Is it true that there is no absolute morality?

[Edwardo Piet]

I've seen people say a lot that there is an absolute morality, but it seems to me that there is not. For example, some people say that killing is ultimately wrong, but there can be no reason why one thinks killing is wrong, other than personal desire. Personal desire is not quantifiable, therefor it's an arbitrary measurement of a person's feelings. 

It would seem were it not for this problem, there wouldn't be religion, which tries to solve this problem through dogma, and the imposition of an imaginary creator of whom punishment is inescapable. It would seem to me, that all morality is nothing more than dogmas, whether it be social norms or enforced laws. 

How does one cope with knowing that all morality is arbitrary, and say that one respects morality beyond being blinded by dogmas, or simply appreciating the geometry of such arbitrary systems? on a purely intellectual level. The alternative is, of course, "psychopathy", where the dogmas and appreciation of arbitrary systems is absent.

By cope, I mean cope with the fact that the systems in place are arbitrary, so there's no one system which can ultimately bring about the best of humanity. Without an objective morality, of which one could appeal to every person through reason, there is basically only wars and dogmas that struggle for dominance.

When followed to it's logical conclusion, atheism seems to result in a depressing philosophy - nihilism. I'm going with the God-is-not-dead theme and ground my reality in something objective. 

Theism is no less nihlistic.

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The existence of thoughts is objective fact.

The value system defined by those thoughts also has objective existence, inasmuch as any concept does. The opinions offered by this value system remain subjective, because whether or not they are "true" depends on whether or not you share the same basis for making value judgments.

You are equivocating back and forth between different senses of subjective . All opinions are subjective ontologically in the sense of relative to the subject but that by no means entails epistemic subjectivity. And of course these things all "exist objectivity". All existence is objective. Subjects exist objectively in an ontological sense which just means conscious beings have subjectivity by their very nature of being conscious subjects. Subjectivity isn't necessarily epistemologically objective but it necessarily exists objectively ontologically in order to exist at all because unless it's an existent object it is no object at all and existential subjectivity and ontological objectivity is the same thing.

Subjectivity is always ontologically objective but although it is indeed not necessarily epistemologically objective it's certainly not necessarily epistemologically subjective either.

Something cannot be both epistemologically objective and epstemologically subjective at the same time but both what can and cannot be known objectively applies to subjects that obviously exist subjectively ontologically by their nature of being subjects but also exists objectively ontologically by the nature of all things with or without subjectivity being objective, existent and onological by virtue of all things being objects and all objects involving ontology.

...basically TL;DR: All subjects are also objects but not all objects are necessarily subjects, objectivity is all that exists because existence itself is objective (Even if I am all that exists it's still an absolute fact that I exist. "I think therefore I am") but all this talk of existence only speaks of ontology and just because something is ontologically subjective (I.E. we are are conscious beings with subjectivity and have different opinions in our brains) that says absolutely noting about something being epistemologically subjective.

There is absolutely no contradiction between us on the one hand existing ontologically objectively as objects that are also subjects (we are living things (living objects) that are also conscious (have subjectivity) but on the other hand we have different opinions in our brains as to what is and is not morally true but there are still true and false answers to these moral questions once we agree on what we mean by "moral". And not everyone has to agree. If someone chooses to define "healthy" as "Eats lots of hemlock" what is and isn't healthy doesn't fall apart because we start with a definition of a word first and THEN there are epistemiologocally objective right and wrong answers based on that definition.

No one has to agree on anything. Objective doesn't mean universal. In fact the whole point of an epistemologically objectively right or wrong answer is that there are IN PRINCIPLE objectively right and wrong answers EVEN IF EVERYONE IN THE WHOLE WORLD DISAGREED WITH THOSE ANSWERS.

I chuckled at Whateverist's post because he said that just because morality is subjective that by no means entails that it is arbitary but I would instead say: Even if the objective answers in principle to moral questions are completely arbitary and can never be realized in practice they're still OBJECTIVE answers in principle.

The terrible logic that most moral nihilists use when they say that people disagreeing on morality entails that all moral opinions are equal is as pathetic as saying that because different chess grandmasters use different openings then this entails that all chess openings are equal.

No it does not. Non-sequitur.

I really wish people would notice what makes something A SEQUITUR and then maybe they WOULD RECOGNIZE THE NON-SEQUITURS.

But most of all I really wish people would notice equivocations.

Ontological subjectivity doesn't entail epistemological subjectivity any more than our brains being in physical and our thoughts being mental and "mental" and "physical" being antonyms entails that our brains can't think.

Ontological subjectivity doesn't entail epistemological subjectivity any more than our imagination being imaginary entails that our imagination doesn't exist and that therefore "No one really has an imagination."

Ontological subjectivity doesn't entail epistemological subjectivity any more than the fact that mental problems involving chemical imbalances that are ultimately in our heads, literally, entail that mental problems are "all in our heads" in the sense that mental problems don't exist or we don't have mental problems.

Do you understand yet? I hope so because I am tired of equivocations.

STOP EQUIVOCATING.