Justification Theory: Preliminary Questions
May 8, 2011 at 7:10 am
(This post was last modified: May 8, 2011 at 9:34 am by Nimzo.)
theVoid has asked me to respond to a "challenge" he posted back in November last year:
First, why should a theist take this challenge seriously? What are the implications if a theist (or anyone) is not able to give a definition of justification that satisfies theVoid? If theVoid means to imply that if a theist cannot meet this challenge, then his theistic belief is either unjustified or irrational, then he is assuming a form of epistemic methodism. Methodism, broadly speaking, is the view that the question of what justification is should be asked before the question of which beliefs we hold are justified. On the other hand, particularism says the reverse, that our understanding of what justification is should be based on our answer to which beliefs we understand to be justified. If particularism is correct, then it seems that theVoid's challenge is rather vacuous.
Second, what are the criteria by which theVoid wishes to judge between competing justification theories? If we wish to apply the criterion of "consistency with reality" there is an inevitable circularity about the whole project - after all, the central question that makes the question of justification in any way interesting is "What are we justified to believe about reality?"
Third, there is an implicit assumption in the search for a universal theory of justification that we are talking about a normative standard that applies to all people and to all beliefs. The implication is that, if we are not justified in believing something, we are somehow failing to be intellectually responsible, dare I say intellectually virtuous (to use an old-fashioned term). If theVOID does not hold that justification is in some sense normative, then the theist is under no obligation to hold justified beliefs. And if he does, then the theist has to wonder how theVOID, as a metaphysical naturalist, accounts for such a strange thing as a normative standard on his worldview. For the theist it is simple: God, Who is Wisdom itself, is the standard, and He holds everyone accountable to reflecting His nature as the bearers of His image, and so the obligation to be responsible believers is part of our duty towards Him and our world.
EDIT: Few minor typos.
(November 4, 2010 at 8:08 pm)theVOID Wrote: Here I propose an Epistemology that I argue is entirely coherent and suffers none of the normal epistemic problems for Justification, such as the lottery problem, the new evil demon problem etc. I will argue that this epistemology is entirely consistent with reality and that no examples to the contrary can fault it.He then went on to explain his view (which was a hybrid of reliabilism and evidentialism), though his signature now states that his view is "Epistemic Bayesian" - whether that means he has modified his view since his original post will hopefully become clear. In any case, I want to ask a few preliminary questions to understand the nature and purpose of the challenge.
I challenge the theists (or atheists) to either 1) refute my epistemology OR 2) come up with an epistemology that is coherent, consistent and demonstrates that your beliefs are justified.
First, why should a theist take this challenge seriously? What are the implications if a theist (or anyone) is not able to give a definition of justification that satisfies theVoid? If theVoid means to imply that if a theist cannot meet this challenge, then his theistic belief is either unjustified or irrational, then he is assuming a form of epistemic methodism. Methodism, broadly speaking, is the view that the question of what justification is should be asked before the question of which beliefs we hold are justified. On the other hand, particularism says the reverse, that our understanding of what justification is should be based on our answer to which beliefs we understand to be justified. If particularism is correct, then it seems that theVoid's challenge is rather vacuous.
Second, what are the criteria by which theVoid wishes to judge between competing justification theories? If we wish to apply the criterion of "consistency with reality" there is an inevitable circularity about the whole project - after all, the central question that makes the question of justification in any way interesting is "What are we justified to believe about reality?"
Third, there is an implicit assumption in the search for a universal theory of justification that we are talking about a normative standard that applies to all people and to all beliefs. The implication is that, if we are not justified in believing something, we are somehow failing to be intellectually responsible, dare I say intellectually virtuous (to use an old-fashioned term). If theVOID does not hold that justification is in some sense normative, then the theist is under no obligation to hold justified beliefs. And if he does, then the theist has to wonder how theVOID, as a metaphysical naturalist, accounts for such a strange thing as a normative standard on his worldview. For the theist it is simple: God, Who is Wisdom itself, is the standard, and He holds everyone accountable to reflecting His nature as the bearers of His image, and so the obligation to be responsible believers is part of our duty towards Him and our world.
EDIT: Few minor typos.
