Existence as a real predicate

[TheMuslim]

 "Existence is a real predicate for Mulla Sadra since it is a property of an essence that is found in extra-mental reality 

Provide evidence of essence and we may proceed from there. (Essence exists?!)

I don't think he's asserting the existence of anything in particular. In the argument I posted, Mulla Sadra is simply analyzing the semantics of intellectual conversations.

By "essence" he simply means the "definition" of something. According to the dictionary, "essence" means: the basic nature of a thing: the quality or qualities that make a thing what it is.

Sadra argues that when we speak of subjects, the subject does not necessarily have "existence" in its very definition. As demonstrated in his argument, existential propositions are not analytic. When we speak of things, we speak of the concepts or definitions or "set-of-quiddities" or the "ipseity" of those things, and then if we find these concepts/sets-of-quiddities to be existent, we predicate existence to them. In other words, just as Kant argued that existence is not a real predicate, Sadra argued that existence is a real predicate. Kant argued that predicating existence is not meaningful, but Sadra argued that not predicating existence is not meaningful.

Sadra's justification seems more harmonious with natural semantics and makes more sense to me than Kant's. With this thread, I was hoping to see what other philosophers might think about this; is existence a real predicate, or not? Is it really not meaningful to not treat existence as a predicate, as Sadra argued?

[Arkilogue]

Speaking of our visual perception of existence, on a logarithmic scale of frequency, visible light is 2.3% of the whole electromagnetic spectrum, while on a linear scale it is 0.0035%.

That's how much we see of what is actually here. And if there was nothing essential to it, would we perceive anything?

[LostLocke]

That's how much we see of what is actually here. And if there was nothing essential to it, would we perceive anything?

What does "essential" have to do with it? We perceive a certain part of the EM spectrum because that's what our eyes are sensitive to.

[Arkilogue]

That's how much we see of what is actually here. And if there was nothing essential to it, would we perceive anything?

What does "essential" have to do with it? We perceive a certain part of the EM spectrum because that's what our eyes are sensitive to.

There is an independent "essential" reality to the EM force/field quite apart from our perception of it and reconstruction of image by our brains.

Perhaps I'm using the term/concept incorrectly....

[The Grand Nudger]

@The OP, we don't know.  There are mutually exclusive positions on that in the western tradition, each one has it's use...and it's drawbacks. That probably accounts for western philosophies "failure" to acknowledge your boy. We have our own that say the same thing, and slightly dissimilar but still related things.

You're mistaken about Kant and unicorns though. Kant would probably tell you that unicorns -aren't-...lol, but that the person making the claim must at least believe they are - to be describing them in the first place - or barring that, must mean such a sentence in a way that doesn;t refer to their existence as animals out there in the wild. If someone says that unicorns are white, they are saying that unicorns are real world objects (and there's at least one sense of this statement that could be completely factual, btw)..regardless of how ridiculous that may sound to me, or to you, or to Kant. Saying that unicorns aren't real doesn't actually address Kants point...and isn't, strictly speaking, a factual statement in any case.

His point was that a red apple and a red apple that exists are the same thing. A thing must exist to have properties, such as the having the property of a specific color. Conversely, that it is incoherent to consider a nonexistent red apple. If it doesn't exist..it isn't red, or an apple.

[TheMuslim]

@The OP, we don't know.  There are mutually exclusive positions on that in the western tradition, each one has it's use...and it's drawbacks.  That probably accounts for western philosophies "failure" to acknowledge your boy.  We have our own that say the same thing, and slightly dissimilar but still related things.  

You're mistaken about Kant and unicorns though.  Kant would probably tell you that unicorns -aren't-...lol, but that the person making the claim must at least believe they are - to be describing them in the first place - or barring that, must mean such a sentence in a way that doesn;t refer to their existence as animals out there in the wild.  If someone says that unicorns are white, they are saying that unicorns are real world objects (and there's at least one sense of this statement that could be completely factual, btw)..regardless of how ridiculous that may sound to me, or to you, or to Kant.  Saying that unicorns aren't real doesn't actually address Kants point...and isn't, strictly speaking, a factual statement in any case.

His point was that a red apple and a red apple that exists are the same thing.  A thing must exist to have properties, such as the having the property of a specific color.  Conversely, that it is incoherent to consider a nonexistent red apple.  If it doesn't exist..it isn't red, or an apple.

Uh, but there are nonexistent red apples. Nonexistent red apples exist - in my dreams

But seriously though. Let's suppose that I had a dream about red apples. These apples were red, but they weren't actually existent (unless you're one of those types who believe that our dreams are actually projections into other real universes, but I doubt you're of that type).

Consider an imaginary red apple. Imaginary red apples are red, but not all of them necessarily exist.

My imagination and dreams have, as you can now see, refuted one of the most celebrated Western philosophers! Mwahahahaha!


Anyhow, I couldn't think of any "drawbacks" of using existence as a real predicate, as argued by Sadra. That is why I started this thread in the first place; I want to see if there are any problems or "drawbacks" to what he argued.

[The Grand Nudger]

But seriously though. Let's suppose that I had a dream about red apples. These apples were red, but they weren't actually existent (unless you're one of those types who believe that our dreams are actually projections into other real universes, but I doubt you're of that type).

Are dreams red, or apples?  Incoherence, meaninglessness.  See.  More accurately, you had a dream about a real object, that object being a red apple. A dream and an apple are not the same thing. This is why it's problematic to treat them as such in inference (which is also how and why you failed to refute Kant while believing that you had, btw).

