Proof Mind is Fundamental and Matter Doesn't Exist

[Cato]

confusing idealism with solipsism... the world we experience is functionally real, which is to say it operates on its own consistently and we don't determine these operations... but that doesn't mean it's objectively real containing a material substance that is independent of our experiences and perceptions. it can still be just a mental construct without being constructed from your mind.

and did you say very simple demonstration? tell me how I can demonstrate to you with empirical evidence you can only observe with your senses, what is behind those senses? we can only perceive the world through the lens of our senses, thus we cannot demonstrate using evidence from the world what is behind those senses. so what exactly is this 'simple demonstration' you're referring to?

Invoking a god, reality creating mind, to save your neck. Charming.

[downbeatplumb]

This thread mentions "proof" mind is fundamental. Has anyone seen any proof yet?

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, you can't read too much into not seeing it.............. it's immaterial (like everything else), after all.  The OP is just shaky on how to structure and argument by elimination, that's all.  It's a herculean task, cut some slack, give it some time, I'm sure we'll end end with proof of something, eventually.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qu5q_awytxU

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[Rational AKD]

And you can't die from being bludgeoned by a baseball bat in a hallucination or a dream either...

right... because 'your' hallucinations have no effect on your body. but your real life body is made of the same stuff as the rest of the world in your experience. so whether this 'material' in our experience is an actual material substance or just a mental construct, your body is still made of the same substance you find in the objects of your experience. so they can all affect your body on that same level.

I've never even heard of anyone who believes this before. Do you have a church?

Monistic Idealism is an epistemological belief, not a religious one thus there is no 'church' for it. just look up monistic idealism and you'll see it is an actual belief many people believe.

[The Grand Nudger]

And you can't die from being bludgeoned by a baseball bat in a hallucination or a dream either...

right... because 'your' hallucinations have no effect on your body. but your real life body is made of the same stuff as the rest of the world in your experience. so whether this 'material' in our experience is an actual material substance or just a mental construct, your body is still made of the same substance you find in the objects of your experience. so they can all affect your body on that same level.

and yet, as you've just stated, those hallucinations don't seem to have the same effect...it's almost as if something is true of one type of mental construct...that isn't true of another type of mental construct......hmn.....I could swear I've heard an argument like this before...and I could have sworn that the last time I heard it, that same arguer concluded that those two "whatevers" must then not be the same thing......and yet that same arguer, for whatever reason......later concluded that that they -were- the same thing.....in fact, I do believe that same said arguer proposed that -everything- was that same type of thing.

Curious.

[Captain Scarlet]

This entire argument is bullshit. If an idealist was truly convinced, he would voluntarily separate his head from his neck and be able to gloat afterwards that he was right. The fact that none have nor will is all we need to understand about the confidence in their position. 

The warp speed backpeddling and excuse making to avoid a very simple demonstration may now commence.

confusing idealism with solipsism... the world we experience is functionally real, which is to say it operates on its own consistently and we don't determine these operations... but that doesn't mean it's objectively real containing a material substance that is independent of our experiences and perceptions. it can still be just a mental construct without being constructed from your mind.

and did you say very simple demonstration? tell me how I can demonstrate to you with empirical evidence you can only observe with your senses, what is behind those senses? we can only perceive the world through the lens of our senses, thus we cannot demonstrate using evidence from the world what is behind those senses. so what exactly is this 'simple demonstration' you're referring to?

Again this isn't even false, its worse in that it is meaningless.  What is a "functionally real" but not "objectively real" world. The world is real or it is not. You cannot place an adjective in front of it to describe what type of real it is.  To say you do not live in an objectively real world, is to say you live in a fantasy world, whether you created or someone else did.

[Rational AKD]

They are all contained -within- premise 1.  In a solipsistic world, all implications and constraints by definition would be true.  As I've already said, if you need, as your premise, to have a metaphysical solipsism granted - then you have no need of an argument, your premise -is- your conclusion.

premises 1-3 aren't to 'grant' metaphysical solipsism. you seem to completely miss the point. they are to show that a solipsist world is a possible world. it establishes this starting at 1 by establishing its epistemic possibility first. then premise 2 states that it is most reasonable to grant there is a possible world that is purely solipsistic given its epistemic possibility (the step from epistemic possibility from actual possibility which on this thread is the most objected step of the argument). then 3 states that if there is a possible world that is purely solipsistic, then there is a possible world where mind exists but matter doesn't. this would be a modal difference between the two which makes ground to move onto premise 4. hopefully using these modal terms will help you understand better.

No need to argue, and you certainly aren't establishing anything.  In a metaphysical solipsist world there -is- no matter.  No argument required, nothing to establish.

it may be obvious to you, but not everyone can so easily think in modal terms. so even though you think it's redundant, it still has a purpose of providing clarity to those who can't follow the steps so easily.

