The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[RobbyPants]

Thoughts?

My first thought is that this basically posits a single thing that's unknowable, but technically possible. The problem is, we can do that about anything that follows in that vein:

1. It is possible that a leprechaun exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a leprechaun exists, then a leprechaun exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a leprechaun exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a leprechaun exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a leprechaun exists in the actual world, then a leprechaun exists.
   
6. Therefore, a leprechaun exists.
   

So, my first question is: do you think leprechauns are real, based on this reasoning? Back when I was a Christian, I heard this argument and could not fathom why anyone would make it.

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Now, actually looking at the points to break down the problems of the argument:

• P1 is technically true, but you're dealing with nonfalsifiable things here, so take anything that follows with a grain of salt. Lots of grains of salt.
  
• P2 is not given at all. You'd have to prove that there are multiple "possible worlds".
  
• P3 is a non sequitur and cannot be inferred from any of the previous points.
  
• P4 is building off of P3, which is already not logically valid.
  
• P5 is logically valid, but is based off of P3 and P4, so it is not reasonable to infer, despite being logically correct in itself.
  
• The conclusion would also be valid, if not built off of P3 and P4.
  

So, that's where it all falls apart. I mean, once you take out the formal sounding syllogism, you're basically saying "if something could be real, it is real". I shouldn't have to explain why that's dumb. Again, leprechauns could be real.