The Ethics of Belief

[Dystopia]

When one believes one thing, it affects the other beliefs one has.  Both in terms of what other things fit with it, and in terms of the way one acquires one's beliefs.  In your specific example of deism, it is likely to impact one's examination of the origins of the universe, as well as make one more receptive to other god related beliefs.  And those affected beliefs may affect other beliefs, rather like a pebble being tossed into a still pond, causing a ripple across the surface.

I can certainly see the evidence and merit to the conclusion that all our beliefs are connected at least by the mere fact all of it belongs to us (and our brains) and therefore no belief exists in isolation - That makes perfect sense and I hadn't thought about it because I didn't see it as relevant to this topic. I have some doubts regarding your example - There are deists who don't like (And even dislike or hate) organized religion and every kind of non-deistic god, and there are deists who use god as merely a word to describe the first cause of the universe as some sort of cosmic force with a poetical, metaphorical touch - I would me more inclined to say that believing in one specific religion and its core principles makes you more open and vulnerable to other additional principles. For example, someone who converts to Christianity due to belief in the Resurrection has an easier time believing in other miracles as described by the bible. I don't know many deists aside from my significant other, but I do know most of them, when they say "first cause", mean the first cause of all existence and not necessarily the first cause to the big bang or the first cause to a hypothetical universe that existed before this one - So if you mean something like denying an obvious cause to the universe I don't think a deist would deny that, specially considering they value rationality (even if you think their belief is irrational) and frequently support and cherish science as more desirable for the world than religion.

To put this another way, beliefs are not all held in isolation from each other.  So one belief will affect the aggregate of beliefs one has.  And, as already mentioned, if one is willing to accept one thing on insufficient evidence, one is more likely to accept another thing on insufficient evidence.  After all, if such 'reasoning' is okay in one case, why not another?  As Clifford puts it:

Isn't this affirming the consequent? You are inferring that because one believes one thing without evidence, they are more likely to believe more things without evidence... If I reverse your example and use atheism as some sort of model for skeptical thinking I can easily point out to atheists who, disbelieving in god, believe all sorts of crazy shit like conspiracy theories without evidence. In fact, a troubling fact about an association called Men's rights activists is the fact some surveys (to be fair it was done on reddit) reveal the majority of them are non-religious - So this means non-religious (maybe skeptics, at least some) who support an organization known for its misogyny. Wouldn't the opposite make sense? So why are some people skeptical about some claims and not about others? Wouldn't this apply to your example - Someone who believes in something without evidence may actually be skeptical towards other claims? Please notice how religionists are skeptical about all gods minus one (assuming monotheism).

There are two separate issues in those questions.  If you mean, 'can we prove that the person did the action for the reason the person claims,' much will depend on what one counts as "proof."  But if you mean to question whether the action had any connection to any belief, are you seriously going to tell us that you believe the action had no connection to any beliefs the person had?

If I take a gun and shoot someone in the head, are you going to tell me that I did not have the belief that shooting someone in the head might lead to the person's death?  That when I loaded the gun, I had no beliefs about the significance of putting bullets in it, in order to make it work?  Is not every action that one takes connected to some belief (or more likely, beliefs)?

If you mean that a person might lie about an action, obviously, that is true.  So we cannot simply accept people's claims.  But that does not mean that their actions have no connection with any beliefs.

Indeed, every action is connected to some belief unless it's a reflexive or instinctive act, etc - My question is how can we determine to what degree religious belief and specific beliefs in every denomination influence people's behavior? Anyone who says "zero" is wrong and irrational, but there are people who think religion is a sole motivating factor of evil - I disagree with that as well. Using the example of Muslim terrorists, how do we determine to what degree it is Islam or geo-politics' fault? Because both variables seem to help - Sometimes religion simply fills the void, other times it drives the main act of terrorism just by itself - But certainly it isn't a coincidence some environments create more Jihadists than others.

