Quote:First, why should a theist take this challenge seriously? What are the implications if a theist (or anyone) is not able to give a definition of justification that satisfies theVoid? If theVoid means to imply that if a theist cannot meet this challenge, then his theistic belief is either unjustified or irrational, then he is assuming a form of epistemic methodism. Methodism, broadly speaking, is the view that the question of what justification is should be asked before the question of which beliefs we hold are justified. On the other hand, particularism says the reverse, that our understanding of what justification should be based on our answer to which beliefs we know to be justified. If particularism is correct, then it seems that theVoid's challenge is rather vacuous.
Thanks for the response
I am essentially of the position that a theory of justification should be at the core of our worldview, we must first establish what it means for a belief to be justified and then go about evaluating various propositions to determine whether or not they are permitted by this theory of justification - If they are we should believe them and if not we should not - If it turns out that another theory of justification is superior then we must reformulate our beliefs based on this new standard.
Quote:Second, what are the criteria by which theVoid wishes to judge between competing justification theories? If we wish to apply the criterion of "consistency with reality" there is an inevitable circularity about the whole project - after all, the central question that makes the question of justification in any way interesting is "What are we justified to believe about reality?"
By consistency I mean the theory should be consistent in it's formulation and conclusions. An example would be the 'personal revelation' claimed by many theists, it is a proposed standard of evidence that leads to innumerable contradictory conclusions, thus it is not consistent in it's conclusions and cannot be considered sufficient for justification - This does not imply that the revelation is necessarily false, only that it is not alone sufficient for justification. You could not have within the theory of justification something along the lines of "S is justified in belief that P if S has a personal revelation that P"
Quote:Third, there is an implicit assumption in the search for a universal theory of justification that we are talking about a normative standard that applies to all people and to all beliefs.
The implication is that, if we are not justified in believing something, we are somehow failing to be intellectually responsible, dare I say intellectually virtuous (to use an old-fashioned term). If theVOID does not hold that justification is in some sense normative, then the theist is under no obligation to hold justified beliefs. And if he does, then the theist has to wonder how theVOID, as a metaphysical naturalism, accounts for such a strange thing as a normative standard on his worldview. For the theist it is simple: God, Who is Wisdom itself, is the standard, and He holds everyone accountable to reflecting His nature as the bearers of His image, and so the obligation to be responsible believers is part of our duty towards Him and our world.
I would say that if we desire to be as rational as possible, to have the map as accurate as possible in describing the territory, then we ought to have the best theory of justification possible so as to form as many true beliefs and as few false beliefs as possible - Failure to have justified beliefs is failure to be as rational as possible.
I do believe we have an intellectual responsibility to have justified beliefs, a responsibility to other beings and their values, for instance: If someone only cared about having beliefs that were subjectively appealing, such as 'vaccines caused my child's autism' (for possible reasons such as emotional duress at the thought that god allowed their child to be born disabled, or that blaming someone is more emotionally satisfying) then they are more likely to act as to fulfill their desire to keep children safe in a way that ultimately undermines that desire, by promoting anti-vaccination attitudes, and in doing so thwarting the desires of others.
I believe that a desire that tends to promote more/stronger desires than it thwarts is a morally good desire, having a desire that tends to thwart more/stronger desires than they promote is morally bad, a desire to have justified beliefs is one that leads to us having a map that better represents the territory which leads to a greater understanding of the implications of our actions as we seek to fulfill our own desires which in turn leads to us being less likely to unintentionally thwart and more likely to intentionally promote the desires of others - The reverse is that not caring about having justified beliefs leads to thwarting more/stronger desires and is thus morally bad.
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