Theists: How can predetermined fate and free will coexist?

[Angrboda]

I don't see how any of this solves the problem.  If Judas has/had libertarian free will, there is no counterfactual which would cover the situation as there is no knowledge of an event with more than one possible outcome given the context.  Saying that Judas' choice was weakly actualized depends upon his choices being determined by the combination of his character and his circumstance.  That's not libertarian free will no matter how you slice it.

Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:

1. God's natural knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

So, at step 2, the counterfactual "if Judas was in circumstance C, he would freely do A", can be true or false only if that statement is determinate in the sense that C is fully specified. Being fully specified is not the same as being causally determined. Because of the ordering of God's knowledge (1-3), at step 2 there will be an unimaginable number of counterfactuals that will have truth value that will never be actualized.

Your response doesn't in any way answer my objection. Judas' actions must be determined in order for there to be a counterfactual for God to know. But if his actions are determined, he doesn't have libertarian free will. You can't have both, knowable counterfactuals and libertarian free will.