Metaethical subjective relativism

[bennyboy]

Let me ask you a question.  As a mental agent, would one's DNA and the instinctive behaviors beyond the control of conscious awareness be considered part of the mechanism of the subjective agent, or part of the objective environment?  Since I have no control over those things, I would consider them objective to my subjective agency, even though other people seem them as part and parcel.

Well, the order of base pairs in your DNA is probably not a property of your mind, since we can ascertain them even if you die and no longer have a mind.

I don't know that conscious awareness "controls" anything, so I don't know what is or is not beyond that boundary.

I'm not really sure where you're going here. 'm not really going for a deep understanding of consciousness here; I mean the ordinary commonsense understandings of properties of minds per se, and relations of minds to objective physical reality.

How do you differentiate from some mental experiences, which are "externally" sourced, like looking at a rock, and others, which are "internally" sourced, like an instinctive response to a bear?  Why is one subjective and one objective, if the subjective agent has no control (or even the illusion of control) over the experiencing of either?

Not all brain processes, I'd argue, are from or of the conscious agent, and they are therefore external to it, even though physically they are processed in the same brain.  If this is not the case, and you include those processes which are not experienced by the subjective agent cotemporaneously with the processes, then you are already treating the entire subjective agency as an illusory projection of an objective agent, which is a whole new ballpark: it's now an objective philosophy in a subjectivist's clothing.

In short, what I'm going for is to find out whether you consider those brain processes which are not experienced directly as part of the subjective agent, or whether they may be considered part of the objective environment.