(unquote)

PR hi
It seems to be a very interesting new discovered phenomenon about which scientists are still debating.
What bothers me in your affirmation is the expression of "pure random".

I don't know of any phenomenon in nature which can be considered as "pure".

You should not focus on one word in my quote and ignore the rest of it. I clearly stated that it is random to the best of current scientifc knowledge. And as I have stated many times earlier elsewhere on this forum, scientific kowledge, much like any human knowledge, is not proven absolute. This means that whenever cutting edge science establishes a 'fact', there is room for some doubt, however small. In the case of randomness of the Casimir effect there is no empirical basis for doubt, in other words, doubt is based on none other than sheer speculation. I added the phrase "to the best of current scientifc knowledge" just to express that. So you are of course free to speculate, but when you stick to the facts that science present us the Casimir effect is random. Casimir's starting point was the predicted forming of virtual particles as a consequence of the thoroughly tested Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. A virtual particle is a particle that exists for a limited time and space as a result of applying Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle on the vacuum. In fact Casimir's attempt was to test the applicability of the principle on the vacuum, not an attempt to find virtual particles.

Take phenomena such as gravity,eloctromagnetic fields,chemical reactions, lest of all phenomena of life,none of them are pure but mixed up in each event taking place in space/time with other major or minor phenomena.
(Even when you come out of the shower you are not entirely pure)

You are mixing synonymous meanings of the word pure. My use of the word is related to the state of scientific knowledge only.

Take the most basic law of measuring of material entities such as
1+1=2,not as an abstract mathematic expression but as a mode of summing up measurable identical entities.
Well even this most simple expression can by no means by considered as pure because identical entities exist only within conventional limits and are never absolute identical being always placed in other positions within space/time coordinates.

This is like saying, no human knowledge is absolute, with which I already agreed.

Now, even if you did not so exactly mean the expression of "pure" the meanning of randomness for the Casimir phenomenon as presented by you seems to lead to an instantly borne material entity out of nothing previous.
Such a conception contradicts all what we know and believe about laws of the material world as we totally deny instantaneous creation.
It could be manna from heaven for creationists who will caress their bellies and cry out for all to hear "we told you that after all God exists".

You should definitely read the link I provided before attempting digressing on the subject. Energy is conserved with the creation of a matter-antimatter pair. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle predicts energy fluctuations of the vacuum and leaves room for short lived virtual particle pairs. To deny quantum fluctuations is to deny the heart of quantum mechanics. Be sure on what quest you decide to embark. And yes quantum mechanics is indeed very counterintuitive, it's quite astonishing that humans at all have been able to arrive at it.

I don't have the skill to deny anything about quantum mechanics and I didn't deny either the existence of the Casimir effect.
However as counterintuitive as a problem might be ,even in such a domain demanding high knowledge of physics,I don't believe that the essence of it is unaccessable to common wisdom.
Therefore I asked an din't get a clear answer if the Casimir effect means
the creation of an event out of nothing previous ,which was my understanding of your statement of "pure random",or it is the causal effect of some previous event.
The item of this thread is determinism vs. indeterminism ,(which in my view bears consequences related to aheism,even if some members of this forum disagree),so from this point of view I said that it would be interesting to learn from your knowledge about the Casimir effect.