The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[Esquilax]

Strictly speaking, the sun rising every morning in the past, is not a demonstration that it will rise tomorrow.

Which is why I took great pains to both call this a "probabilistic inference," and to list our understanding of the celestial mechanics that cause the sun to rise in my answer. It's not just "the sun rises in the past, therefore it will in the future," that's an oversimplification. In truth, we understand why it is that the sun has risen all those other times, and thus we can, in the absence of anything that might interfere with those workings, assign a high probability to it continuing to do so. It's the key difference between this claim and the ontological argument; where the former presents us with accessible evidence laying out exactly how the claim might work, and demonstrations that it does work, the latter does not. The ontological argument merely insists on a series of vague philosophical categories, with no indication that the things within them really exist, or that the categories themselves are even relevant to objective reality. Then, having made those two assumptions, the argument continues with no referents to external reality, no evidence to justify the claims being made, and no reason to believe that reality works the way the argument asserts it does.

At least the items of the former- the sun, the earth, and the concept of sunrise- can be readily shown to exist. No such evidence is contained within the ontological argument.

Very often we see cases of apparent regularities fall through, such as where someone who drinks coffee with sugar for a decade suddenly switches to artificial sweeteners. You can have a decade's worth of demonstrations, observations and the mechanics of putting sugar in coffee, and the next day the person will still switch to artificial sweetener.

Are you going to say you've demonstrated that this person will drink coffee with sugar for the rest of their lives? Clearly not. Only an atheist apologist would be so desperate to salvage such an obviously false position.

I did call it a probabilistic inference in my response. Everyone can go back and read that. You're not going to be able to equivocate between that and a certain demonstration and get away with it, you know.

Instead, we appeal to non-demonstrative bases to justify accepting premises. This is what we do when we accept a premise like "Brown is in Barcelona" even when you cannot directly demonstrate that Brown is in Barcelona, but you have other reasons for believing he is.

With demonstration refuted, I think we can agree that if we want to talk about refuting the OA, we have to look elsewhere. 

Do you want to discuss the actual things I said, or just do an end-zone dance around your strawman and flee from the points I've made at top speed?