My views on objective morality

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

1.  His claim that evolution cannot be a source for morality is flawed.  He states, in effect, that if morality changes, there must be a standard, objective morality against which these changes can be measured.  Aside from assuming what he wishes to prove to be true, he is (apparently) unwittingly making a pretty fair case for subjective (or at least positional) morality.  His further claim that if one can't make the distinction between 'accepted' and 'acceptable' then one can't criticize slavery is hard to follow.  By definition, that which is morally accepted IS morally acceptable.  The fact that (as he admits) acceptability is a variable further weakens the case he is trying to make.

2.  I can't quite get the point he is trying to make that reason cannot be a source of morality.  Simply because murderers - necessarily a VERY tiny minority in any human society - can't reason that murder is morally wrong while at the same time using reason to plan the murders they commit is simply wrong.  Murderers, by and large, know that murder is morally wrong, which is why they carefully plan their actions in the first place - they don't wish to be caught.  As to the actions of gentiles in the Holocaust, he's got this one back to front.  A great many more gentiles were either complicit or did nothing to prevent the slaughter.  I can easily reason that innocent human life has value, and stopping the unjustifiable killing of human beings is both reasonable and moral.  Also, whenever a philosopher tells you 'the answer is obvious', he has no more idea of what the answer is than do his first year students.

3.  As to conscience, Kreeft is (again) using an unfair standard.  Most people's consciences tell them that murder is wrong.  The fact that Himmler's did not is a pretty poor argument.  Using a psychopath as a yardstick is simply foolish.  He asks me to determine whether my conscience is right and Himmler's is wrong almost immediately after he strongly intimates that Himmler had no conscience at all.  Huh?

4.  His point about human nature is simply baffling.  He lists the bad points about human nature as if these were the only factors in determining how humans behave.  Of course, humans can be vain, greedy, callous and so on.  But they can also be kind, helpful, generous and so on.  Who is Kreeft to decide what 'human nature' is?

5.  He grossly mischaracterizes utilitarianism.  A philosopher should know better.  I remain unconvinced that utilitarianism is a useful moral guide, but Kreeft's claim that it is 'whatever produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number' is not just simply wrong, it is simplistically wrong.

Boru