Consider an imaginary red apple. Imaginary red apples are red, but not all of them necessarily exist.

Again, neither red nor an apple, nor meaningful or coherent.

My imagination and dreams have, as you can now see, refuted one of the most celebrated Western philosophers! Mwahahahaha!

There obviously -was- a point at which you thought it would be that easy, lol.  In both of the examples above, I can understand what you are referring to - and that's precisely how the problem arises. Why do I understand it, despite it's incoherence...and regardless of whether or not I can understand it (as linguistic shorthand for something else, for example) can a proper inference be drawn -from- it?

Anyhow, I couldn't think of any "drawbacks" of using existence as a real predicate, as argued by Sadra. That is why I started this thread in the first place; I want to see if there are any problems or "drawbacks" to what he argued.

In specific context to Sadra and Kant, that the system used by the former is incompatible with the qualifications used by the latter.  They aren;t talking about the same thing, or using the same means or methods -to- talk about it.  In the context of drawing them together, the same issues that exist for the same/similar pov in the western tradition by dealing with existence as a second order property, namely the requirement of descriptivism or the requirement that we accept non-existent individuals as a possibility (which is something you asked about in another thread, lol.....). Which, itself, returns us to Kant in another form. Is it meaningful or coherent to speak of a "non-existent individual"?

[quip]

Provide evidence of essence and we may proceed from there. (Essence exists?!)

I don't think he's asserting the existence of anything in particular. In the argument I posted, Mulla Sadra is simply analyzing the semantics of intellectual conversations.

By "essence" he simply means the "definition" of something. According to the dictionary, "essence" means: the basic nature of a thing: the quality or qualities that make a thing what it is.

Sadra argues that when we speak of subjects, the subject does not necessarily have "existence" in its very definition. As demonstrated in his argument, existential propositions are not analytic. When we speak of things, we speak of the concepts or definitions or "set-of-quiddities" or the "ipseity" of those things, and then if we find these concepts/sets-of-quiddities to be existent, we predicate existence to them. In other words, just as Kant argued that existence is not a real predicate, Sadra argued that existence is a real predicate. Kant argued that predicating existence is not meaningful, but Sadra argued that not predicating existence is not meaningful.

Sadra's justification seems more harmonious with natural semantics and makes more sense to me than Kant's. With this thread, I was hoping to see what other philosophers might think about this; is existence a real predicate, or not? Is it really not meaningful to not treat existence as a predicate, as Sadra argued?


"Existence is a real predicate for Mulla Sadra since it is a property of an essence that is found in extra-mental reality (Mulla Sadra 2001-5, I: 47-52).

To the contrary, essence is a property of existence by way of fashioned design i.e. (extant) scissors were specifically designed to cut (essence). Not all of existence may be concisely classifies as such.  (what is the 'purpose' of black?)

[TheMuslim]

Is it meaningful or coherent to speak of a "non-existent individual"?

 

Yes. Atheists and theists do it all the time. We speak of non-existent individuals such as Baal, Zeus, Poseidon, etc.

Whenever we speak of something, we are speaking of a concept or set of quiddities or ipseities - which we then predicate stuff to. Those sets of quiddities per se do not necessarily have to correspond to real world objects. They can be sets of quiddities that are not necessarily existent in the real world (e.g. Yahweh), and yet we can still predicate stuff to them through essential predication (e.g. Yahweh is the creator of everything, Yahweh is evil).

I can conceive of a red apple, and I find no reason why this apple - which I conceive - cannot be considered an apple. As Kant himself said, there really is no difference between a real hundred dollars and a fake hundred dollars - except that the real hundred dollar bill is real. Similarly, I find no difference between a real apple and a conceived apple except that the real apple is real and that the conceived apple is not real. But they're both still apples. Just because it's conceived doesn't mean it's not an apple.

I simply do not find anything incoherent about treating existence as a real predicate.

I would actually argue that existence should indeed be treated as a real predicate. As demonstrated by Sadra, as far as I understand, if we did not take existence as a predicate, then the statement "black is black" would be no more meaningful than the statement "black exists." But in reality, we know that there indeed is a meaningful difference between the statement "black is black" and "black exists." Hence not treating existence as a predicate will be incoherent.

And if we should use existence as a real predicate in the "black" case, I do not see why we should not use it as a real predicate for any other case.

I think Kant would reconsider his objections if he really thought about Sadra's example. I sort of understand where Kant is coming from, but I think that's only because - colloquially - people have an unspoken understanding that the subjects of their sentences are existent, because people usually speak about stuff that's very relevant to their lives (and nonexistent subjects tend to be not very relevant to most everyday talks, so instead of constantly predicating existence first and then speaking, we just assume the subjects are existent - because most conversations aren't really technical or philosophical enough for us to care about meticulously predicating existence to each subject).

At the end of the day, in proper/technical philosophical discussions, I believe that existence should be treated as a real predicate (for the aforementioned reasons).

[robvalue]

You seem to be talking about abstract concepts that don't map to reality. I don't think it's reasonable to say that they map to a non-existent entity. That's an attempt to conflate the real and the abstract.

If you really wanted to go down that road, I think you'd have to say "nonexistence" is a single entity in reality (although this is still nonsense, really) and that all abstract concepts that don't exist in reality map to this one entity. That's about as close as you can get, and it's still dishonest conflation.