RE: Nihilism
January 13, 2018 at 9:11 pm
(This post was last modified: January 13, 2018 at 9:23 pm by Edwardo Piet.)
(January 13, 2018 at 1:27 am)vulcanlogician Wrote:(January 12, 2018 at 11:49 pm)Hammy Wrote: My bold.
Regardless of metaphysics, there are times when we are confronted with two or more alternatives. When this happens, we take time to deliberate, and following this deliberation, make a selection. There is a name for this phenomenon: choosing.
Not at all regardless of metaphysics. According to the incompatabilist metaphysics the idea of actual 'alternatives' is illusory. You don't confront real alternatives, you simply don't know which future is guaranteed and which future was never going to happen.
Quote: Hard incompatibilists insist that any choice one way or the other is caused by antecedent states and events, but they acknowledge that a deliberation process still occurs--whether one is in control of it or not.
The point is that it's merely deliberating, it's thought processes, exactly like I said. It's not actually choosing anything. Actually choosing something would be freely choosing something.
When a compatabilist says to an incompatabilist "You're a compatabilist in everything but name!" it just goes to show how completely devoid of content compatabilism is. That isn't a win for compatabilism. That's a win for incompatabilism. Compatabilism is comparable to pantheism in terms of utter vapidness. Merely calling the will "free will" or unfree choices "choices" is exactly like calling the universe "God". It's an empty label, completely devoid of any actual content.
Quote:plato.stanford Wrote:Determinism might imply that our choices and efforts have earlier sufficient causes; it does not imply that we don’t make choices or that our choices and efforts are causally impotent. Determinism is consistent with the fact that our deliberation, choices and efforts are part of the causal process whereby our bodies move and cause further effects in the world. And a cause is the kind of thing that “makes a difference” (Sartorio 2005). If I raise my hand because I chose to do so, then it’s true, ceteris paribus, that if my choice had not occurred, my hand-raising would not have occurred.https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incom...llIncoDete
It does imply that we don't make choices and it does imply that our will isn't free. Unless you wanna go ahead and call a lack of choices "choices" and a lack of free will "free will" anyhow.
As I said, and you kudosed it and said "well said": The problem with fatalism is not that it suggests that we have any more or less choices than determinism. It doesn't. There are no choices in either case. The problem with fatalism is that it denies the fact that our actions are part of the causal stream. Obviously our actions are part of the causal stream... things don't happen regardless of what we do. That doesn't mean they are chosen freely/chosen (I'm still yet to see a way 'chosen unfreely' can make any sense. That's what I object to.). And the point is that ultimately our actions aren't up to us and it's not really 'us' doing it. Not ultimately. Ultimately it's impersonal causes ultimately entirely and absolutely causing our behaviors. It's not that we're not absolutely ultimately free, it's that we're ultimately not even relatively free.
(January 13, 2018 at 8:41 pm)emjay Wrote: My view on all this is that determinism is not the same thing as fatalism... that fatalism is a huge misunderstanding of determinism, confusing the notions of fate and destiny with causality. Say for instance I had won the lottery in the past... and it was thus part of the causally determined path of my life... then fatalism would be akin to me hypothetically being informed in the past that I was destined to win the lottery, and with that information concluding 'if I'm destined to win the lottery, I may as well not buy a ticket', which is just silly.
Agreed. The problem with fatalism is that it pretends like the future is determined regardless of our actions... which makes no sense because our actions are equally part of the universe. This doesn't make them any more free at all under determinism than under fatalism, that's my point. We're just as unfree as we would be if fatalism were true, it's merely that it's entirely irrational to believe that fatalism is true because if fatalism were true we'd live in a very bizarre universe where, for example hard work and effort would be absolutely pointless because all achievements would have absolutely nothing to do with our efforts.
Under determinism it's ultimately entirely not even one bit up to us whether we bother to not be lazy and start trying to work hard. We still have no choice in the matter as to whether we actually get shit done, but at least we understand that it would be irrational to believe that shit will get done regardless of if we put effort into stuff. Stuff WON'T get done regardless of if we try, but yes, we have absolutely no choice in the matter as to whether we will actually try or not. We'll try and put the effort in when we are motivated to do so/when we think it's worth it. We ultimately can't force ourselves to do anything, at all, because even whether we want to force ourselves is ultimately not down to us. Ultimately there is no self-motivation because the buck doesn't stop at the self... the buck never stops and it stretches back prior to the self.... and prior to our birth.