On Anselm's 2nd Formulation of the Ontological Argument

[FallentoReason]

Firstly, let's begin with the first formulation:

1. It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).
   
   
2. God exists as an idea in the mind.
   
   
3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.
   
   
4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).
   
   
5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)
   
   
6. Therefore, God exists.
   

http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/

The refutation by Kant is that the 3rd premise assumes existence to be a property. But this isn't so. Existence is *required* by things *so that* they can have properties, but existence itself isn't a property that objects have. It is a condition.

But Anselm happened to have a second formulation of the argument, one which apparently avoids the mistake of the first:

1. By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
   
   
2. A being that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarilyexist.
   
   
3. Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
   
   
4. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
   
   
5. Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.
   
   
6. God exists in the mind as an idea.
   
   
7. Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.
   

According to the source I linked, a 'necessary existence' *is* in fact a legitimate property, which means Kant's critique no longer applies.


I've been staring at this formulation for half an hour and I cannot see where it might break down. My worries concerning this formulation are:

(1) that perhaps 'necessary existence' can only be argued for once the object's mere existence has been established first. 
(2) that the idea of God existing in the mind is already at its greatest *regardless* of whether the object of God necessarily exists in reality. 

I don't really know where to insert (1) in the syllogism, and (2) is I suppose a point of contention for premise 3, but I'm not sure if it's already logically defended by premise 2.

What are your thoughts on this formulation of the Ontological Argument?