RE: Christians and Their Homework!
March 5, 2018 at 5:29 am
(This post was last modified: March 5, 2018 at 5:33 am by Crimson Apologist.)
Wow, I’m very impressed by the seriousness with which you guys responded to my arguments. I’m really sorry these posts have been really long but I hope you’ll agree that this conversation has been very enjoyable and worth having. In the interest of addressing points instead of individual responses, I will attempt to formulate my thoughts in the form of responses to questions. If my questions misrepresent your thoughts in any way, I apologize in advance. Also, in the interest of creating shorter posts, I will try to post my thoughts in several smaller posts instead of one large post.
What do agnosticism and atheism mean?
Perhaps I neglected to establish or conform to some kind of accepted definition of these terms within this community, and for that I do apologize. When I said that having no good evidence for God’s existence or inexistence should result in agnosticism instead of atheism, I meant that lack of evidence either way should, in my view, rationally result in a neutral intellectual judgment and a functionally theistic lifestyle a la Pascal’s wager.
Can a person be saved if they believe in God purely through Pascal’s wager?
I’m not entirely sure but I wouldn’t immediately discount it. I hold that saving faith is trust in God’s existence and His promises in a way that would be reflected in the way one lives one’s life. This means that if someone logically thinks that God’s existence is improbable but nonetheless chooses to live their life as if He did exist, then I would say that the trust they place in God’s existence and promises could plausibly be sufficient for their salvation. Now, even if this kind of faith doesn’t immediately result in salvation, it’s not inconceivable to think that it could eventually lead to the kind of faith that does result in salvation.
What kind of evidence is necessary to believe that God exists?
I don’t think irrefutable evidence is a necessary requirement to believe in anything. In my view, you are justified in believing something if you have better reasons to believe in it than its negation. That being said, the warrant a person has for a particular belief is drastically increased by evidence we may consider irrefutable. However, I question the notion that if God existed, He would provide irrefutable evidence of His existence for everyone. After all, if God's goal is not to get people to believe that He exists, but to have a love and trust relationship with human beings, then it seems to me that the lack of irrefutable evidence is to be expected. In fact, I think it's quite plausible that if God’s existence was made more obvious to everyone, then more people would believe THAT God exists but even fewer people would believe IN God (ie. fewer people would choose to enter into that kind of relationship with God). Thus, I don't think the hiddenness of God is a very good objection to His existence.
Have the classical arguments for God’s existence been debunked?
Just as one user correctly pointed out that arguments do not equate to existence, I’d like to point out that objections do not equate to refutation. For as many objections that have been raised against the arguments for God’s existence, there have been equally as many, if not more, counterarguments defending the validity of these arguments. I’d like to offer some of these defenses in response to the objections posed in this thread.
Is the universe a contingent existence?
I don’t see what property of the universe would make it a necessary existence. That Big Bang cosmology essentially proves a finite beginning of the universe entails that the universe has not always existed and therefore does not exist necessarily.
Was the universe created from nothing?
I actually mistyped my earlier description of the Kalam Cosmological Argument and meant to say that the universe could not have come into being from nothing. The Law of Causality affirms that the universe could not have come into being from nothing uncaused and I posit that God is this cause of the universe. Now, it’s certainly possible that something existed prior to the universe but then you’re faced with an infinite regress of causes until you arrive at the first uncaused cause. On an unrelated note, I find it interesting that some are so eager to hold to some non-God entities existing prior to the universe when there is no evidence of such things, while asserting atheism on the grounds of having no evidence for God.
Is an infinite regress logically possible?
Why, of course it is! But the Contingency Argument and Kalam Cosmological Argument don’t depend on an infinite regress being a logical impossibility, but a physical impossibility. On the tensed theory of time, it can be shown that it is not possible to have an infinite number of past events and that there must be a first cause.
Must there be only one first cause?
Considering that causes need to be greater than their effects, the regression of causes leads us to the ultimate cause, and neither of two equally great causes can be said to be ultimate, I think we can confidently conclude that there can only be one first cause.
Is the first cause part of our universe?
If being a part of the universe means being a constituent, then no, because the first cause created the universe and therefore exists independently from it. If it means physical presence, then I would say that God does directly interact with the universe.
Does quantum mechanics provide an exception to the Law of Causality?
Not at all! There are many interpretations of the equations of quantum mechanics, only a few of which assert indeterministic quantum events. However, even these indeterministic events are not uncaused in that they require causal preconditions to even occur (eg. fluctuations in a quantum vacuum).
Does a multiverse solve the problem of a finite beginning of the universe or fine-tuning?
No, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem shows that even the multiverse needs a finite beginning and the multiverse theory is fraught with problems as an explanation of the fine-tuning of this universe. For example, as the Kalam Cosmological Argument explains, a physical infinite is not possible, so there aren’t actually an infinite number of universes in a multiverse, meaning there’s no guarantee of a universe with constants as precise as ours. If there were a large number of universes out there, it’s a mystery why the highly probable chaotic collapse of all these universes wouldn’t trigger the collapse of our own. If there were such a large number of universes, then it would still be far less likely to end up in a universe as finely tuned as ours than a universe barely capable of supporting life. Lastly, the existence of a multiverse itself would require an incredible degree of fine-tuning (eg. a very precise critical density). Given all these problems, it seems to me that God is a far simpler and more plausible explanation for the fine-tuning of the universe than such an extravagant theory as the multiverse, for which there is no evidence.
Can the Ontological Argument be used to show the necessary existence of the maximally great unicorn?
Not at all! The great-making properties of the maximally great being are logically incompatible with the necessary properties of a unicorn, making the possibility of the maximally great unicorn’s existence untenable. If you reduce the great-making properties such that we arrive at the greatest possible unicorn, then it no longer has the properties which make its existence necessary in every possible world. Now, if you diminish the necessary properties of the unicorn such that this unicorn shares the same properties as the maximally great being, then that unicorn is in fact God, just going by a different name.
Is it possible for the maximally great being to exist?
In my view, this is the only premise of the Ontological Argument that can be reasonably attacked but from what I can tell, there has not been any successful objection to this premise. Some historical attempts include the Problem of Evil (the logical version of which has been resolved with the free will argument) and the omnipotence paradox (which is resolved by defining omnipotence to mean that God can do anything that is logically possible). It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the atheist to show that the maximally great being cannot logically exist.
Are testimony and historical facts best explained by delusion/myth or God?
In regards to history, I’d argue that the scholarly consensus on certain historical facts obtained from the New Testament documents (eg. the crucifixion of Jesus, the empty tomb, the radical transformation of the apostles, the explosive rise of early Christianity following their leader’s death, the multiple independent eyewitness testimony of the risen Jesus, and the martyrdom of the apostles) are best explained by Jesus actually resurrecting from the dead, which is then best explained by God. In regards to testimony of miracles and experiences of God, I think the ubiquity of these claims (which share an uncanny number of commonalities) from independent sources worldwide are, in the absence of a powerful defeater, also best explained by God.
Does Bayes’ Theorem disprove Jesus’ resurrection?
Given that Bayes’ Theorem applied to history relies upon arbitrary probability values, the most bizarre of which is the intrinsic probability of the hypothesis (ie. that miracles are possible), I simply don’t think Bayes’ Theorem is reliable for calculating the likelihood of whether or not Jesus was resurrected and thus reject it as a good argument against the resurrection.
Is morality grounded in human well-being?
As I have argued, if objective moral values exist, then morality cannot be grounded in human well-being because it must exist apart from even the existence of human beings or any other contingent moral agents. Even if objective moral values did not exist, I still don’t see how human well-being would necessarily be the foundation of morality. Moral decisions would merely be governed by evolutionarily developed cognitive predispositions and whimsical decisions of those in power in a certain place and time, which would not likely result in the determination of human well-being as the foundation of morality. And even if it did in every scenario, there’s nothing giving these moral decisions any normative weight because what IS does not necessitate what OUGHT TO BE.
How can objective morality be grounded in God’s nature?
Because God is the maximally great being, part of that greatness entails moral perfection, and so morality is rightly grounded in God’s nature. This means that whatever is good is consistent with God’s nature. For example, justice is good because God’s nature is just and vice versa. And so, when I say that someone can do good without knowledge of God, what I mean is that they can act in accordance with one or more aspect of God’s nature without believing that God exists.
Is God evil?
If God’s nature is the standard of objective morality, then by definition, God and anything He does cannot be evil, regardless of what we may believe. If there is no such thing as objective morality, then clearly, human beings would be pragmatically disposed to oppose any command by God that would threaten their individual well-being. However, there would be no moral basis for accusing God of being evil because human morality would be subjective and therefore illusory. That is to say, if objective morality does not exist, then there would be no such thing as good and evil. In regards to the argument that God contradicts Himself in the Bible, I don’t think so. Again, under the version of Divine Command Theory I defend, God’s specific direct commands supercede His general moral law. For example, it is normally immoral for people to kill each other, but when God commands it, it becomes a moral obligation. God does not wrong anyone because every adult is liable for judgment and I believe young children who die go to heaven. In regards to the Problem of Evil, God is morally justified in permitting evil and suffering to exist if doing so results in a greater good than the universal well-being of all people, namely, the greatest number of people freely choosing to believe in God and be saved. In doing this, God is different from an abusive parent in that abusive parents are morally fallible and unaware of their actions’ consequences, whereas God is incapable of deviating from His nature and cognizant of the outcomes of every single one of His actions and commands. In regards to the Problem of Hell, I don’t see a problem with the consequence of eternal separation from God if people reject Him in their life on earth and I don’t believe in the eternal suffering of souls in Hell. I hold to the (admittedly controversial) doctrine of Annihilationism which proposes that souls that go to Hell are destroyed forever.
