I read Mr. Lycan’s paper some time ago. First he says that the arguments against dualism have been grossly overrated (which they have). Secondly he reflects on his own materialist conviction and concludes that it doesn’t fare much better. He seems to believe that the primary justification for materialism is parsimony, which isn’t really an argument at all; but rather, an epistemological preference to interpret data in a certain way. What I find interesting is that Lycan and the people he references keep contrasting dualism with materialism. The more appropriate contrasts would be between dualism/monism and materialism/idealism.
I don’t exactly understand the relevance of objections that say something like: mind/brain identity is true because minds cannot exist in a disembodied state. In point of fact the two concepts are unrelated. The question is not whether the mind and body have independent existence (I don’t believe they do); but rather, whether they can be recognized as distinct one from the other (and I believe they can). What we are basically looking at is the Problem of Universals. Solve that and you solve the mind-body problem.
I don’t exactly understand the relevance of objections that say something like: mind/brain identity is true because minds cannot exist in a disembodied state. In point of fact the two concepts are unrelated. The question is not whether the mind and body have independent existence (I don’t believe they do); but rather, whether they can be recognized as distinct one from the other (and I believe they can). What we are basically looking at is the Problem of Universals. Solve that and you solve the mind-body problem.
