The Ethics of Belief

[Pyrrho]

Do you mean that you believe you can pick it all up?  I certainly would not jump to the conclusion that you believed that, if I saw you picking up some garbage.  I would not suppose that someone must believe such a thing in order to pick up some garbage.

I think we're not on the same page.  With the idea that humans should be killed in order to protect the environment, I'd say that this idea can be founded in sufficient evidence-- it's fairly clear that humans do great harm to nature, but not clear that we have the capacity or the will to do great good for nature.

Now, it's not all-or nothing.  If you killed say 2/3 of the people on Earth, you'd reduce crowding and probably reduce human impact on the world.  So you don't need the belief that you CAN kill all people in order, only the willingness to try.  The belief is just that there should be less people.

Your claim that humans should be killed in order to protect the environment is a compound idea rather than something simple.  That humans are damaging the environment is easy enough for one to support by evidence.  But your idea that it is better to kill billions of people rather than to let the environment be damaged is going to be much harder to support with evidence.

However, I will set that aside for the moment because there are a couple of other issues that will be fatal to your proposal.  You are proposing a particular method for protecting the environment.  You give as a justification for killing people that it will help protect the environment.  The action in your proposal is a means to an end.  This brings us to a connection with your earlier question:

"Does a moral idea really have to be associated with a statistical chance of success for it to be moral?"

Whenever using an end to justify a means, there are several requirements.  One is that the proposed means must have a reasonable chance of achieving the end.  To explain that idea, imagine me cheating on my wife, and when asked about, I say that I am doing it for world peace, and it is therefore justified.  Regardless of whether one thinks it better for me to cheat on my wife than for people to fight in the world, it is not reasonable to believe that me cheating on my wife is going to bring about world peace, and so bringing about world peace cannot be a justification for me cheating on my wife.  Likewise, in your case, if you start killing people in order to protect the environment, you will not be able to kill enough people to make any significant difference in the environment before someone stops you.  So it cannot be a justification for you to go out and kill people, because it is unreasonable for you to believe that it would succeed at the goal.

Another requirement when using an end to justify the means to get that end, is that there are not better means available for the same ends.  If, to go with my previous absurd example, I were able to bring about world peace by cheating on my wife, but I also could bring about world peace by eating a bagel with the leader of Israel, then obviously I ought to eat the bagel rather than cheat on my wife, so even though my method works (in this absurd imaginary example), there is a better method of achieving the goal than cheating on my wife and so the goal does not justify my chosen means (cheating on my wife).  And in your case of protecting the environment, there are better means to achieve that goal than killing billions of people, which also have a better (though perhaps not good) chance of success, that I stated previously:

...

  There is sufficient evidence that humans represent a net negative for the world.  It wouldn't be hard to establish the belief that the only way to save most of nature would be to start killing as many people as possible.

I think that more humane methods of achieving the goal you have in mind would be better.  And your likelihood of success would be no better if you tried to kill everyone, as the vast majority of people will be against you.  Most likely, you would be caught before you had killed a significant number of people (that is, significant in terms of your goal).  So I would recommend trying to get people to stop having so many children, through education, access to birth control, helping to get people out of poverty, etc.  And to also get them to look at the evidence regarding damage to the environment (which is to say, get them to go along with Clifford on this matter).  You are more likely to be able to find allies in those sorts of things, and so you are more likely to make a difference.

This is not to say that your chances of success would be good in some other way, but if you tried to kill everyone, you will be very unlikely to get very far.  Even if you are one of the people in a nuclear missile silo, one nuclear missile is not going to kill all humans (not to mention the fact that, I believe, they design them such that it takes two people to fire off such a missile, in order to prevent one crazy person from causing too much damage).

...

So, again, whenever the end or goal of something is used to try to justify some means, in order for the justification to work, it must be that there is a reasonable chance of the means actually achieving the goal, and there must not be any reasonably known better way to achieve the goal.  There is obviously more required, as it must also be that the end is more important than whatever the means are, which is to say, it must be that it is better to achieve the end than to not do the means.  I have done nothing to show anything about that last requirement, but both of the previous requirements are such that your proposal cannot be justified on the basis you propose.

I don't agree with that.  If someone picks up some litter, they make the world a slightly better place.  That is enough.  When I return money to a cashier due to the cashier giving me too much change, I have no delusions about everyone else doing the same.  Of course, I know many others will do the same, but not everyone will.  My action is based on the idea that I feel it is right.  It is not based on any expectations of what others will do.  I would generally expect that those who pick up garbage likewise do so because they feel it is right, but I would not attribute to them the ridiculous idea that they believed that everyone else will do likewise.  That is, not unless I had some reason to do so.

Should you act as people do, or as they might do?  It doesn't matter whether people act like me.  What matters is that I act as I feel people should.  I might pick up the garbage because the archetypal Perfect Man would, in my opinion, pick up the garbage.  IF others also did it, the world would be better, so I do it, though I know few others, in actuality, will.

I do not think it is necessary to think that everyone should do a thing in order for it to be a good thing to do.  I do not think everyone should have sex with my wife, but I think it is a good thing for me to do when we are both in the mood.  I live in my home, but I do not think that everyone should live in my home.  There are countless right and proper things that I do that I neither expect everyone else to do, nor do I want them to even try to do.

In your specific case, it would be nice if everyone picked up garbage they see, when they reasonably can and are able to safely dispose of it  But it is not a general requirement of something being moral that one would want everyone to do it.


Though this is getting off topic, I suspect you may be partly thinking of Kant's Categorical Imperative, which is similar to what you are saying, but importantly different.  One of the statements of the Categorical Imperative is:

Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.[1]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative

Notice, it is not saying that one should will that everyone do the action that one does, but that one can will that everyone invariably act in accordance with whatever maxim (rule, principle) that one is acting upon.  Thus, for example, if I have as a maxim or rule, never lie, then when I say some particular truth, I am not willing that everyone say that particular truth, but that when they speak, they likewise tell the truth about whatever it is about which they are speaking.  That is, I can will that everyone else follow the same rule or maxim upon which I am acting.  But I am not necessarily willing that everyone do the specific thing that I am doing.

Kant's ethical system is more complicated than just that, for he stated that it was okay to do things that were neither moral nor immoral, but that for something to be morally good, it must follow the Categorical Imperative.  But this is all getting us away from the topic at hand, and so if you are interested in Kant, another thread should be started for that.