Is there biblical evidence that young children go to heaven when they die?
Actually, yes, sort of. In 2 Samuel 12:23, King David remarks of his deceased infant son: “I will go to him, but he will not return to me,” suggesting that he will meet his son again in heaven. Now, this doesn’t show that all young children go to heaven when they die, but that it’s possible for young children to go to heaven. Another passage I reference is Matthew 18:2-4, where Jesus says: “Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever takes the lowly position of this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. And whoever welcomes one such child in my name welcomes me.” If Jesus holds young children in such high esteem, I think we can infer that God would be merciful towards children who die young.
Is there moral knowledge that God revealed which human beings could not have discovered on their own?
I don’t see how this could not be the case. Naturalistic or purely rational explanations of morality attempt to describe moral actions in terms of the benefit they confer on the survival of the individual, but I find that this is an inadequate explanation of our current moral views. It’s true that altruistic behavior is observable in some animal species, but they are a rare exception compared to the selfish kill-or-be-killed nature of most animal behavior. On the other hand, our moral views overwhelmingly favor altruism, often at the expense of our own well-being, which I don’t think natural selection even comes close to explaining. So I think the best explanation of the moral knowledge characterized by our culture of altruism is God’s revelation in history. I think my argument is further supported by the fact that God’s commandments and moral teachings at various points in history were extremely radical and counter-cultural in the patriarchal Jewish societies to which they were issued.
Is the Bible a reliable source of information about God?
I’d like to point out that belief in biblical inerrancy is not a requirement for being a Christian; it is very much an in-house debate. Although I personally believe in the divine inspiration of the Bible for philosophical reasons, I also hold that the sections of the New Testament that scholars almost universally regard as historically reliable (eg. 1 Corinthians 15:3-7 and Galatians 1:11-24, 2:1-10) are sufficient to justify belief in the core doctrine of Christianity (ie. Jesus’ crucifixion/resurrection and salvation through faith in Jesus)
What do agnosticism and atheism mean?
Perhaps I neglected to establish or conform to some kind of accepted definition of these terms within this community, and for that I do apologize. When I said that having no good evidence for God’s existence or inexistence should result in agnosticism instead of atheism, I meant that lack of evidence either way should, in my view, rationally result in a neutral intellectual judgment and a functionally theistic lifestyle a la Pascal’s wager.
Can a person be saved if they believe in God purely through Pascal’s wager?
I’m not entirely sure but I wouldn’t immediately discount it. I hold that saving faith is trust in God’s existence and His promises in a way that would be reflected in the way one lives one’s life. This means that if someone logically thinks that God’s existence is improbable but nonetheless chooses to live their life as if He did exist, then I would say that the trust they place in God’s existence and promises could plausibly be sufficient for their salvation. Now, even if this kind of faith doesn’t immediately result in salvation, it’s not inconceivable to think that it could eventually lead to the kind of faith that does result in salvation.
What kind of evidence is necessary to believe that God exists?
I don’t think irrefutable evidence is a necessary requirement to believe in anything. In my view, you are justified in believing something if you have better reasons to believe in it than its negation. That being said, the warrant a person has for a particular belief is drastically increased by evidence we may consider irrefutable. However, I question the notion that if God existed, He would provide irrefutable evidence of His existence for everyone. After all, if God's goal is not to get people to believe that He exists, but to have a love and trust relationship with human beings, then it seems to me that the lack of irrefutable evidence is to be expected. In fact, I think it's quite plausible that if God’s existence was made more obvious to everyone, then more people would believe THAT God exists but even fewer people would believe IN God (ie. fewer people would choose to enter into that kind of relationship with God). Thus, I don't think the hiddenness of God is a very good objection to His existence.
Have the classical arguments for God’s existence been debunked?
Just as one user correctly pointed out that arguments do not equate to existence, I’d like to point out that objections do not equate to refutation. For as many objections that have been raised against the arguments for God’s existence, there have been equally as many, if not more, counterarguments defending the validity of these arguments. I’d like to offer some of these defenses in response to the objections posed in this thread.
