Mind is the brain?

[little_monkey]

*** my boldening

But are you really that sure?

For instance, I can point to you to a tree, and say it's a tree, and for the sake of argument, it's the first time you see a tree. Later I can point to you another tree, which you will agree that it is also a tree. Yet, that second tree has a slightly different trunk, the leaves are designed differently, the branches are more drooping than the first tree. Yet, you can agree with me that it's still a tree. Why? Didn't you understand the first time the essence of what constitute a tree, otherwise you would disagree that the second object is also a tree? Isn't it the way we teach our kids? If our experience would be so widely different, we would not be able to communicate, we would not be able to pass on our knowledge to the next generation, our ideas would be stuck in first gear, and we would never be able to unstuck ourselves. Solipsism would rule. Yet, look around, and solipsism doesn't rule.

In the case of a tree, we are defining tree such that the idea of multiple trees can be inherited from a more general "tree" idea: a trunk, some branches, and leaves.  As more exposure is gained, that general idea can be fleshed out to a pretty good understanding of the qualities of the general category, tree.

In the case of a human being, something happens when the mind realizes that the 10 fingers under its control are part of the category "human," that when he feels happy, he "smiles" as other people smile, etc.-- the person considers himself a child of that category.  The person, realizing he himself has a mind, will see in human behavior the feelings he himself experiences: apparent anger, love, sadness, etc.  He will then generalize that very specific property to his understanding of "human:" other humans who frown likely frown for the same reason he does: they have the capacity to feel anger.  Other people who cry probably cry because they have the capacity to feel sadness; and so on.  So now, he's satisfied that humans have minds, and that he is one of them.

I think we all agree on how this semantic process works, so let me stop here and see if anyone still in the thread disagrees or woulud add to this narrative of how we see mind in other humans.  Then we can look at how scientific inquiry should refine, or support, or contradict those semantics, or how we could refine science to give answers meaningful not just to a pharmaceutical developer but to someone with a philosophical interest in the nature of mind.

As I've said before, I have two interests: 1) establishing whether those processes allowing for "mind" are specific to the human brain or are more generally found in the Universe; 2) establishing whether we can know non-Earth-animal systems are/aren't mindful without just assuming them so because they seem "human" enough.  Due to improvements in AI and robotics, I think it possible that in our lifetime, real androids might pass the Turing test, or at least seem sufficiently human to elicit our instinctive emotional response: they seem to feel, so it is easily believed that they DO feel.  What does this mean for a philosopher interested in qualia, and how would science assist in establishing whether complex androids really would feel, or just seem to?

So it seems you're basically saying what I'm saying with different words. Remind me why we disagree?