My objection is that you didn't use any logic in your argument - as I said from the very beginning.  You strung claims together, many repetitive, none useful or informative, while failing to leverage any valid means of inference or deduction.  Not really -my- problem......now is it?

let me reword the argument then, specifically for you as you don't seem to deny a metaphysically solipsist world is possible. i'll only change the wording up to 4 however.
1. solipsism is possible.
2. given 1, there is a possible world where mind exists and matter doesn't and therefore there is a property (modal property) of mind that matter doesn't have.
3. given 2 and according to Leibniz Law, mind and matter are not identical; given 1 and 2, mind is not reducible to matter.
4 and 5 would be worded the same as 5 and 6.

You think my imagination, and the concepts I can come up with are distinguishable from my identity, distinguishable from my mind?

as I said, mind is that which enables consciousness. thus your mind is equivocal to what you call 'self.'

I'd say that my mind -is- one of those concepts.  But, regardless, again, how might you determine that?  What means do you have..or is this another one of those things you'll simply claim ad naus?

determined by the definition of mind.. tautology.

LOL?  There's no need to explain how your analogy fails after having repeatedly explained to you how the thing we are -actually- discussing works.

you know... just because you 'think' you communicated something though implication doesn't mean you did...

and again...a simulated mountain doesn't actually have to be a mountain, or have the qualities of a mountain.  If it had the qualities of a mountain..it would be a mountain..plain and simple...not a simulated mountain.

in order to be a simulation, it needs to be an imitative representation of something else... which means a simulated mountain needs to imitate and represent qualities of an actual mountain in order to be a simulation... if it's just code, then it's no more a simulation of a mountain than the word mountain.

Just where do you think the game is? Wait for it..............on the board....machines...in..state.

in this context, i'll equivocate game with video game since that's the topic of discussion. video game- "a game played by electronically manipulating images produced by a computer program on a monitor or other display." so the game is what's electronically displayed... the hardware is the... wait for it.......... game system. i mean come on, no one calls an Xbox a game. game is always referring to the contents on the disk, cartage, or whatever stores the game. but i'll invoke a minor correction. the simulation would be the video content of the game rather than the game itself. the game would be the purpose and rules set in place, and the video content would be the simulation which serves as the objects of game play the same as in chess the game is the rules established and the objects of game play are the pieces and board.

Go punch some arbitrary code into your machine and see if it does anything.  It won't..because it isn't arbitrary.

arbitrary doesn't mean random... you need to assign values meaning, but the meaning you assign to the values are arbitrarily decided. that's how programming works... you have a memory storage and you can give certain values meaning based on your intentions of what you want to program. for example, when you program a game you can designate certain bits in the memory to represent in game currency. you can make a list of in game items and assign them with identifier values you designate based on the range of values you assigned to be the item list. the values you assign can represent whatever you want them to be... which makes them arbitrary... by definition.

Not sure you understood the phrase, I wasn't disagreeing with you here...but yeah, sure for a tangible interaction at least -one- of the two substances must be tangible.  Do they both need to be tangible...no, there doesn't seem to be any requirement there.

apparently we do disagree here. both substances must be tangible to tangibly interact. I mean, how can a substance that lacks tangibility tangibly interact with anything? tangible interaction of any substance requires tangibility of the substance. this applies to both substances that are tangibly interacting. in intangible substance can't tangibly do anything by definition... let alone tangibly interact even with a tangible substance.

Why don't you just rephrase your argument.......it shouldn't be that difficult.

good idea. i'll start with the questions you agree with. and make new ones following them.

fundamental means most basic form possible.
2 different substances not identical have to be different somehow.
for 2 substances to interact, there must be at least one similar property both possess for which they can interact.
fundamental substances must have fundamental properties.
fundamental properties must be fundamentally tied to a substance.
given the prior, those fundamental properties can't be exhibited without the substance it is fundamentally tied to.
given all this, the fundamental properties of fundamental substances must be fundamental to that substance and thus cannot be exhibited without that substance.

[Rational AKD]

Again this isn't even false, its worse in that it is meaningless.  What is a "functionally real" but not "objectively real" world. The world is real or it is not.

a virtual reality world would likewise have simulative objects that function like real objects, but are not real objects. 'is the matrix real or not?' Quote Morpheus
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-M4kPxd03k

You cannot place an adjective in front of it to describe what type of real it is.

...Objectively is an and adverb... it is describing the verb of the sentence 'is.' this by virtue adds to the description of the noun 'it' which is being described also by the adjective 'real.' fail.

To say you do not live in an objectively real world, is to say you live in a fantasy world, whether you created or someone else did.

it really doesn't matter whether you consider it real or not. the point is it functions like a real world, thus you would interact in it with the same functional purposes as a real world.

[The Grand Nudger]

Just to get this out of the way - I'm done trying to explain how computers and sims work to you.  If you want to know how they work, rather than how you might try to continue your argument, fucking google it.

Now that we're done with that.  

1. solipsism is possible.
-granted

2. given 1, there is a possible world where mind exists and matter doesn't and therefore there is a property (modal property) of mind that matter doesn't have.
-"if premise 1 were true, then premise 1 would be true"
3. given 2 and according to Leibniz Law, mind and matter are not identical; given 1 and 2, mind is not reducible to matter.
-"if premise 1 were true, then premise 1 would be true"  In a meta solipsist world (possible or actual).....mind would not be reducible to matter - cheifly, because there would be no matter. Full stop, nothing else need be said...1-3 are -still- contained within premise 1.