Is the universe a contingent existence?
I don’t see what property of the universe would make it a necessary existence. That Big Bang cosmology essentially proves a finite beginning of the universe entails that the universe has not always existed and therefore does not exist necessarily.
Was the universe created from nothing?
I actually mistyped my earlier description of the Kalam Cosmological Argument and meant to say that the universe could not have come into being from nothing. The Law of Causality affirms that the universe could not have come into being from nothing uncaused and I posit that God is this cause of the universe. Now, it’s certainly possible that something existed prior to the universe but then you’re faced with an infinite regress of causes until you arrive at the first uncaused cause. On an unrelated note, I find it interesting that some are so eager to hold to some non-God entities existing prior to the universe when there is no evidence of such things, while asserting atheism on the grounds of having no evidence for God.
Is an infinite regress logically possible?
Why, of course it is! But the Contingency Argument and Kalam Cosmological Argument don’t depend on an infinite regress being a logical impossibility, but a physical impossibility. On the tensed theory of time, it can be shown that it is not possible to have an infinite number of past events and that there must be a first cause.
Must there be only one first cause?
Considering that causes need to be greater than their effects, the regression of causes leads us to the ultimate cause, and neither of two equally great causes can be said to be ultimate, I think we can confidently conclude that there can only be one first cause.
Is the first cause part of our universe?
If being a part of the universe means being a constituent, then no, because the first cause created the universe and therefore exists independently from it. If it means physical presence, then I would say that God does directly interact with the universe.
Does quantum mechanics provide an exception to the Law of Causality?
Not at all! There are many interpretations of the equations of quantum mechanics, only a few of which assert indeterministic quantum events. However, even these indeterministic events are not uncaused in that they require causal preconditions to even occur (eg. fluctuations in a quantum vacuum).
Does a multiverse solve the problem of a finite beginning of the universe or fine-tuning?
No, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem shows that even the multiverse needs a finite beginning and the multiverse theory is fraught with problems as an explanation of the fine-tuning of this universe. For example, as the Kalam Cosmological Argument explains, a physical infinite is not possible, so there aren’t actually an infinite number of universes in a multiverse, meaning there’s no guarantee of a universe with constants as precise as ours. If there were a large number of universes out there, it’s a mystery why the highly probable chaotic collapse of all these universes wouldn’t trigger the collapse of our own. If there were such a large number of universes, then it would still be far less likely to end up in a universe as finely tuned as ours than a universe barely capable of supporting life. Lastly, the existence of a multiverse itself would require an incredible degree of fine-tuning (eg. a very precise critical density). Given all these problems, it seems to me that God is a far simpler and more plausible explanation for the fine-tuning of the universe than such an extravagant theory as the multiverse, for which there is no evidence.
Can the Ontological Argument be used to show the necessary existence of the maximally great unicorn?
Not at all! The great-making properties of the maximally great being are logically incompatible with the necessary properties of a unicorn, making the possibility of the maximally great unicorn’s existence untenable. If you reduce the great-making properties such that we arrive at the greatest possible unicorn, then it no longer has the properties which make its existence necessary in every possible world. Now, if you diminish the necessary properties of the unicorn such that this unicorn shares the same properties as the maximally great being, then that unicorn is in fact God, just going by a different name.
Is it possible for the maximally great being to exist?
In my view, this is the only premise of the Ontological Argument that can be reasonably attacked but from what I can tell, there has not been any successful objection to this premise. Some historical attempts include the Problem of Evil (the logical version of which has been resolved with the free will argument) and the omnipotence paradox (which is resolved by defining omnipotence to mean that God can do anything that is logically possible). It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the atheist to show that the maximally great being cannot logically exist.
Are testimony and historical facts best explained by delusion/myth or God?
In regards to history, I’d argue that the scholarly consensus on certain historical facts obtained from the New Testament documents (eg. the crucifixion of Jesus, the empty tomb, the radical transformation of the apostles, the explosive rise of early Christianity following their leader’s death, the multiple independent eyewitness testimony of the risen Jesus, and the martyrdom of the apostles) are best explained by Jesus actually resurrecting from the dead, which is then best explained by God. In regards to testimony of miracles and experiences of God, I think the ubiquity of these claims (which share an uncanny number of commonalities) from independent sources worldwide are, in the absence of a powerful defeater, also best explained by God.
Does Bayes’ Theorem disprove Jesus’ resurrection?
