(September 29, 2015 at 10:31 am)Captain Scarlet Wrote: But I think this can be delivered back to the door of Idealism with interest:No, those competing ideas are not peers, like opposite sides of a coin. The knowledge of mind supercedes all other knowledge-- I think therefore I am, and all that. So I know for sure there IS mind-- I just don't know exactly what it is or where it comes from. No assumptions about substance or source are required at all.
- the often repeated mantra on this thread is "we can doubt matter, but we cannot doubt mind". This simply begs the question by assuming that the mind is not matter from the outset.
Quote:- there is a epistemic and ontological confusion. To state: "I am certain I have a mind, but not certain of existents outside of my mind" is an epistemic problem not an ontoligical one, ie it does nothing to say I know what my mind is made of because I cannot be certain object x exists. It is perfectly consistent to say "I am certain I have a mind, but not certain of existents outside of my mind, but my mind is an emergent property of brain structures".You had me until that last sentence, which is clearly a non sequitur. At best you can say, in my experience, it seems that my mind is an emergent property of brain structures, with emphasis on "seems."
Quote:I think both of these problems too often confuse the issue, as the next step is to then leap to mind is fundamental and matter is not.No, those first steps aren't fait accompli, and you don't get to proceed to the next steps.
Quote:Using the same faulty reasoning we could argue (and we do not) thus:I haven't made this reasoning about mind, nor asserted the things you are asserting. Are you responding to the OP maybe?
1. If god exists then he is fundamental
2. I can doubt the existence of god
3. If I can doubt the existence of god, then he cannot be fundamental
C. God does not exist.
