Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[The Grand Nudger]

It;s sort of amusing that you think a description of cause might not have "causal power"....and instead imply that only pro/prescriptive this or thats are causal.

It's almost as if there's a silent invocation of the articles of your faith at play. Is that pro/prescriptive or descriptive...and does it present as causal agent...in you?

[Jenny A]

I am objecting to the fact that the phrase "begin to exist" is used to describe one kind of change in premise one and another in premise two.  Premise one concerns change within the universe.  That kind of change involves only the change in form of pre-existing matter and energy.  Premise two refers to the creation of matter and energy.  We know that changes in the form of matter and energy within the universe requires causes.  We do not know if the creation of matter does.

Regarding, "begins to exist", that can be dealt with in two ways.

1) is to provide a univocal meaning of the phrase in both premises. So, let's go with comes into being. 
2) is to provide a more detailed meaning that would apply to both premises: x begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t' prior to t at which x exists.

either one eliminates your objection. 

Either you are being disingenuous, or you don't understand the objection.  I'll explain it again.  When you say in premise 1 that all things that begin to exist have a cause, you are making an statement about the transformation of matter and energy from one form to another. If you include the universe in the set of all things that begin to exist then you are also talking about the creation of new matter.  The two  types of beginning to exist are fundamentally different. We see things in the universe transform all the time, and often can show the cause (really causes) of that transformation.   We do not see matter itself begin to exist.  We cannot say whether such a creation has a cause.  

Changing your phrase from beginning to exist to coming into being doesn't help you, because you are still talking about to fundamentally different types of comming into existence.

Matilda gets at this problem when she asks when a snowflake begins to exist.  It's rather hard to say as it doesn't spring into existenceall at once.  The crystalline shape of the water forms becomes a snowflake bit by bit. Water is added as it forms.  Similarly, a person is formed slowly over a long gestation period during which material is is continuously added.  Even after a person comes into existence material continues to be added and subtracted.  There is no precise beginning or end to this kind of material transformation.  And all of the little bits of transformation have their own causes.

The universe began with all of its material parts and it still had all of its material parts.  It began at a discrete time, i.e the first moment of time.  Prior to that there was no time.  

Your second more precise definition actually makes the problem clearer.  Because time begins with the beginning of the universe, it makes no sense to discuss whether there was a time before the universe existed.

What you have have here is an elementary category error, in that you have  a set which includes the set as a member of the set.  Your set incudes all material things, and the universe which is the set of all material things. Anytime you include a set in it's own set it leads to logical error.  For example, if you describe the set of all whole numbers and include set of of all whole numbers within the set then you end up with syllogisms like this.

All whole numbers are finite
The set all whole numbers is a whole number
Therefore the set of all whole numbers is finite.

[polymath257]

And that was incorrect. The reason that the ball breaks the glass is that the forces induced on the glass from the motion of the ball are sufficient to overcome the forces between the atoms in the glass itself. That is all because of the *physical laws* applicable to this situation. In particular here, it is the electromagnetic repulsion between the electrons of the ball and those of the glass as compared to the attraction between the atoms in the ball and between atoms of the glass that is relevant for the glass breaking.

Without physical laws, the 'logic' would give absolutely no information about this interaction. That is the only 'logically prior' here. The causality is *because* of the physical laws.

And the interaction does, in fact, happen through a period of time. In particular, the reaction of the glass to the ball takes time, it is NOT a simultaneous thing.

I would agree, that there are a series of things which occur in the instance of a ball breaking a window.

Would you agree, that the "physical laws" are just descriptive and do not have a causal abilitiy?  The physical laws, give us a way to describe, understand, and model what happens as the force of the ball is transferred to the glass?  The physical laws that you are describing is just how things behave.  They are not prescriptive, and do not have causal power.

To the extent that physical laws are purely descriptive, so is the notion of causality. It is simply a description that certain things tend to follow other things.

[The Grand Nudger]

A man is shot, stabbed, then pushed off a cliff.  What killed him? 

[polymath257]

A man is shot, stabbed, then pushed off a cliff.  What killed him. 

Lack of oxygen delivered to his brain.

[RoadRunner79]

I would agree, that there are a series of things which occur in the instance of a ball breaking a window.

Would you agree, that the "physical laws" are just descriptive and do not have a causal abilitiy?  The physical laws, give us a way to describe, understand, and model what happens as the force of the ball is transferred to the glass?  The physical laws that you are describing is just how things behave.  They are not prescriptive, and do not have causal power.

To the extent that physical laws are purely descriptive, so is the notion of causality. It is simply a description that certain things tend to follow other things.

I would agree...

