Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[Simon Moon]

quent:

P implies Q
Q 
therefore P

Also called the fallacy of the converse. An example is:

1. If Bill Gates owns Fort Knox (P), then Bill Gates is rich (Q).
2. Bill Gates is rich. (Q)
3. Therefore, Bill Gates owns Fort Knox. (P)

This is the KCA

P implies Q 
P 
therefore Q

1. Everything that begins to exist (P) has a cause. (Q)
2. The universe began to exist. (P)
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Q)

Nope. Definitely not Affirming the Consequent. 

You point out two possibilities: those things that don't begin to exist and those things that do. That is very simply put the distinction between something that is necessary and something that is contingent. You could insert the phrase "All contingent objects" in the Premise (1) and it would mean exactly the same thing. The universe by definition is a contingent object. The reason that Premise (1) is formulated that way is because necessary objects don't have a cause--so don't belong in Premise (1)

You may be correct on this technically not being affirming the consequent, but it still smuggles the conclusion into the first premise.

The problem is, even if the terms are changed to contingent and necessary, the problem remains.

The formulation of premise 1 is the problem. Just because it does not explicitly contain the term "necessary" (or, things that don't begin to exist), does not mean it is not implicitly there. You can't create a set of "all things that begin to exist" without implicitly creating the set of "things that do not begin to exist".

And, if the theist using this argument only believes one thing (his or her god) is in the set of all things that don't begin to exist (or necessary), the the first premise (implicitly) contains the conclusion.

Even if I am wrong here, KCA also contains an equivocation fallacy in the second premise, so it still fails.