Consciousness Trilemma

[pocaracas]

Like in a programming language. You have to define the basic numbers, then you can bring them together in arrays, then matrices and even n-dimensional matrices. At some point, you have an object which is a matrix and there are some operations that you can perform on it and with it. And you prefer to use this object and these operations without thinking of all the processing that goes on under the hood, down to each number and memory location and stuff that you don't care about when wanting to add a matrix to another.
Our consciousness doesn't need to be aware of all the workings of the individual neurons... there seems to have been no evolutionary drive for that. But it works fast enough for most of our interactions with the real world to seem as instantaneous, or, to use better terminology, in real time.

OFC it doesn't need to be aware of all of it's workings, and it's self report doesn't -need- to be accurate (personally, I'd be more than surprised if it did and was, were not exactly talking about an intentionally designed machine here...eh?).  

However, our explanation of consciousness -does- need to be aware of it;s workings, and accurate with respect to them, or it's not an explanation of consciousness.  If we refer to those inaccuracies -as- consciousness......we aren't explaining consciousness at all.  We're just commenting endlessly about something that doesn't exist, but seems like it does.  

Given the very complex nature of the problem, for the time being, at best, all we can do is model artificial neurons and map out all the interactions they have and see what comes out. We'd have access to all the inner workings, but I doubt we can model the complexity, nor the number of neurons required to replicate a consciousness... so here we are... producing our best guesses.

If one wants to map out all the neurons and neuron interactions that collectively "produce" our consciousness, then, yes such a delay will be there.
I don't get why you say there is a discrepancy...

Because there is a discrepancy, between how it feels to be, and what the brain is or can be doing.  

Now, about that key difference, from earlier.  Eliminative materialists suggest that how it feels to be will not, or cannot map to nuerons and nueron interactions (mental states).  Cheifly, because those nuerons are not only -not- doing what it feels like they are doing, they are incapable of doing what it feels like they're doing.  Because of this, that self report which we all share is either artifact or illusion.  Illusion, in the sense that it is something else presenting itself as-such..or artifact, in that it;s not even presenting itself as such, just a strange tick of language/culture to describe it as-such.  Yet another story the brain is telling, based upon the inputs it's received.

So... these "Eliminative Materialists" are claiming that neurons cannot produce the feelings that we observe as consciousness, is that it? Why not?