What is 'objective' value?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Only if you consider God just another kind of particular being among other particular beings, a common assumption by skeptics. In the case of the God of Classical theism, or "The Good", it serves as the objective standard of that which is most to be desired. In Aristotle, this is called Happiness. In Western theology, this is called Blessedness. In other words, the value of human life lies in its potential to strive for and manifest the greatest good of which it is capable in comparison to the greatest possible Good.

You're getting farther and farther away from the intentionality required of value.  Saying that God is not merely an agent, but something else in addition, doesn't provide any ground for value.  We could go over Euthyphro's dilemma again, but all that will result in is a bunch of metaphysically flavored word salad.  Value requires teleology.  Period.  You can just assert that there is teleology to reality, but without any support, that's a bare assertion that I will simply reject.  So which half of this new dilemma do you care to attack: that value requires an agent, or that God being a special kind of agent doesn't establish value?

Because you've always been familiar with and respectful of philosophical inquiry, I'm rather disappointed with your 'word salad' comment. Usually only people confused by or ignorant of the technical nomenclature use the term 'word salad'. I do not know any theologian that takes the Euthyphro's dilemma as a serious objection to the Classical God, particularly since Plato uses the dilemma to argue against polytheism in favor of monotheism.

The idea of the Good necessarily entails a goal, that which is (objectively) most to be desired, and a final end, or purpose, for rational agents. Both, goals and purposes, are most definitely directly related to intentionality. At the very least teleology appears operative in nature, it takes a special effort to show that what is apparently true isn't actually true - the same kind of effort it takes to show that objects that appear solid are actually made of mostly empty space. Saying you can reject it as a bare assertion suggests a kind of argument argument from incredulity. Or perhaps you're going to again assert that brute facts alone sufficiently account for the appearance of intentionality at more fundamental levels. Or perhaps you're going to go for the 'emergent property' non-explanation in which at an unknown point of development the rabbit of intentionality pops magically out of the hat of undirected physical processes.