Free Will

[Pyrrho]

It is no more a part of compatibilism than it is of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible.  In all of the discussions of free will, there is something that is described as having free will, or not having free will, depending on the position taken.

If one takes the position that there is no self, no will, then there is nothing being discussed that can be said to be free, nor that can be said to be not free.

If you are not, then it would be incorrect to say that you are free, and equally incorrect to say that you are not free.  If there is no you, then neither "you are free" nor "you are not free" would be about anything.

You haven't actually answered the question.  That there is a self involved does not involve any discontinuity between agent and circumstance until you postulate that the agent is free in a sense that the circumstance is not.  It is then that you need to justify the difference.  So long as agent and circumstance are playing by the same rules, there is no question.

It isn't that the agent is necessarily free in a sense in which the circumstance is not.  It is that the meaning of saying that an agent is free is that its action is caused from within the agent, rather than from the circumstance (i.e., whatever is present that is not the agent).  And if we keep with Aristotle, the line of separation is not clean, but allows for "mixed" sorts of cases.

The same idea applies to your dog.  Your dog is free for any action for which the primary cause is the dog and not some other aspect of the dog's environment.  Thus, if one has a dog on a leash, and one drags the dog by the leash, the dog is not acting freely.  If the dog is not on a leash, but walks in that same direction, then that action is free.

Of course, if we have no idea where the dog ends and the other aspects of the situation begin, then we are going to have a great deal of difficulty in determining whether the cause of the action is from the dog or external to the dog.  And if there is no dog, then it will make no sense to speak of the nonexistent dog being either free or not free.


To expand on that initial idea ("It isn't that the agent is necessarily free in a sense in which the circumstance is not."), if a man ties up another man and drags him somewhere, the circumstance of the man being dragged involves another man who is dragging him, who, presumably, is free in whatever sense a man tends to be free (if, that is, a man is free in some sense).  So there is no claim of special powers in the agent, the subject of the statement, that may not be had by the circumstance.  All other people in a situation are a part of the circumstances of a particular individual.  When you are in a room with another person, that other person is a part of the situation or circumstances you are in at that time.  That individual, presumably, ordinarily has as much freedom as you do.  And there would even be no theoretical incompatibility with trees and rocks being inhabited by spirits and having as much freedom as a person.  So it is not making a man free in a sense that other things may not be.  Things in an agent's environment or circumstances or situation may have as much freedom as the agent has.  Or, theoretically, the entire environment of an agent could itself be another agent.


Again, what is being said is that the meaning of saying that an agent is free is that its action is caused from within the agent, rather than from the circumstance (i.e., whatever is present that is not the agent).  Of course, if we cannot distinguish between the agent and the circumstance, then would be nothing to say about this.


It might be worthwhile to consider that the ideas are not merely abstract, but have practical importance.  If we cannot distinguish between an agent and the circumstance, then we have nothing to charge with a crime, or to put into jail in the case of wrongdoing.  And it affects rewards as well.  If you do a job, there needs to somehow be a you in order for you to be paid for doing the job.  If we have no way of distinguishing between you and the rest of the environment, then you will not get paid for any work you may do.

So the entire thing is tied to rewards and punishments, and also with rehabilitation.

Typically, if a person has a muscle spasm and accidentally kicks someone, we do not blame the person for it (assuming, of course, that we are able to make the determination that it was a muscle spasm and not intentional).  But if the cause of the kicking of the other person is the will (whether that be a bit of brain function or immaterial soul makes no difference for this), then we typically blame the person.

Of course, as in other matters of practical importance, one may have cases where one has no idea what was the cause of some action, and we may not know whether to praise or blame someone or not.