The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[Delicate]

The idea that omnipotent contains a contradiction is a canard introduced by uneducated youtube atheists, the bane of intelligent discussion everywhere.

I think you need a little education on the definition of a canard.  A canard is a unfounded rumor or story not an unfounded argument.  Nor was the argument that an omnipotent being creates inherent contradictions created by young modern atheists.  It goes all the way back at least as far as  C. D. Broad who died in 1971.  Not that it matters.   1 + 1 is still 2 even if an idiot says so.

Omnipotence does not include logical contradictions. The moment you ask an omnipotent being to do something logically incoherent, whatever the answer is becomes incoherent, because you've failed to preserve logical structure in your concepts. So, minimally to have meaningful discussions, we constrain omnipotence to that which is logically possible. There's nothing contradictory there.

Therein lies the problem.  If you have to take the definition and then constrain it to the logically possible, you are admitting that the bare definition is not logically possible.   Okay, so omnipotence is limited to the logically possible. So which is it?  Can God lift everything he creates, or is he so great he create that which he can't lift?  Similarly, can he destroy everything he creates or is he great enough and weak enough to create that which he can't destroy?  It must be one or the other.  But if you can't say which you really don't know what omnipotence is do you?

Likewise with perfect morality, the incoherence you notice is illusory. Professional atheistic philosophers don't really quibble on these issues. What you might imagine as morally perfect in another world different from ours would be a feature of your imagination, your moral intuition. Or perhaps the moral intuition of peoples and societies in that other world. They could be mistaken, just as we could be mistaken. None of this rules out the possibility of moral perfection. 

When you can define moral perfection without reference to god's opinion you might have a coherent definition of it. As is, until you can define moral perfection it's a meaningless idea.  And it's subjective meaning will vary depending up the possible world you imagine.

And third, the discussion of possible worlds presumes possible worlds semantics, formalized in a system of modal logic developed first by David Lewis in the 60s or 70s that is almost universally accepted today. (youtube animated presentation). So what you should be asking is not whether something can be maximally excellent in every world you imagine, but whether it's possible for something to be maximally excellent in every possible world.

Again, maximally excellent (excellent?, I thought we were talking about great or perhaps greatest actuality)  is not a well defined term and there are certainly possible worlds in which no being can be the best at all things.  I think we live in one of them.

So which of your objections survive now? Refine your objections and get back to me.

Done that.  Response?

You're not listening.

I'm not constraining the definition of omniscience. I'm constraining the scope of what you can meaningfully ask questions about. You cannot meaningfully ask questions about anything logically incoherent. To my mind, the question of whether God can do logically incoherent things cannot be answered in our domain of discourse. 

You can keep asking it if you like, but the question makes no sense, and thus has no answer.

So where is the problem with omnipotence now? 

Your objection to moral perfection makes no sense either. If you have a separate reason to question the coherence of moral perfection, provide an argument. You can't just assume it's incoherent from the get-go unless you have a reason for it.

And if you paid attention to the argument, you'd notice that there are two notions being discussed by Plantinga, maximal greatness and maximal excellence. 

Now what's left?