Here's one reason I recently thought of (though someone else may have said this before) for thinking that moral principles are not objective. There are certain facts that are obvious and that as a result just about everyone agrees with. For example, just about everyone agrees that 1+1=2. (Anyone who disagrees would have to have some serious mental issues.)
Now, in morality what would be an example of an obvious principle? Well, one candidate is "killing an innocent person is (almost always) wrong." And there are many other cases like that, principles that, for those of us who agree with them, seem obvious.
But here's the thing: there are always plenty of people who disagree with such supposedly obvious moral principles. As we all know, quite a few people unfortunately do not consider killing innocent people as almost always wrong.
So why are so-called moral facts different from empirical and logical facts in this respect? Could it be because morality isn't objective?
Note that what I'm arguing here is not simply that there is moral disagreement, and therefore morality isn't objective. Rather, it is that if there were moral truths, then those that are obvious should be obvious to nearly everyone. And since that's not the case, this suggests that there are no moral truths.
Now, in morality what would be an example of an obvious principle? Well, one candidate is "killing an innocent person is (almost always) wrong." And there are many other cases like that, principles that, for those of us who agree with them, seem obvious.
But here's the thing: there are always plenty of people who disagree with such supposedly obvious moral principles. As we all know, quite a few people unfortunately do not consider killing innocent people as almost always wrong.
So why are so-called moral facts different from empirical and logical facts in this respect? Could it be because morality isn't objective?
Note that what I'm arguing here is not simply that there is moral disagreement, and therefore morality isn't objective. Rather, it is that if there were moral truths, then those that are obvious should be obvious to nearly everyone. And since that's not the case, this suggests that there are no moral truths.