Jackson's experiment suggests that it is possible to have the same knowledge, only in different forms. If Mary indeed knows all there is to know about brain states of seeing red then she knows 'about' her own brain state when she sees red. To argue that she is experiencing something different than what she already knows is begging the question that her experience of redness is not equal to the indirect knowledge she has about the brain states making up the experience of redness. I may have a book of the physics of gasoline combustion, that book doesn't necessarily have to explode for it to be considered complete. And if I should create a gasoline explosion in the lab, it doesn't teach me anything I couldn't have learned from the book; only the form of the knowledge is different.
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