As you have [correctly] said, our actions are connected to our beliefs, but since we have so many beliefs and it's complicated to know precisely what everyone believes, how do we know with reasonable certainty which belief or beliefs influenced the action? In the case of crimes done in the name of religion, how do we distinguish between someone who just believes unbelievers must die because religion says so, and someone who, despite using religion and being motivated by it, already has violent tendencies and would have committed the same crime even without religion or with any other religion? Like Reza Aslan said - If religious belief determined behavior, all believers would behave similarly, but that just doesn't happen - Hence why I think the option of "evil people will be evil" regardless of belief is more accurate, because someone who is evil or violent will inevitably, in any religion or lack of thereof find excuses to hurt others.

That is a very complicated question to answer.  And to be perfectly frank, I am not going to give a complete answer, as that would be practically impossible.  However, the short answer is, different things require different kinds of things as evidence.  For example, evidence that the Pythagorean theorem is true is going to look very different from evidence that I am presently in my home.  The former is going to involve discussions of mathematical concepts, and the latter is going to involve looking in my home (or, for such a trivial thing, one might regard my testimony as adequate, as there is nothing extraordinary in being in one's home).

The nature of a particular idea determines the sort of things that would be necessary for there to be evidence in favor of it.  It is no use looking in my home and seeing me here if the object is to prove the Pythagorean theorem, but it is more than acceptable for determining that I am in my home.

No objections - But how do I deal with theists who say that because different objects require different standards, types and amount of evidence, the standards for god are low or non-existent because he exists outside of time and space, and therefore cannot be proven because we can't measure what exists outside of what our imperfect senses can perceive? [And ultimately it depends just on faith)

You will either need to repeat the story or at least provide a link for me to address your specific example regarding your love.  However, I can address the general idea of trusting someone.  I trust my wife.  Now, I do that not because I love her, but because I have known her for many years, and have gotten to know her character fairly well.  She has been honest in the past, and so I infer that she is likely to be honest in the future.  Of course, there is much more than that, as there has not been a falling out or argument recently, nor has she started being distant or otherwise altered her behavior, etc.  Regardless of the details, the evidence I have regarding such things is not the same sort of evidence one can have for the Pythagorean theorem.  That may affect the level of certainty involved, but it does not mean that there is not enough evidence for it to be reasonable for me to trust my wife.

My example was basically - I can't know if my girlfriend loves me because all the "acts of love" she does with me can easily be a method of manipulation, so I need to have some faith in it. In your example, it seems reasonable to trust your wife - However, many times when it comes to love people follow (and sometimes correctly) their "gut" feelings, or "heart" - Can I say that because we use our gut feelings to love because it can't be measured physically then the same standards can be applied to god? (I suspect not!)

I presume that if you are in love with someone, you have known the person for some time, and during that time, you have observed that person's conduct.  You can make inferences from such observations, though what inferences will depend on what observations you have made.

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Yes, but don't forget that sometimes all of this is not enough to prevent getting emotionally hurt.

It is also worth emphasizing that Clifford specifically wrote about "sufficient evidence" and was not trying to tell you that you needed an absolute perfect certain proof before believing something.  You may, of course, complain that there is some slippage in some of what I have stated in this post, but, to bring in someone else for variety:

Yes, I'm aware of that - no one could live comfortably pursuing the need of absolute evidence for everything, hyperskepticism is a bad idea (generally). A better question would be what constitutes sufficient evidence for every case - It is easy to define it in the Pythagorean theorem, or to prove gravity exists, but what is sufficient evidence for a god claim? It is a question I still haven't fully answered, but I generally require some degree of logical consistency and a lack of logical fallacies. I do not require physical evidence for any deity at all (unless the person claims the deity exists physically), just a logically robust argument with little and preferably no flaws. 

Not every subject has the same level of precision, and so we must be content with what is possible in a given subject.

What level of precision do we need when discussing the case for god, specially considering the a priori premise that he only exists outside of time and space and is therefore unverifiable? (This is usually a premise defined on the main motion and not something to be prove, if someone wishes to discuss the existence of god then there are certain characteristics you must accept beforehand otherwise the motion is left undefined)