Mind is the brain?

[bennyboy]

You are equivocating on the man-made object we call "computer" and on a philosophical principle of mind.

Predictable failure.  No, I'm not...and wtf is the "man-made" business doing here, lol?  A comp system is a comp system, regardless of who or what made it.  It's a simple issue of fitting a technical description.  

Stop making this thread about you and your pet theory. We're talking about mind. . . actual mind. And if you want to participate in that discussion of computers, you'll have to demonstrate that a "comp mind" and the subjective experience of qualia that people call mind are the same thing.

Since the question at hand is exactly what about the brain allows for (or is, if you want it that way) mind, then you can't just wave at the whole "system," unless you are claiming that the entire system is mind.  We've been through this already-- are veins mind?  Cerebral fluid?  Hormones?

Is the air an airplane?  This is nonsense.  Either you allow for identity and we have a rational conversation, or you do not...and we do not.

Either the brain is mind, or parts of the brain are mind, or some brain function is mind. But you don't get to wave toward the brain and say it's all mind.

See, the brain-waving is sufficient if you are trying to prove that the brain is the seat of mind, rather than say the heart or the balls.  It isn't sufficient if you are trying to explain the fact of subjective awareness, and exactly what about the brain makes it possible.

I don't see why you would say that, or how you could even know it to begin with.  Perhaps we could discuss the abilities of comp systems as soon as you allow for them in your universe.

In the case of the computer under the desk, I don't really need to know what parts of it are responsible for Windows 10, because that is not a very important philosophical discussion. A computer is what a computer is, because we made it and we get to label it. I've never argued against comp systems. I'm arguing against brain-waving. I know there's no difference to you, but there's an important philosophical difference to anyone who cares about mind as an experience of qualia.

What you haven't done is explain why a system experiences what it's like to be a system-- comp or otherwise.  You've been rambling for almost 30 pages about computers and "comp mind," and said nothing about the existence of qualia.  So yeah, you've implicitly defined mind as function rather than experience.  But unless you can draw a bridge to qualia, you are in fact just begging the question.

There's no question to beg.  There can't be until we can agree that comp systems exist.

That's not a very well thought-out sentence. If you think someone's begging the question about God, for example, do you have to agree that God can exist in order to point out that they are begging the question?

I'm fine with comp systems when you are talking about computers, because it's just an ontology. However, when you want to say that a comp system is mind, you'll have to do more than wave your hand toward computers, and say, "See? I said minds are comps, and there are comps everywhere, and the brain acts like a comp, too. So comp mind, gotcha!"