What is 'objective' value?

[Angrboda]

You're getting farther and farther away from the intentionality required of value.  Saying that God is not merely an agent, but something else in addition, doesn't provide any ground for value.  We could go over Euthyphro's dilemma again, but all that will result in is a bunch of metaphysically flavored word salad.  Value requires teleology.  Period.  You can just assert that there is teleology to reality, but without any support, that's a bare assertion that I will simply reject.  So which half of this new dilemma do you care to attack: that value requires an agent, or that God being a special kind of agent doesn't establish value?

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Because you've always been familiar with and respectful of philosophical inquiry, I'm rather disappointed with your 'word salad' comment. Usually only people confused by or ignorant of the technical nomenclature use the term 'word salad'. I do not know any theologian that takes the Euthyphro's dilemma as a serious objection to the Classical God, particularly since Plato uses the dilemma to argue against polytheism in favor of monotheism.

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The idea of the Good necessarily entails a goal, that which is (objectively) most to be desired, and a final end, or purpose, for rational agents. Both, goals and purposes, are most definitely directly related to intentionality.

So you've decided to deny that value requires agency by resorting to a form of Platonism.  Despite your attempts to muddy the waters below, such a hypothesis bears some heavy burdens.  The most important being the interaction problem, namely of demonstrating how such things as "The Good" inform the judgement of a rational agent.  Are you planning to duck once again into asserting magical properties to consciousness?  This property of the soul appears to be a nexus to all your defenses.  It's a shame you aren't burdened with providing a defensible account of how value afflicts the rational mind using only material properties.  Anytime you are pressed to explain the how, you can simply reply, "It just does."  

At the very least teleology appears operative in nature, it takes a special effort to show that what is apparently true isn't actually true - the same kind of effort it takes to show that objects that appear solid are actually made of mostly empty space.

I think you're going to need to support this.  What appears operative in nature to you sounds like more magical speculation.

Saying you can reject it as a bare assertion suggests a kind of argument argument from incredulity.

Saying that I can reject it as a bare assertion is simple acknowledgement that your 'teleology in nature' is a minority opinion based on specific philosophical and religious views not accepted by the common man.  If you're going to drive off the road, it's your responsibility to avoid getting stuck.

Or perhaps you're going to again assert that brute facts alone sufficiently account for the appearance of intentionality at more fundamental levels. Or perhaps you're going to go for the 'emergent property' non-explanation in which at an unknown point of development the rabbit of intentionality pops magically out of the hat of undirected physical processes.

Or perhaps that I just don't care that you don't subscribe to naturalism and fully expect that when you depart from it as the null hypothesis, you provide more than mere assertion by way of support.