[Simon Moon]

quent:

P implies Q
Q 
therefore P

Also called the fallacy of the converse. An example is:

1. If Bill Gates owns Fort Knox (P), then Bill Gates is rich (Q).
2. Bill Gates is rich. (Q)
3. Therefore, Bill Gates owns Fort Knox. (P)

This is the KCA

P implies Q 
P 
therefore Q

1. Everything that begins to exist (P) has a cause. (Q)
2. The universe began to exist. (P)
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Q)

Nope. Definitely not Affirming the Consequent. 

You point out two possibilities: those things that don't begin to exist and those things that do. That is very simply put the distinction between something that is necessary and something that is contingent. You could insert the phrase "All contingent objects" in the Premise (1) and it would mean exactly the same thing. The universe by definition is a contingent object. The reason that Premise (1) is formulated that way is because necessary objects don't have a cause--so don't belong in Premise (1)

You may be correct on this technically not being affirming the consequent, but it still smuggles the conclusion into the first premise.

The problem is, even if the terms are changed to contingent and necessary, the problem remains.

The formulation of premise 1 is the problem. Just because it does not explicitly contain the term "necessary" (or, things that don't begin to exist), does not mean it is not implicitly there. You can't create a set of "all things that begin to exist" without implicitly creating the set of "things that do not begin to exist".

And, if the theist using this argument only believes one thing (his or her god) is in the set of all things that don't begin to exist (or necessary), the the first premise (implicitly) contains the conclusion.

Even if I am wrong here, KCA also contains an equivocation fallacy in the second premise, so it still fails.

[The Grand Nudger]

I don't have it in me to pursue most of the time......but.....  a person is absolutely capable of expressing any conjecture in a way that satisfies the if p then q format...but it's also true that some people organize their propositions so that it formally meets the conditions but communicates some idea that would not if they were -accurately- communicated for what they are.  

-and so it comes to pass that a person can say something that absolutely is a formal logical fallacy but has been couched in language that they can defend so long as anyone humors them.

This is lying for jesus..in a nutshell. I asked..pages ago...if there was anything other than "god" on the other set for this very reason. No bites, never have been any bites.....never will be any bites. If I was fishing for honesty in the pool of apologism...I'd have long since starved to death.

[Jackalope]

A man is shot, stabbed, then pushed off a cliff.  What killed him? 

His jilted lover, obv.

[RoadRunner79]

quent:

P implies Q
Q 
therefore P

Also called the fallacy of the converse. An example is:

1. If Bill Gates owns Fort Knox (P), then Bill Gates is rich (Q).
2. Bill Gates is rich. (Q)
3. Therefore, Bill Gates owns Fort Knox. (P)

This is the KCA

P implies Q 
P 
therefore Q

1. Everything that begins to exist (P) has a cause. (Q)
2. The universe began to exist. (P)
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Q)

Nope. Definitely not Affirming the Consequent. 

You point out two possibilities: those things that don't begin to exist and those things that do. That is very simply put the distinction between something that is necessary and something that is contingent. You could insert the phrase "All contingent objects" in the Premise (1) and it would mean exactly the same thing. The universe by definition is a contingent object. The reason that Premise (1) is formulated that way is because necessary objects don't have a cause--so don't belong in Premise (1)

You may be correct on this technically not being affirming the consequent, but it still smuggles the conclusion into the first premise.

The problem is, even if the terms are changed to contingent and necessary, the problem remains.

The formulation of premise 1 is the problem. Just because it does not explicitly contain the term "necessary" (or, things that don't begin to exist), does not mean it is not implicitly there. You can't create a set of "all things that begin to exist" without implicitly creating the set of "things that do not begin to exist".

And, if the theist using this argument only believes one thing (his or her god) is in the set of all things that don't begin to exist (or necessary), the the first premise (implicitly) contains the conclusion.  

Even if I am wrong here, KCA also contains an equivocation fallacy in the second premise, so it still fails.

He is definitely correct on confirming the consequent.  If you look up syllogisms, you will undoubtedly run across the following:

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.

This is the same form of construction as the KCA.

It also does not smuggle the conclusion into the premise.  The conclusion is logically derived from the premises, which may be why you think you are seeing something.  The other option, is you may not be going by the actual arguments that someone is presenting, but making up your own, in which the conclusion is in the premise.

There is no logical reason or necessity that I can see for you set of 1 rule.  To me this seems ad hoc, I've only ever seen it used in this context.  Perhaps it is self refuting.

As to the equivocation fallacy, it is not. 
There comes a point at times like this, where one might suspect that people are just throwing shit against the wall to see what sticks.