4 and 5 would be worded the same as 5 and 6.

...okay, if you insist..

4. substance dualism has been proven false due to the interaction problem (substances can only interact via shared properties and substances cannot be fundamental and share properties).
-you haven't reworded this, so the problem remains.  

5. therefore, all is mind and monistic idealism entails.
-You've failed to make any change to your argument that would remove the same issues already discussed.  I'll condense your entire argument for you.

If the world is meta-solipsist, and substance dualism is false - then monistic idealism is true.
(look at all the words you've wasted when you could simply say this.....gee...I wonder why )

Ultimately, this is -still- a non-seq, and for the same reason that it was before.  You have attempted an argument by means of elimination......but presented a whopping -1- possibility to be eliminated (and you're still simply asking us to accept a nestled argument from assertion in presenting that one possibility).  You're going to need to add the statement "and this is the only other possibility" -somewhere......and until you do, there's no reason for me to discuss whether or not any particular portion is sound....because the structure of the argument has yet to pass the bar of validity. Honestly, there's no reason to even discuss dualism as stated..because in a meta-solipsist world....substance dualism is false by definition. Hmn, further reduction...

If premise 1 were true.......then premise 1 would be true.

This is the -entirety- of your argument, as I said from the very start. Well done! No wonder you find it so compelling, what a tight little knot you've tied yourself into.

Now, on to our meta discussion regarding that argument from assertion -as stated-.

apparently we do disagree here. both substances must be tangible to tangibly interact. I mean, how can a substance that lacks tangibility tangibly interact with anything? tangible interaction of any substance requires tangibility of the substance. this applies to both substances that are tangibly interacting. in intangible substance can't tangibly do anything by definition... let alone tangibly interact even with a tangible substance.

Must they? It's not my business to establish how they interact to you (that would be the business of people who claim to possess proof that dualism is true)..you claimed that it had been disproven, so this is your baby..get to work. The swan song of every armchair "philosopher" everywhere is to demand that another do the work they've assumed upon themselves. Tangible interaction of substances certainly implies that -some- of those involved substances be tangible (at least insomuch as you appear to be using the term as a stand in for what is detectable), but you've yet to demonstrate that it requires both (or all- maybe there are 30..who would know?) of those substances to be tangible - or even that both (or all) substances -aren't- tangible to begin with, plenty of people see the immaterial "other substance" as very, very tangible - and gl to you sir, disproving their claims. Here, as with the premise you are trying to support...you are attempting to argue by assertion and unspoken assumption. The only thing that's true -by definition- in your claim, is that a tangible -interaction- must be tangible, the interaction.....not all involved parties to it. Try again, Mr. bait and switch.

I'm wondering why you thought dualism would actually be that easy to disprove, btw? More than that..I'm wondering why tangibility means anything at all to you, given your position? Tangibility is, essentially, an illusion in your worldview. That something is or isn't tangible, particularly relative to notions of the material vs the immaterial (the general context of substance dualism), has nothing to do with anything in a world composed of immaterial ideas devoid of material -anythings-, the very notion of tangibility, in that framework - is nonsense. Just another stolen concept which doesn't do anything in your framework because you've removed it's foundational propositions.

If you're going to claim that you're a monistic idealist, ffs man...be one. You're arguing against substance dualism, in effect, from a position of materialism - and if you find the arguments from that position compelling..perhaps you ought to include that as possibility number two above (at least then you'd be eliminating more of the available possibilities..which are important to you, or so your statements would lead us to believe), rather than waive it away by invoking, as your starting premise, a meta solipsist world?

[Rational AKD]

1. solipsism is possible.
-granted

2. given 1, there is a possible world where mind exists and matter doesn't and therefore there is a property (modal property) of mind that matter doesn't have.
-"if premise 1 were true, then premise 1 would be true"
3. given 2 and according to Leibniz Law, mind and matter are not identical; given 1 and 2, mind is not reducible to matter.
-"if premise 1 were true, then premise 1 would be true"  In a meta solipsist world (possible or actual).....mind would not be reducible to matter - cheifly, because there would be no matter.  Full stop, nothing else need be said...1-3 are -still- contained within premise 1.

you misunderstand premise 3... it is not simply concluding mind and matter aren't the same thing in a possible world that is solipsistic... it is concluding that mind and matter aren't the same thing in actuality. according to Leibniz Law, for 2 things to be identical they can't have properties that distinguish them from one another. if something is possible for A but not B, then they are not the same. and this establishment of non-identical terms would be true in all cases, not just the specific circumstances.

you haven't reworded this, so the problem remains.

I readdressed the problem with substance dualism as per your request. i'm still waiting for your response. EDIT: I missed your explanation in the paragraph so i'll go ahead and address it.

If the world is meta-solipsist, and substance dualism is false - then monistic idealism is true.

your misinterpretation is premise 3 is affecting your summery. let me try: if solipsism is possible, then mind is not reducable to matter. given that and substance dualism is false, then mind is fundamental and everything is derived from mind; thus Monistic Idealism entails.