The Ethics of Belief

[Pyrrho]

+1 rep for best-defined OP ever.

Thank you.

It seems to me, however, that at least SOME beliefs will reliably support moral actions or at least cannot possibly be the root for immoral actions, despite having insufficient evidence.  Therefore, while they may be poorly founded, they are at least not immoral.

Let's say I hold the belief that whenever I see a brown dog, I have to act extra kindly toward people, or I will have bad luck.  The truth is that this belief is probably false, and could therefore never be corroborated with sufficient evidence.  But the anecdotal evidence stemming from my own random interactions with the world has led to a belief which will, at least sometimes, cause me to act more kindly than I would otherwise.  I do not see that this is an immoral belief.

I would say that superstitious beliefs, at least sometimes, are relatively moral-neutral.  For example, if I have a lucky tie that I like to wear on dates, it may cause me to act more confidently, as my belief in that tie's "powers" will cause me to feel more positive and confident.  I cannot see making an argument that causing myself to behave more postively and confidently would be immoral.

I answer that in part in my response to Dystopia; but I will repeat a bit here:

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Clifford addresses that concern:

       Nor is it that truly a belief at all which has not some influence upon the actions of him who holds it.  He who truly believes that which prompts him to an action has looked upon the action to lust after it, he has committed it already in his heart.  If a belief is not realized immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the guidance of the future.  It goes to make a part of that aggregate of beliefs which is the link between sensation and action at every moment of all our lives, and which is so organized and compacted together that no part of it can be isolated from the rest, but every new addition modifies the structure of the whole.  No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may some day explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character for ever.

When one believes one thing, it affects the other beliefs one has.  Both in terms of what other things fit with it, and in terms of the way one acquires one's beliefs.  In your specific example of deism, it is likely to impact one's examination of the origins of the universe, as well as make one more receptive to other god related beliefs.  And those affected beliefs may affect other beliefs, rather like a pebble being tossed into a still pond, causing a ripple across the surface.

To put this another way, beliefs are not all held in isolation from each other.  So one belief will affect the aggregate of beliefs one has.  And, as already mentioned, if one is willing to accept one thing on insufficient evidence, one is more likely to accept another thing on insufficient evidence.  After all, if such 'reasoning' is okay in one case, why not another?  As Clifford puts it:

We all suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of false beliefs and the fatally wrong actions which they lead to, and the evil born when one such belief is entertained is great and wide.  But a greater and wider evil arises when the credulous character is maintained and supported, when a habit of believing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made permanent.

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As for a particular instance working out well, Clifford addresses that with what immediately follows the last quote (in the hidden part above):

If I steal money from any person, there may be no harm done by the mere transfer of possession; he may not feel the loss, or it may prevent him from using the money badly.  But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself dishonest.  What hurts society is not that it should lose its property, but that it should become a den of thieves; for then it must cease to be society.

That a particular instance of something turns out well does not entail that the practice is a good one, as Clifford's example of theft illustrates.

It may be that a particular action is good that is caused by a belief lacking sufficient evidence.  But that does not justify the practice of believing things without sufficient evidence.  To give a wild example, but a possible one, if I fire a gun into a crowded room, and I happen to accidentally kill a murderer who was going to kill again, would that justify firing guns into crowded rooms?

Being reckless is dangerous, even if it does not involve anyone actually getting harmed.  If I drive home after drinking heavily at a party, and manage to make it home safely, that does not mean that it is okay for me to drive in such a state.  I have a duty to be careful, and that is not fulfilling that duty, even though in my hypothetical example no one got hurt.

In like manner, one should be careful about one's beliefs, because beliefs can be very dangerous, and can have a very significant effect on others.