Given that Bayes’ Theorem applied to history relies upon arbitrary probability values, the most bizarre of which is the intrinsic probability of the hypothesis (ie. that miracles are possible), I simply don’t think Bayes’ Theorem is reliable for calculating the likelihood of whether or not Jesus was resurrected and thus reject it as a good argument against the resurrection.
Is morality grounded in human well-being?
As I have argued, if objective moral values exist, then morality cannot be grounded in human well-being because it must exist apart from even the existence of human beings or any other contingent moral agents. Even if objective moral values did not exist, I still don’t see how human well-being would necessarily be the foundation of morality. Moral decisions would merely be governed by evolutionarily developed cognitive predispositions and whimsical decisions of those in power in a certain place and time, which would not likely result in the determination of human well-being as the foundation of morality. And even if it did in every scenario, there’s nothing giving these moral decisions any normative weight because what IS does not necessitate what OUGHT TO BE.
How can objective morality be grounded in God’s nature?
Because God is the maximally great being, part of that greatness entails moral perfection, and so morality is rightly grounded in God’s nature. This means that whatever is good is consistent with God’s nature. For example, justice is good because God’s nature is just and vice versa. And so, when I say that someone can do good without knowledge of God, what I mean is that they can act in accordance with one or more aspect of God’s nature without believing that God exists.
Is God evil?
If God’s nature is the standard of objective morality, then by definition, God and anything He does cannot be evil, regardless of what we may believe. If there is no such thing as objective morality, then clearly, human beings would be pragmatically disposed to oppose any command by God that would threaten their individual well-being. However, there would be no moral basis for accusing God of being evil because human morality would be subjective and therefore illusory. That is to say, if objective morality does not exist, then there would be no such thing as good and evil. In regards to the argument that God contradicts Himself in the Bible, I don’t think so. Again, under the version of Divine Command Theory I defend, God’s specific direct commands supercede His general moral law. For example, it is normally immoral for people to kill each other, but when God commands it, it becomes a moral obligation. God does not wrong anyone because every adult is liable for judgment and I believe young children who die go to heaven. In regards to the Problem of Evil, God is morally justified in permitting evil and suffering to exist if doing so results in a greater good than the universal well-being of all people, namely, the greatest number of people freely choosing to believe in God and be saved. In doing this, God is different from an abusive parent in that abusive parents are morally fallible and unaware of their actions’ consequences, whereas God is incapable of deviating from His nature and cognizant of the outcomes of every single one of His actions and commands. In regards to the Problem of Hell, I don’t see a problem with the consequence of eternal separation from God if people reject Him in their life on earth and I don’t believe in the eternal suffering of souls in Hell. I hold to the (admittedly controversial) doctrine of Annihilationism which proposes that souls that go to Hell are destroyed forever.
Is there biblical evidence that young children go to heaven when they die?
Actually, yes, sort of. In 2 Samuel 12:23, King David remarks of his deceased infant son: “I will go to him, but he will not return to me,” suggesting that he will meet his son again in heaven. Now, this doesn’t show that all young children go to heaven when they die, but that it’s possible for young children to go to heaven. Another passage I reference is Matthew 18:2-4, where Jesus says: “Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever takes the lowly position of this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. And whoever welcomes one such child in my name welcomes me.” If Jesus holds young children in such high esteem, I think we can infer that God would be merciful towards children who die young.
Is there moral knowledge that God revealed which human beings could not have discovered on their own?
I don’t see how this could not be the case. Naturalistic or purely rational explanations of morality attempt to describe moral actions in terms of the benefit they confer on the survival of the individual, but I find that this is an inadequate explanation of our current moral views. It’s true that altruistic behavior is observable in some animal species, but they are a rare exception compared to the selfish kill-or-be-killed nature of most animal behavior. On the other hand, our moral views overwhelmingly favor altruism, often at the expense of our own well-being, which I don’t think natural selection even comes close to explaining. So I think the best explanation of the moral knowledge characterized by our culture of altruism is God’s revelation in history. I think my argument is further supported by the fact that God’s commandments and moral teachings at various points in history were extremely radical and counter-cultural in the patriarchal Jewish societies to which they were issued.
Is the Bible a reliable source of information about God?
I’d like to point out that belief in biblical inerrancy is not a requirement for being a Christian; it is very much an in-house debate. Although I personally believe in the divine inspiration of the Bible for philosophical reasons, I also hold that the sections of the New Testament that scholars almost universally regard as historically reliable (eg. 1 Corinthians 15:3-7 and Galatians 1:11-24, 2:1-10) are sufficient to justify belief in the core doctrine of Christianity (ie. Jesus’ crucifixion/resurrection and salvation through faith in Jesus)
