Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

Because it is your opinion that matters, in a subjective system, not any fact of the matter x that you may discover - and you don't need to discover any fact of any matter to have an opinion.  Facts of the matter are the purview of moral realism, as thats the position of moral realism, that there are facts of the matter.  Subjectivism denies this, fundamentally obviating discovery since it contends that there is no there...there...to discover.  

That's not how I see it.  I see moral objectivism as the idea that there are MORAL facts, i.e. moral ideas which are true whether people think so or not.  There aren't, though very many people have claimed their moral flavor-of-the-time to be so.  There are physical facts, and subjective interpretations of their meaning and importance.

Read the bolded again, with your own comments set right alongside.  Yes, moral realists contend that there are (or at least could be) moral facts.  Subjectivism denies this.  

One example of a physical fact would be that a human being's body has been disrupted, and has stopped functioning, due to insertion of an object into its heart.  The moral interpretation depends greatly on the feelings of other people about that particular human, and the narrative behind the killing.  Was it a revenge murder?  Was it done to silence a rape victim?  Was it done in a ritual sacrifice meant to stop the Volgons from attacking Earth?

The reason we need to establish this narrative is that we need to feed it through our world view and through our emotional system, to see how we FEEL about things.  Unless you want to argue that feelings aren't subjective, since they're mediated by hormones, etc. etc., then I can't see how it could be clearer that our moral ideas are subjective expressions of subjective agency in response to a (mostly mythological and also highly subjective) narrative ABOUT objective truths.

In some way more, or more fundamentally...than any other narrative about any other kind of objective truth? More than this, it might be useful to point out that moral realists don't contend that we, the moral agent...-don't- do all of the above. It's coherent for a moral realist to say "this moral system x is deeply subjective" - and that will be one of the chief criticisms of a subjective morality from a moral realist. Proving that, a position which you could share with any moral realist, doesn't endanger the contention of moral realism. What a moral realist might see as the shortcomings of moral systems as currently devised or practiced provide the backdrop of moral realisms utility or ability to compel.

The far more difficult problem is reconciling naturalism with the conservativism required to maintain a realist position.