Existence as a real predicate

[The Grand Nudger]

But seriously though. Let's suppose that I had a dream about red apples. These apples were red, but they weren't actually existent (unless you're one of those types who believe that our dreams are actually projections into other real universes, but I doubt you're of that type).

Are dreams red, or apples?  Incoherence, meaninglessness.  See.  More accurately, you had a dream about a real object, that object being a red apple. A dream and an apple are not the same thing. This is why it's problematic to treat them as such in inference (which is also how and why you failed to refute Kant while believing that you had, btw).

Consider an imaginary red apple. Imaginary red apples are red, but not all of them necessarily exist.

Again, neither red nor an apple, nor meaningful or coherent.

My imagination and dreams have, as you can now see, refuted one of the most celebrated Western philosophers! Mwahahahaha!

There obviously -was- a point at which you thought it would be that easy, lol.  In both of the examples above, I can understand what you are referring to - and that's precisely how the problem arises. Why do I understand it, despite it's incoherence...and regardless of whether or not I can understand it (as linguistic shorthand for something else, for example) can a proper inference be drawn -from- it?

Anyhow, I couldn't think of any "drawbacks" of using existence as a real predicate, as argued by Sadra. That is why I started this thread in the first place; I want to see if there are any problems or "drawbacks" to what he argued.

In specific context to Sadra and Kant, that the system used by the former is incompatible with the qualifications used by the latter.  They aren;t talking about the same thing, or using the same means or methods -to- talk about it.  In the context of drawing them together, the same issues that exist for the same/similar pov in the western tradition by dealing with existence as a second order property, namely the requirement of descriptivism or the requirement that we accept non-existent individuals as a possibility (which is something you asked about in another thread, lol.....). Which, itself, returns us to Kant in another form. Is it meaningful or coherent to speak of a "non-existent individual"?