RE: The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God
December 23, 2015 at 10:40 am
(This post was last modified: December 23, 2015 at 10:43 am by Neo-Scholastic.)
(December 23, 2015 at 8:57 am)Cato Wrote: A discussion of revelation and associated contradictions have absolutely nothing to do with what you call 'general proofs'. I have been quite clear regarding the validity of the proposed arguments, but have also pointed out the unverified premises making the argument unsound; therefore, I disagree with your conclusion that the general proofs are reasonable.
While we may disagree on the soundness of the ontological proof (certainly not my favorite), I agree with you that weighting the significance of contradictions in revealed texts should generally happen apart from theological demonstrations resulting from reflections on general experience. I am truly sorry for attributing to you a position that you do not actually profess. Please forgive me.
(December 23, 2015 at 8:57 am)Cato Wrote: ...I have also stated that even if the arguments were to be sound there is no way one could get from there to the particular god described in any text. How then can you conclude that I blur the distinction?Again, I apologize, this time for not being clear. I share this opinion. The best any theologian can do is show that the god of classical theism (from Aristotle's unmoved mover to Plotinus's "the One") as revealed through the study of Nature is consistent with the nature of God as revealed in sacred texts. My criticism was directed toward those who feel it unnecessary to directly address the substance and context implicit in ontological and cosmological demonstrations; but rather, say that if doesn't matter if the proofs are sound or not. Their position is that the proofs should be dismissed because the associated sacred texts seem problematic. For what it is worth, MysticKnight and I seem to share a similar concept of the god of Nature even though we disagree on the relative value of the sacred texts of our respective traditions.
Jor, simply existing throughout eternity does not turn a particular being into a necessary one. In Scholasticism, a temporally series of efficient causes is accidentally, rather than essentially, ordered. As such, a necessary being would be fundamental and logically prior to contingent beings. For example, atoms are 'prior' to things made out of atoms. I think even a physical reductionist can conceive of something or some things that pervades everything and yet cannot itself be reduced to anything more fundamental. Showing that what is fundamental is singular and not many is a separate demonstration.
