Justification Theory: Preliminary Questions

[Nimzo]

Thanks for the response

I am essentially of the position that a theory of justification should be at the core of our worldview, we must first establish what it means for a belief to be justified and then go about evaluating various propositions to determine whether or not they are permitted by this theory of justification - If they are we should believe them and if not we should not - If it turns out that another theory of justification is superior then we must reformulate our beliefs based on this new standard.

OK, but you haven't answered my question of why the theist, or anyone, should take your methodist view rather than a particularist one.

By consistency I mean the theory should be consistent in it's formulation and conclusions.

Well, presumably any theory of justification with a "no defeaters" clause is going to satisfy that condition. The condition also has nothing to do with whether the theory is actually a correct description of justification.

I would say that if we desire to be as rational as possible, to have the map as accurate as possible in describing the territory, then we ought to have the best theory of justification possible so as to form as many true beliefs and as few false beliefs as possible - Failure to have justified beliefs is failure to be as rational as possible.

Right, but the whole question is whether we should have the desire to be "rational" according to your standard. A conditional "ought" isn't going to get you a normative standard.

I do believe we have an intellectual responsibility to have justified beliefs, a responsibility to other beings and their values, for instance: If someone only cared about having beliefs that were subjectively appealing, such as 'vaccines caused my child's autism' (for possible reasons such as emotional duress at the thought that god allowed their child to be born disabled, or that blaming someone is more emotionally satisfying) then they are more likely to act as to fulfill their desire to keep children safe in a way that ultimately undermines that desire, by promoting anti-vaccination attitudes, and in doing so thwarting the desires of others.

I don't think you've given a reason here why there exists intellectual (which you set up as a subset of moral) responsibility. You've said you believe that we have one (and I agree), but being a methodist you need to show that you are justified in believing in one.

I believe that a desire that tends to promote more/stronger desires than it thwarts is a morally good desire,

I don't think you really mean this - I can have a desire that promotes lots of very strong desires to do morally wrong things. That I have a desire to do something says nothing about the moral status of the action I desire to do. I presume I am misunderstanding what you mean here.