The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[God of Mr. Hanky]

Uh, sorry I repeated a post - maybe the page didn't load correctly in Firefox, but I thought the post without the Roman enumeration had turned to ether and vanished somehow.

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A discussion of revelation and associated contradictions have absolutely nothing to do with what you call 'general proofs'. I have been quite clear regarding the validity of the proposed arguments, but have also pointed out the unverified premises making the argument unsound; therefore, I disagree with your conclusion that the general proofs are reasonable.

While we may disagree on the soundness of the ontological proof (certainly not my favorite), I agree with you that weighting the significance of contradictions in revealed texts should generally happen apart from theological demonstrations resulting from reflections on general experience. I am truly sorry for attributing to you a position that you do not actually profess. Please forgive me.

...I have also stated that even if the arguments were to be sound there is no way one could get from there to the particular god described in any text. How then can you conclude that I blur the distinction?

Again, I apologize, this time for not being clear. I share this opinion. The best any theologian can do is show that the god of classical theism (from Aristotle's unmoved mover to Plotinus's "the One") as revealed through the study of Nature is consistent with the nature of God as revealed in sacred texts. My criticism was directed toward those who feel it unnecessary to directly address the substance and context implicit in ontological and cosmological demonstrations; but rather, say that if doesn't matter if the proofs are sound or not. Their position is that the proofs should be dismissed because the associated sacred texts seem problematic. For what it is worth, MysticKnight and I seem to share a similar concept of the god of Nature even though we disagree on the relative value of the sacred texts of our respective traditions.

Jor, simply existing throughout eternity does not turn a particular being into a necessary one. In Scholasticism, a temporally series of efficient causes is accidentally, rather than essentially, ordered. As such, a necessary being would be fundamental and logically prior to contingent beings. For example, atoms are 'prior' to things made out of atoms. I think even a physical reductionist can conceive of something or some things that pervades everything and yet cannot itself be reduced to anything more fundamental. Showing that what is fundamental is singular and not many is a separate demonstration.

Chad, the problem with Plantinga's ontology is that it tries to use a non-sequitor mathematical principle of probability. Yes, there is a possibility that a god exists (and also it's possible that numerous gods exist). He argues as if a probability equation has been applied, but this would require a known value for that possibility. It applies only for random samplings, not for an existential determination, which can only be done through direct observation. Then, before he's even finished his second presumption it gets uber-ridiculous with the presumption that anything is known of other universes, much less that they are of infinite quantity!

Do you believe in Thor's Hammer? If not, then is Thor's Hammer a possibility? Why or why not? If you don't consider it possible, then there may be some very good reasons not to consider the proposition, but the ancient Norse had no reasons not to believe it, therefore their field of possibilities was different. I almost said "wider", but they could not have imagined the possibility-changing facts which we are aware of now. Possibilities by default from ignorance are as vast as the hordes which your imagination can conjure up, but for a finite universe or multiverse (if such a thing exists), their probability will necessarily be unknown as well.