(December 18, 2016 at 5:36 pm)robvalue Wrote: Well, if you looked at it before you chose, then yeah. [1] You'd have to "choose" to go through the red door. That's what I'm suggesting. It's not a real choice. [2] If you instead had the ability to go through the blue door, this makes my prediction wrong. But it can't be wrong. [3] If you can explain how you could choose to go through the blue door, I'd be interested. It doesn't matter if you look before or after you've made your "choice". [4]
As I wrote in a previous post, the envelope is just an extension of the prediction, cementing the fact that it's a constant prediction that can be stated before the event. Not some undetermined squiggle which just copies outcomes, like some people seem to think (not saying you do). [5]
1) I'm sorry, my question was ambiguous. I meant: "Will I choose to go through the red door once I see the red door?" No worries though, because I think your elaboration takes care of that question too.
2) Here is the important thing to clear up. Does your precognition include the reality of me choosing the red door and going through that door, or does the precognition simply include the reality of me going through the red door? If you foreknow that I will choose something... how does that somehow mean that I am not actually choosing? If it isn't a real choice, then your precognition is false. If it is a real choice, then your precognition is true, and I will absolutely and actually choose the red door.
3) Clearly, as a human being, I am a thing which is capable of choosing to walk through blue colored doors. I am even a thing which is capable of choosing to walk through this blue colored door. That "ability" is simply mine as long as I am a human being. That doesn't make your precognition wrong. It just means that, in this case, I didn't actually utilize that specific "ability", even while it remains a real potentiality (as long as I am a thing which is capable of choosing to walk through a blue door, I have the potential to choose to walk through any blue door).
4) In the case in which you have infallible knowledge of one of my future choices (in this case, my choice to walk through the red door), then I will definitely choose to walk through the red door. How does your knowledge of a future choice somehow invalidate the action as a choice?
5) Fair enough. I think the above comments operate with that understanding. Let me know if you think they don't.
